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1. Forschungsrahmen 
Zahlungsmittel stellen eine der zentralen Erfindungen der Menschheit dar und begleiten 
diese seit Jahrtausenden. Frühe Geldformen sind zum Beispiel das Kaurigeld, bestehend 
aus den Muscheln der Kaurischnecke, Tierzähne, Nutztiere oder Getreide (Davies 2016). 
Typischerweise wird die erste Verwendung von Münzgeld im Reich der Lyder um ca. 
600-700 v. Christus vermutet und insbesondere mit dem Lyderkönig Krösus und dessen 
Vater Alyattes II in Verbindung gebracht (Schaps 2015). Münzenartige Gegenstände, die 
hinsichtlich ihres Gewichts und Reinheitsgrades genormt waren und somit allgemein als 
Transaktionsmittel anerkannt wurde, lassen sich aber bereits 2250 v. Christus in Kap-
padokien finden (Davies 2016). Die ersten Spuren von Papiergeld können ungefähr im 
China des 8. Jahrhunderts verortet werden (Rogoff 2016). Der Hauptzweck dieser histo-
rischen Zahlungsmittel ist noch heute gültig: Die Vereinfachung der Abwicklung von 
Handelsgeschäften. Er motiviert zum Teil auch gegenwärtige Trends wie Kryptowäh-
rungen, beispielhaft den Bitcoin (Dyhrberg 2016). Geld hat jedoch im Zeitverlauf weitere 
Funktionen hinzugewonnen, die wesentlich mit der zugrunde gelegten Geldtheorie ver-
knüpft sind.  
 
Bereits in der Antike existierten derartige Geldtheorien. Schumpeter (1965) betrachtet 
diese theoretischen Ursprünge in seiner „Geschichte der ökonomischen Analyse“ und 
stellt fest ,dass diese sich primär mit der Frage beschäftigen, ob der Geldwert von der 
Beschaffenheit des Zahlungsmittels, also beispielsweise von der Verwendung bestimm-
ter Edelmetalle bei der Münzprägung, abhängt. Dementsprechend vertrat Aristoteles 
(350 v. Chr.) laut Schumpeter eine metallistische Sichtweise, die den Wert einer Münze 
allein von ihrem Material abhängig macht, wohingegen Platon (380 v. Chr.) Münzen als 
Symbol ansieht, deren Wert unabhängig von dem ihnen zugrundeliegenden Material ist.  
 
Eine umfassendere Theorie des Geldes bzw. des Geldwertes stellt die Quantitätstheorie 
dar, welche bereits von Kopernikus (1517) und Bodin (1568) angedeutet und durch 
Hume (1752) ausformuliert wurde. Die zentrale Gleichung der Quantitätstheorie besagt, 
dass das Produkt aus Geldmenge und der Geschwindigkeit des Einkommenskreislaufs 
dem Produkt aus dem Preisniveau und dem Volkseinkommen entspricht. Hieraus folgt, 
dass eine Veränderung der Geldmenge die Preisniveaus verändert, wenn die Umlaufge-
schwindigkeit konstant ist. Wirtschaftsfaktoren wie die Unterbeschäftigung oder das 
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volkswirtschaftliche Einkommen sind von diesem Zusammenhang nicht betroffen. Somit 
wirkt sich die Geldpolitik langfristig nicht auf die Leistung einer Volkswirtschaft aus und 
verfolgt primär das Ziel, die Abwicklung von Transaktionen zu vereinfachen (Papade-
mos/Stark 2010). Wie auch im Walrasianischen allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodell 
(Walras 1874) ist Geld gem. der Quantitätstheorie kein eigenes Wirtschaftsgut sondern 
dient als Abrechnungsgut. 
 
Die weitere geldtheoretische Entwicklung wurde durch Keynes (1936) initiiert und über 
die Keynesianisch-neoklassische Synthese von Hicks (1937) mathematisch ausgedrückt. 
Sie sieht Geld als eigenständiges Gut an, das nicht nur zur Vereinfachung von Transakti-
onen existiert sondern auf Grundlage des Vorsichts- sowie des Spekulationsmotives 
nachgefragt wird. Das Vorsichtsmotiv besagt, dass Geld gehalten wird, um sich gegen 
unvorhergesehene Ereignisse zu schützen. Dem Spekulationsmotiv folgend wird Geld 
gehalten, um zukünftige Investitionsgelegenheiten auszunutzen. Die Geldhaltung nimmt 
also zu, wenn die Zukunft unsicherer ist und keine lohnenden Investitionsmöglichkeiten 
zur Verfügung stehen, da diese teuer sind bzw. geringe Renditen erwirtschaften. Hier ist 
ersichtlich, dass die Umlaufgeschwindigkeit des Geldes nicht mehr als konstant angese-
hen wird. Unter Berücksichtigung der genannten Motive kann also ein Fall eintreten, in 
dem eine Erhöhung der Geldmenge die nominale Güternachfrage nicht steigert. Zusätzli-
che Geldmitteln werden also gehortet und nicht ausgegeben. In dieser Situation soll der 
Staat eingreifen und selber Güter nachfragen, um die Unterbeschäftigung einzudämmen 
und die Investition des gehaltenen Geldes anzuregen. 
 
Keynes beschreibt folglich eine Situation, in der die Geldmenge und die Geldnachfrage 
die Produktion, die Beschäftigungsquote sowie das Wirtschaftswachstum beeinflussen, 
sofern das Preisniveau konstant ist. Somit besteht eine Verbindung zwischen Geldpolitik 
und der realen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Diese Sichtweise wird vom Monetarismus, 
beispielsweise nach Phelps (1968) und Friedman (1968), abgelehnt. Dieser erachtet die 
Arbeitslosenquote als natürlich durch den Arbeitsmarkt gegeben und somit unabhängig 
von der Geldpolitik. Diese Annahme beruht auf der empirischen Beobachtung, dass die 
Umlaufgeschwindigkeit des Geldes im Rahmen der Weltwirtschaftskrise ab 1929 nicht 
gesunken sei (Friedman/Schwartz 1963). 
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Die dargestellte Auswahl geldpolitischer Theorien versucht die Geldmenge bzw. ihre 
Wirkung auf volkswirtschaftlicher Ebene zu erklären. Keynes (1936) beleuchtet dabei 
einige Motive, warum Akteure Geld halten. Die nachfolgende mikroökonomische und 
betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung vertieft diese Perspektive und untersucht vor allem 
die Fragen, warum ein einzelnes Unternehmen einen bestimmten Zahlungsmittelbe-
stand (Cash Holdings) hält und wie sich dieser Bestand auf den Marktwert des Unter-
nehmens auswirkt. Die zweite Frage betrifft den sogenannten Marktwert der Cash Hol-
dings. Dieser bezeichnet die Veränderung in der Marktkapitalisierung eines Unterneh-
mens als Reaktion auf die Aufnahme einer zusätzlichen Zahlungsmitteleinheit (Pinko-
witz et al. 2006). 
 
Die Neoklassische Theorie liefert auf die Frage nach dem Marktwert des Zahlungsmit-
telbestandes eine klare Antwort: Unter der Annahme eines vollkommenen Kapitalmark-
tes, auf dem Soll- und Habenzins identisch sind, Kredite in unbegrenztem Volumen auf-
genommen werden können, keine Transaktionskosten, beispielsweise in Form von 
Steuern, Informationsasymmetrien oder Brokergebühren, vorliegen sowie unter der 
Prämisse des rationalen Verhaltens und homogener Zukunftserwartungen von Investo-
ren, hat Unternehmensfinanzierung keinen Einfluss auf den Marktwert eines Unterneh-
mens (Modigliani/Miller 1958). Dies bedeutet wiederum, dass der Marktwert einer zu-
sätzlich gehaltenen Zahlungsmitteleinheit seinem nominellen Wert entspricht und der 
Unternehmenswert folglich genau um 1 steigt.  
 
Die Neue Institutionenökonomie beschäftigt sich mit den einschränkenden Annahmen 
der Neoklassik und setzt diese stückweise außer Kraft. Hieraus resultiert beispielhaft 
die Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie gem. Berle/Means (1932) und Jensen/Meckling (1976), 
welche verschiedene Arten von Informationsasymmetrien berücksichtigt, oder die 
Transaktionskostentheorie nach Coase (1937), die Kosten der Benutzung von Märkten 
einbezieht. Die neuen institutionenökonomischen Theorien zeigen Situationen, in denen 
die Finanzierung von Unternehmen Auswirkungen auf deren Wert hat und auch der 
Marktwert einer Zahlungsmitteleinheit nicht mehr dem nominellen Wert entspricht. In 
der Folge hat die theoretische und empirische Forschung eine Vielzahl von Motiven und 
Determinanten identifiziert, die einzelne Gründe benennen, warum sich Unternehmen 
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für die Hortung von Zahlungsmitteln entscheiden und wie dieser Umstand mit dem 
Marktwert der betroffenen Unternehmen zusammenhängt. 
 
Diese Arbeit besteht aus drei Beiträgen, die sich damit beschäftigen, warum Unterneh-
men einen bestimmten Bestand an Zahlungsmitteln halten und wie sich dieser Zah-
lungsmittelbestand auf den Wert der betroffenen Unternehmen auswirkt. Der erste Bei-
trag A State-of-the-art Review of Corporate Cash Holding Research stellt einen Über-
sichtsaufsatz dar, der den Stand der Cash Holding-Forschung diskutiert. Der Aufsatz sys-
tematisiert zunächst die heterogenen Theorien, die als Grundlage der empirischen For-
schung dienen, und leitet auf dieser Basis theoretische Determinanten des Zahlungsmit-
telbestandes und seiner Marktwertwirkung ab. Im Anschluss werden die empirischen 
Verfahren zur Schätzung der theoretisch identifizierten Determinanten und ihres Zu-
sammenhangs mit Cash Holdings sowie mit dem Marktwert der Cash Holdings kritisch 
vorgestellt. Auf dieser Grundlage wird nachfolgend der existierende empirische Befund 
zu den Auswirkungen der vorgestellten Determinanten auf den Zahlungsmittelbestand 
sowie zum Einfluss des Zahlungsmittelbestandes auf den Unternehmenswert diskutiert. 
Als Synthese dieses theoretischen, methodischen und empirischen Überblicks werden 
abschließend potentielle Wege für die zukünftige Forschung abgeleitet. Der Aufsatz 
wurde zur Veröffentlichung im Journal of Business Economics angenommen. 
 
Der zweite Beitrag Regional Differences in the Determinants of Cash Holdings greift einen 
der im ersten Aufsatz identifizierten zukünftigen Forschungswege auf. Er untersucht, ob 
sich die Auswirkungen firmenspezifischer Eigenschaften auf den Zahlungsmittelbestand 
in Abhängigkeit von geographischen Regionen ändert. Die Untersuchung wurde im Jahr 
2016 beim Journal of Banking & Finance eingereicht, und eine Reject & Resubmit Ent-
scheidung ist ergangen. Der in dieser Dissertation enthaltene Artikel stellt die überarbei-
tete und wiedereingereichte Fassung dar. Weiterhin wurde die Untersuchung auf den 
Konferenzen 2016 Financial Management Association European Conference, Helsinki; 
European Accounting Association Annual Congress 2016, Maastricht; MAER-Net 2016 Col-
loquium, Conway sowie „Merton H. Miller“ EFM Doctoral Seminar im Rahmen des Euro-
pean Financial Management Association 2016 Annual Meetings, Basel (diskutiert durch 
Prof. Ettore Croci, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore; Prof. Halit Gonenc, University of 
Groningen; Prof. Guanming He, University of Warwick; Prof. Gayané Hovakimian, Ford-
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ham University und Prof. Anup Srivastava, Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College ) 
sowie Doktorandenseminaren an der Universität zu Köln, der Universität Innsbruck und 
der Universität Neuchâtel vorgestellt. 
 
Der dritte Beitrag How to Induce Persistent, Value-Increasing, Cash Holding Policies: The 
Effect of Long-Term Incentives folgt einem weiteren im Rahmen des ersten Aufsatzes 
aufgezeigten Forschungsweg. Die Studie untersucht, ob langfristig orientierte Manage-
mentvergütung ein geeignetes Instrument ist, um das Management dazu zu bewegen, 
langfristig ausgerichtete Strategien zur Steuerung des Zahlungsmittelbestandes zu ver-
folgen. Die Untersuchung wurde auf den Konferenzen European Accounting Association 
Annual Congress 2017, Valencia; 14th Workshop on Corporate Governance 2017 des Eu-
ropean Institute of Advanced Studies in Management, Brüssel und 53rd Annual Eastern 
Finance Association Meeting 2017, Jacksonville (diskutiert durch Prof. Yoon Choi, Univer-
sity of Central Florida) sowie einem Doktorandenseminar an der Universität Innsbruck 
vorgestellt. Weiterhin wurde der Aufsatz im Rahmen des 14th Workshop on Corporate 
Governance 2017 auf die Liste der Best Papers aufgenommen. 
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2. A State-of-the-art Review of Corporate Cash Holding Research 
2.1 Forschungsfrage 
Die empirische Erforschung des Zahlungsmittelbestandes, den Unternehmen halten, 
sowie dessen Auswirkung auf den Marktwert von Unternehmen erfreut sich seit den 
grundlegenden Untersuchungen von Opler et al. (1999) sowie Harford (1999) großer 
Beliebtheit. Dieser Forschungstrend ist insbesondere durch die weltweite Beobachtung 
steigender Cash Holdings motiviert. Die Steigerung des Zahlungsmittelbestandes wurde 
sowohl von der Forschung als auch den Medien und teilweise der Politik wahrgenom-
men.1 Folglich existiert eine Vielzahl von Perspektiven und Meinungen bezüglich der 
Ursachen und Wirkungen gehaltener Zahlungsmittel.  
 
Vor diesem Hintergrund nimmt der erste Beitrag A State-of-the-Art Review of Corporate 
Cash Holding Research in Form eines Übersichtsaufsatzes eine Systematisierung und 
Würdigung der umfangreichen Cash Holding-Forschung vor. Beachtung finden Studien, 
die sich mit zwei zentralen Fragen beschäftigen: Was bestimmt den Zahlungsmittelbe-
stand im Unternehmen? Wie wirkt sich dieser Zahlungsmittelbestand auf den Unter-
nehmenswert aus? Der Aufsatz geht in drei Schritten vor. Zunächst werden die ver-
schiedenartigen Theorien, auf denen die Cash Holding-Forschung aufbaut, strukturiert 
vorgestellt. Sie dienen als Grundlage, um die theoretischen Determinanten des Zah-
lungsmittelbestandes sowie seinen Effekt auf den Marktwert eines Unternehmens zu 
identifizieren. Im zweiten Schritt werden die gängigsten empirischen Methoden zur Un-
tersuchung der Determinanten der Zahlungsmittelhaltung sowie ihrer Marktwertwir-
kung diskutiert. Ebenso werden die am häufigsten verwendeten empirischen Schätz-
möglichkeiten der zuvor vorgestellten theoretischen Determinanten dargestellt. Im drit-
ten Schritt wird der bisherige empirische Befund zum Einfluss der individuellen Deter-
minanten auf die Cash Holdings sowie zum Marktwert von Cash Holdings aufgearbeitet. 
Dies ermöglicht schließlich die Ableitung  zukünftiger Forschungsmöglichkeiten, die aus 
der existierenden Forschung resultieren. 
 
                                                        
1 Vgl. Don Reisinger, “Apple’s Cash Coffers to Swell to $250 Billon”, Fortune, May 1, 2017; Tim Worstall, 
“If Microsoft has $92 Billion in Cash Then Why Has It Just Borrowed $10.75 Billion?”, Forbes, February 
10, 2015. 
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2.2 Ergebnisse und Forschungsbeitrag 
Aus dem dreiteiligen Vorgehen des Aufsatzes resultieren drei zentrale Ergebnisse. Zu-
nächst teilt sich das abgeleitete theoretische Rahmenwerk der Cash Holding-Forschung 
in zwei Kategorien auf. Dies sind zum einen Kapitalstrukturtheorien und zum anderen 
Theorien, die sich auf den Prinzipal-Agenten-Konflikt fokussieren. Diese beiden Katego-
rien umfassen verschiedene untergeordnete Theorien. Im Rahmen der Kapitalstruktur-
theorien sind die Trade-off Theorie und die Pecking-order Theorie zu nennen. Die erste 
unterstellt, dass der Zahlungsmittelbestand aus einer Abwägung aller unmittelbaren 
Vor- und Nachteile der Haltung von Zahlungsmitteln resultiert und dass ein optimaler 
Zahlungsmittelbestand existiert. Die zweite Theorie besagt, dass die Finanzierung un-
ternehmerischer Projekte einer strengen Hierarchie folgt. So werden Projekte zunächst 
durch interne Mittel finanziert. Fremdkapital wird aufgenommen, sobald die internen 
Mittel erschöpft sind. Die Aufnahme neuen Eigenkapitals kommt erst in Frage, wenn 
eine weitere Fremdkapitalaufnahme unmöglich ist. Die Eigenkapitalaufnahme stellt so-
mit ein negatives Signal dar, da sie eine nicht vorteilhafte Projektbewertung durch 
Fremdkapitalgeber und eine potentielle Überbewertung der Eigenkapitalanteile impli-
ziert. Dementsprechend hängt der Zahlungsmittelbestand von den zur Verfügung ste-
henden Möglichkeiten der Finanzierung und den zu finanzierenden Projekten ab.  
 
Die Kategorie der Theorien, die sich auf den Prinzipal-Agenten-Konflikt konzentrieren, 
umfasst fünf untergeordnete Theorien. Die erste dieser Theorien ist die Flexibility-
Hypothese gem. Jensen (1986). Sie besagt, dass Manager zukünftige finanzielle Flexibili-
tät und Unabhängigkeit von externer Kontrolle anstreben und somit die Hortung von 
Zahlungsmitteln der sofortigen Investition dieses Zahlungsmittelbestandes vorziehen. 
Die zweite Theorie, die Spending-Hypothese oder Free-Cashflow-Hypothese von Jen-
sen/Meckling (1976), betrachtet einen schwach kontrollierten Manager, der in der Folge 
dazu neigt, die vorhanden Zahlungsmittel schnell zu reinvestieren, dabei aber auch von 
Eigeninteresse getrieben ist und wertvernichtende Projekte initiiert. Die dritte Theorie 
stellt das Motiv der Verteidigung gegen feindliche Übernahmen nach Faleye (2004) dar 
und sieht die Hortung von Zahlungsmitteln als einen Verteidigungsmechanismus 
schwach kontrollierter Manager an. Die ineffiziente Unternehmensführung dieser Ma-
nager lockt feindliche Übernahmeangebote an. Die betroffenen Manager antizipieren 
solche Angebote und bauen einen Bestand an Zahlungsmitteln auf. Tritt ein feindlicher 
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Übernahmeversuch tatsächlich ein, können die gehaltenen Zahlungsmittel dazu ver-
wendet werden Aktien zurückzukaufen, um so die angestrebte Übernahme zu verhin-
dern. In der Shareholder Power-Hypothese, der vierten der untergeordneten Theorien, 
drücken Harford et al. (2008) aus, dass Anteilseigner unter bestimmten Umständen ei-
nen hohen Cashbestand befürworten. Dies sei der Fall, wenn die Aktionäre derart ge-
schützt sind, dass sie einen Missbrauch des Zahlungsmittelbestandes nicht befürchten 
müssen. Folglich unterstützen sie die Vermeidung hoher Finanzierungskosten durch die 
Hortung interner Mittel. Als fünfte Theorie wird die Costly Contracting-Theorie nach 
Liu/Mauer (2011) betrachtet. Sie fokussiert sich auf junge und wachstumsstarke Unter-
nehmen. Diese erhalten Fremdkapital oft nur unter der Auflage, bestimmte Vertrags-
klauseln (debt covenants) zu erfüllen. Diese Klauseln sehen häufig die Haltung eines be-
stimmten Mindestbestandes an Zahlungsmitteln vor, was Cash Holdings bei risikorei-
chen Unternehmen steigen lässt. 
 
Auf Grundlage dieses Theorienüberblickes lassen sich verschiedene Determinanten ab-
leiten, die den Zahlungsmittelbestand treiben, dies sind: 
 die Unternehmensgröße, 
 Investitions- und Wachstumsmöglichkeiten, 
 die Verschuldung, 
 die Profitabilität,  
 schnell zu liquidierende Vermögenswerte, die Zahlungsmittel ersetzen können, 
 Informationsasymmetrien, 
 die Qualität der Corporate Governance, 
 Finanzierungsprobleme bzw. Insolvenzgefahr, 
 Investitionsaktivitäten und  
 Dividenden.  
 
Der erste Forschungsbeitrag dieser Arbeit liegt also zum einen in der systematischen 
Aufarbeitung der theoretischen Grundlagen der Cash Holding-Forschung. Zum anderen 
ermöglicht diese Aufarbeitung eine Unterscheidung der identifizierten Theorien hin-
sichtlich des von ihnen erwarteten theoretischen Einflusses der aufgeführten Determi-
nanten auf die Cash Holdings bzw. deren Marktwertwirkung. Die Kapitalstrukturtheo-
rien unterscheiden sich untereinander durch den erwarteten Zusammenhang der Un-
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ternehmensprofitabilität sowie schnell liquidierbarer Vermögenswerte mit dem Zah-
lungsmittelbestand und seiner Marktwertwirkung. Die Theorien, die aus Überlegungen 
zum Prinzipal-Agenten-Konflikt resultieren, weisen größere Unterschiede auf. Insbe-
sondere die Shareholder Power-Hypothese erwartet einen Zusammenhang zwischen 
den Determinanten und den Cash Holdings, der im Gegensatz zu den sonstigen Theorien 
dieser Kategorie steht. 
 
Als zweiter Forschungsbeitrag ermöglicht die Aufarbeitung des empirischen Befundes 
zum Einfluss der theoretischen Determinanten die Überprüfung der zuvor abgeleiteten 
theoretischen Erwartungen und liefert Hinweise über die Relevanz der einzelnen Theo-
rien. Die Mehrheit der betrachteten Studien berichtet, dass der Zahlungsmittelbestand 
steigt, wenn Wachstumsmöglichkeiten, Profitabilität und Finanzierungsschwierigkeiten 
bzw. die Insolvenzgefahr zunehmen. Hingegen sinkt der Zahlungsmittelbestand, wenn 
die Unternehmensgröße, die Verschuldung, der Umfang schnell zu liquidierender Ver-
mögenswerte, Investitionsaktivitäten, Dividenden und die Qualität der Corporate 
Governance steigen. Die Auswirkung der Corporate Governance kehrt sich um, wie von 
der Shareholder Power-Hypothese erwartet, wenn Unternehmen sich in einem landes-
spezifischen Umfeld von schwachen Informationsasymmetrien oder hohem Investoren-
schutz befinden. Folglich steigt in einem solchen Umfeld der Zahlungsmittelbestand, 
wenn die Qualität der Corporate Governance steigt. Der Marktwert des Zahlungsmittel-
bestandes hängt hauptsächlich von zwei zentralen Determinanten ab: Der Qualität der 
Corporate Governance sowie Finanzierungsschwierigkeiten bzw. Insolvenzgefahr. Ge-
haltene Zahlungsmittel werden folglich als wertvoller erachtet, wenn die Qualität der 
Corporate Governance hoch ist oder ein Unternehmen Schwierigkeiten hat, sich extern 
zu finanzieren. 
 
Den dritten Forschungsbeitrag bilden die Implikationen für zukünftige Untersuchungen, 
die sich aus dem Überblick existierender empirischer Ergebnisse gewinnen lassen. Zu-
nächst fällt auf, dass die einzelnen Theorien zur Zahlungsmittelhaltung zwar umfassend 
untersucht wurden, jedoch ist wenig über ihr Zusammenwirken bekannt. Folglich er-
scheint es interessant zu untersuchen, in welchen Situationen einzelne Theorien an Be-
deutung gewinnen und von welchen Determinanten die Bedeutung bzw. Abwägung der 
verschiedenen Theorien abhängt. Lebenszyklusmodelle stellen hierbei ein mögliches 
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Instrument dar, das es erlaubt, den Zahlungsmittelbestand und seine Determinanten 
über verschiedene unternehmerische Lebensphasen zu analysieren. Weiterhin fällt auf, 
dass bisher sowohl der Einfluss von Unternehmenseigenschaften als auch die Auswir-
kung von länder- bzw. regionenspezifischen Eigenschaften auf den Zahlungsmittelbe-
stand und dessen Marktwertwirkung gesondert untersucht werden. Es ist allerdings 
unklar, ob sich diese beiden Arten von Determinanten in ihrem Effekt auf die Zahlungs-
mittel gegenseitig beeinflussen und folglich ein Interaktionseffekt vorliegt. Dies würde 
bedeuten, dass sich der Zusammenhang von Unternehmenseigenschaften und dem Zah-
lungsmittelbstand in Abhängigkeit von länderspezifischen Eigenschaften ändert. Eine 
solche Analyse würde ein genaueres Verständnis davon ermöglichen, wie länderspezifi-
sche oder regionale Charakteristika auf die Cash Holdings einwirken.  
 
Die bisherige Forschung identifiziert neben der Qualität der Corporate Governance und 
Finanzierungsschwierigkeiten einen weiteren Treiber des Marktwerts der Zahlungsmit-
tel: Die Persistenz von Cash Management Strategien. Mikkelson/Partch (2003), 
Martínez-Sola et al. (2013) und Oler/Picconi (2014) zeigen, dass der Marktwert von 
Zahlungsmitteln steigt, wenn er vorhersehbarer wird und das Management der Zah-
lungsmittel die Investoren nicht überrascht. In diesem Kontext stellt die Frage, wie ein 
derartiges vorhersehbares bzw. persistentes Zahlungsmittelmanagement erreicht wer-
den kann, eine weitere Implikation für die zukünftige Forschung dar. Sobald Instrumen-
te zur Anreizung solcher Strategien gefunden werden, stellt die Persistenz des Zah-
lungsmittelmanagements ein handhabbares Instrument zur Steigerung des Marktwertes 
der Zahlungsmittel dar. Schließlich zeigen Breuer et al. (2016), dass Wachstumsmög-
lichkeiten, gemessen durch Forschungs- und Entwicklungsaufwendungen (F&E), als De-
terminanten des Zahlungsmittelbestandes von Messproblemen betroffen sind. Es ist da-
bei unklar, ob F&E-Aufwendungen lediglich als Schätzer für Wachstumsmöglichkeiten 
dienen oder auch Informationsasymmetrien oder sogar das Ausmaß von Ambiguitätsa-
versionen schätzen. Letzteres bezeichnet die Scheu von Investoren vor unsicheren In-
vestitionen.  
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3. Regional Differences in the Determinants of Cash Holdings 
3.1 Forschungsfrage und Untersuchungsdesign 
Der Aufsatz Regional Differences in the Determinants of Cash Holdings greift die Frage 
nach möglichen Interaktionseffekten zwischen unternehmens- und regionenspezifi-
schen Determinanten des Zahlungsmittelbestandes auf, die im Rahmen des ersten Bei-
trags identifiziert wurde. Wie bereits erwähnt, untersucht die bisherige empirische For-
schung die isolierten Effekte von Unternehmenseigenschaften sowie von regionalen 
bzw. Ländereigenschaften auf den Zahlungsmittelbestand und dessen Marktwertwir-
kung. Interaktionseffekte zwischen diesen beiden Kategorien von Determinanten wer-
den nicht beachtet; dabei liefern sie potentiell Erklärungen dafür, wie Ländereigenschaf-
ten den Zahlungsmittelbestand beeinflussen können.  
 
Denkt man beispielhaft an den Investorenschutz auf Landesebene, so dokumentiert die 
Forschung in erster Linie eine negative Assoziation dieser Determinante mit dem Zah-
lungsmittelbestand. Unternehmen halten also weniger Zahlungsmittel, wenn sie sich in 
einem Land befinden, das einen stark ausgeprägten Investorenschutz aufweist. Diese 
Beobachtung wird durch die Vernachlässigung von Interaktionseffekten allein auf einen 
direkten Zusammenhang des länderspezifischen Investorenschutzes mit den Cash Hol-
dings zurückgeführt. Das würde bedeuten, dass Manager den Zahlungsmittelbestand 
allein deshalb nicht erhöhen, weil sie wissen, dass sie ihn nicht zu ihrem eigenen Vorteil 
und gleichzeitig zum Nachteil der Investoren verwenden können. Die Untersuchung von 
Interaktionseffekten könnte in diesem Beispiel ein differenziertes Verständnis der 
Wirkweise des landesspezifischen Investorenschutzes ermöglichen. Es könnte also ana-
lysiert werden, ob Unternehmen, die in Ländern mit starkem Investorenschutz operie-
ren, tatsächlich unmittelbar ihren Bestand an Zahlungsmitteln senken, oder ob das Ab-
sinken des Zahlungsmittelbestandes nur die Konsequenz von anderen strategischen 
Entscheidungen ist, die vom landesspezifischen Investorenschutz motiviert werden. Es 
wäre also möglich die direkten Auswirkungen des Investorenschutzes als länderspezifi-
sche Determinante des Zahlungsmittelbestands vom interagierten Einfluss des landes-
spezifischen Investorenschutzes zu unterscheiden. Dieser Interaktionseffekt entsteht 
aus dem Zusammenwirken des landesspezifischen Investorenschutzes mit verschiede-
nen unternehmensspezifischen Eigenschaften.  
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Solche Interaktionseffekte sind für zahlreiche Kombinationen aus verschiedenen landes- 
und unternehmensspezifischen Determinanten des Zahlungsmittelbestandes denkbar. 
Beispielsweise könnten Unternehmen mit gut geschützten Investoren dazu neigen stär-
ker in die Forschung und Entwicklung zu investieren; sie könnten die Aufnahme von 
Fremdkapital stärker gegenüber der Hortung von Zahlungsmitteln abzuwägen oder die 
gehorteten Zahlungsmittel häufiger auszuschütten. In diesen Fällen würde der Zah-
lungsmittelbestand sich nicht ausschließlich unmittelbar als Reaktion auf eine bestimm-
te Ausprägung des landesspezifischen Investorenschutzes verändern sondern ebenfalls, 
weil dieser Investorenschutz auf zahlreiche unternehmensindividuelle Entscheidungen 
einwirkt, die wiederum Einfluss auf den Zahlungsmittelbestand haben. Losgelöst von 
dem Beispiel des landesspezifischen Investorenschutzes ermöglicht die Betrachtung von 
Interaktionseffekten, zu verstehen, welche Unternehmensentscheidungen durch be-
stimmte Ländereigenschaften beeinflusst werden. Eines der Hauptziele dieses Aufsatzes 
ist es zu zeigen, dass zahlreiche Interaktionseffekte zwischen verschiedenen firmenspe-
zifischen Determinanten und regionalen Eigenschaften vorliegen. Diese Erkenntnis soll 
die nachfolgende Forschung motivieren eine genauere Untersuchung einzelner Interak-
tionseffekte vorzunehmen. 
 
Weiterhin untersucht der Aufsatz, ob Entscheidungen zur empirischen Ausgestaltung 
von Untersuchungen Auswirkungen auf deren Ergebnisse bezüglich der Determinanten 
der Cash Holdings haben. Konkret stellt sich die Frage, ob die Anwendung von Verfah-
ren, die versuchen, einen kausalen Zusammenhang zwischen den Determinanten und 
dem Zahlungsmittelbestand zu etablieren, zu anderen Resultaten führen als Standard-
OLS-Modelle. Zudem soll untersucht werden, ob die Definition der Cash Holding-
Variablen, die Wichtigkeit einer Determinante für die jeweilige Untersuchung oder die 
Quelle der zugrundeliegenden Daten entscheidend für die abgeleiteten Resultate sind. 
Die Beantwortung dieser Fragen identifiziert Bereiche innerhalb der empirischen Mo-
dellierung, die besonders relevant sind für die jeweiligen Untersuchungsergebnisse und 
von Forschern mit besonderer Sorgfalt behandelt werden sollten. 
 
Der Beitrag verfolgt demgemäß zwei Ziele: Zum einen ist zu untersuchen, ob es Interak-
tionseffekte zwischen verschiedenen unternehmensspezifischen und regionenspezifi-
schen Determinanten des Zahlungsmittelbestandes gibt. Zum anderen sind die Einflüsse 
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empirischer Modellierungsentscheidungen auf die Ergebnisse der primären Forschung 
herauszustellen. Der Fokus der Studie liegt somit nicht auf der Ergründung eines einzel-
nen, bestenfalls kausalen, Interaktionseffekts. Vielmehr soll allgemein das Vorliegen 
zahlreicher Interaktionen zwischen unternehmens- und regionenspezifischen Determi-
nanten des Zahlungsmittelbestandes aufgezeigt werden. Dieser Befund soll die For-
schung motivieren individuelle Interaktionseffekte tiefer zu untersuchen und somit 
letztlich das Verständnis der Effekte regionaler Charakteristika zu verbessern. Dieses 
Forschungsziel setzt ein möglichst großes Sample an Unternehmensdaten, Untersu-
chungsjahren und erklärenden Determinanten voraus. Das zweite Forschungsziel, die 
Untersuchung der Wirkung von Modellierungsentscheidungen, legt die Verwendung 
bereits existierender Resultate, die möglichst heterogene Methoden verwenden, nahe. 
Aus der Kombination dieser Untersuchungsanforderungen lässt sich die Meta-
Regressionsanalyse (MRA) gem. Stanley/Doucouliagos (2012), Stanley/Jarrell (1989) 
und Feld/Heckemeyer (2011) als geeignete Untersuchungsmethode identifizieren. 
 
Die MRA ist vor allem ein Instrument, um existierende Forschung zusammenzufassen 
und zu analysieren. Das bedeutet, man erhebt den Zusammenhang zwischen einer erklä-
renden und einer abhängigen Variablen (effect size) aus einer Stichprobe existierender 
Untersuchungen. Ein solcher Zusammenhang ist beispielsweise vorgegeben durch den 
Regressionskoeffizienten oder t-Wert einer erklärenden Variablen. Eine MRA ist nun in 
der Lage festzustellen, welcher Zusammenhang in der Stichprobe von Untersuchungen 
insgesamt gefunden wird und inwiefern die individuellen Eigenschaften der zugrunde-
liegenden primären Untersuchungen diesen Zusammenhang beeinflussen. Diese Eigen-
schaften können viele denkbare Dimensionen der Primärstudien abdecken, zum Bei-
spiel, ob börsennotierte oder private Unternehmen analysiert werden, das durchschnitt-
liche Untersuchungsjahr oder das Alter der betrachteten Unternehmen. Weiterhin kön-
nen auch die Auswirkungen der verwendeten ökonometrischen Methoden betrachtet 
werden. Die MRA erfüllt folglich alle Anforderungen, um die gesetzten Untersuchungs-
ziele zu analysieren. Sie untersucht ein Sample aus zahlreichen existierenden Resultaten 
der vorausgegangenen Forschung, das etliche Regionen, Unternehmenstypen, und Jahre 
abdeckt sowie unter Verwendung verschiedener primärer Modelle erzeugt wurde. Somit 
lassen sich sowohl verschiedenste Interaktionseffekte zwischen zahlreichen unterneh-
mensspezifischen Determinanten und regionalen Eigenschaften untersuchen als auch 
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der Einfluss der Ausgestaltung der primären empirischen Modelle auf die effect sizes der 
Primärforschung betrachten. 
 
Zur Durchführung der Analyse wird eine Stichprobe aus den Ergebnissen von 45 Pri-
märstudien erhoben. Dies führt zu insgesamt 3439 effect sizes, die als abhängige Variab-
len in der MRA dienen. Als effect size wird die Elastizität des Zahlungsmittelbestandes 
gegenüber einer bestimmten unternehmensspezifischen Eigenschaft verwendet. Sie be-
sagt, um welche Prozentzahl sich die Hortung von Zahlungsmitteln ändert, wenn sich 
eine Unternehmenseigenschaft um 1% ändert. Diese Elastizität kann aus den Primärstu-
dien berechnet werden, wenn eine Unternehmenseigenschaft als erklärende Variable 
des Zahlungsmittelbestands verwendet wird und somit ihr Regressionskoeffizient be-
kannt ist. Weiterhin muss der durchschnittliche Zahlungsmittelbestand sowie die durch-
schnittliche Ausprägung der betrachteten Unternehmenseigenschaft in der Primärstudie 
dokumentiert werden.  
 
Insgesamt werden zehn verschiedene Elastizitäten untersucht. Diese Elastizitäten resul-
tieren aus den zehn am häufigsten verwendeten unternehmensspezifischen empirischen 
Determinanten des Zahlungsmittelbestands: Die Unternehmensgröße definiert als Bi-
lanzsumme, Investitionstätigkeiten definiert als Aufwendungen für Investition ins Anla-
gevermögen (Capx) zuzüglich Akquisitionsaufwendungen, Wachstumsmöglichkeiten 
geschätzt durch das Markt-/Buchwert-Verhältnis, F&E-Aufwendungen, die Verfügbar-
keit schnell zu liquidierender Vermögenswerte gemessen durch das Net Working Capi-
tal, die Unternehmensverschuldung, die Unternehmensprofitabilität gemessen durch 
Cashflows, Dividenden, Finanzierungsschwierigkeiten bzw. Insolvenzgefahr und 
schließlich die Qualität der Corporate Governance. Somit müssen in jedem Untersu-
chungsschritt jeweils zehn Modelle geschätzt werden.  
 
Das weitere Vorgehen des Beitrages ist in drei Schritte unterteilt. Erstens wird eine uni-
variate MRA vorgenommen. Diese erklärt die zehn betrachteten Elastizitäten jeweils 
durch den Standardfehler des Regressionskoeffizienten, der für die Berechnung der be-
treffenden abhängigen Elastizität verwendet wurde. Dieses Vorgehen wird gem. Stan-
ley/Doucouliagos (2014) auch als FAT-PET MRA bezeichnet. Es dient dazu, gegen die 
sogenannte Publikationsverzerrung zu kontrollieren. Die Publikationsverzerrung be-
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sagt, dass Forscher einen Anreiz haben, entweder vornehmlich Ergebnisse zu dokumen-
tieren, die ihren Erwartungen bzw. den Ansichten des jeweiligen Forschungszweiges 
entsprechen, oder ihre Modelle so lange zu modifizieren, bis die gewünschten Ergebnis-
se erzielt werden. Unter der Annahme, dass ein wahrer bzw. korrekter Wert für die As-
soziation zwischen einer Determinanten und dem Zahlungsmittelbestand existiert, vari-
ieren alle Schätzungen dieses Zusammenhangs um die präziseste Schätzung. Je unge-
nauer eine Schätzung ist, desto stärker weicht sie von dem wahren Wert und seiner prä-
zisesten Schätzung ab. Die Richtung der Abweichung sollte allerdings zufällig sein. Folg-
lich soll die Gesamtheit der Beobachtungen gleichmäßig um die präziseste Schätzung 
verteilt sein. Die Präzision einer Schätzung kann über ihren Standardfehler beurteilt 
werden, somit sollte der Standardfehler als erklärende Variable im FAT-PET-Modell in 
keinen Zusammenhang mit der Elastizität als abhängige Variable stehen. Hingegen ist es 
ein Hinweis für Publikationsverzerrung, wenn der Standardfehler die abhängige Elasti-
zität in eine bestimmte Richtung beeinflusst. Dies bedeutet, dass unpräzise Ergebnisse 
nicht gleichmäßig verteilt sind, sondern auf einen bestimmten Wert zulaufen. Konkret 
heißt dies, dass Forscher, die unpräzise Ergebnisse erzielen, dazu neigen, entweder nur 
solche Ergebnisse zu berichten, die ihren Erwartungen entsprechen, oder die zugrund-
liegenden Modelle bis zur Erzielung der gewünschten Ergebnisse zu verändern. Der Ko-
effizient des Standardfehlers im FAT-PET MRA stellt die Auswirkung der Publikations-
verzerrung dar, den sogenannten FAT-Test, wohingegen die Konstante die Ausprägung 
der abhängigen Elastizität in Abwesenheit der Publikationsverzerrung darstellt, den 
sogenannten PET-Test. Die FAT-PET MRA wird im ersten Schritt dieses Beitrags ver-
wendet, um für die vorliegende Stichprobe an primären Untersuchungen den Einfluss 
der Publikationsverzerrung auf jede der zehn Elastizitäten zu bestimmen (FAT-Test) 
und die durchschnittliche Ausprägung dieser Elastizitäten in Abwesenheit von Publika-
tionsverzerrung abzuschätzen (PET-Test), die sogenannte consensus association. 
 
Im zweiten Schritt wird eine multivariate MRA durchgeführt. Diese ergänzt die voraus-
gegangene univariate MRA um zahlreiche Variablen, welche die Eigenschaften der zu-
grundeliegenden Primärstudien modellieren. Von besonderer Bedeutung sind in diesem 
Kontext Dummy-Variablen für die geographischen Regionen, aus denen die beobachte-
ten Elastizitäten stammen, sowie Dummies für die in den Primäruntersuchungen vorge-
nommenen empirischen Modellierungsentscheidungen. Konkret werden Dummy-
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Variablen eingefügt, um Studien, die ausschließlich US-amerikanische Firmen betrach-
ten, von rein europäischen Studien, rein asiatischen Studien sowie Studien mit interna-
tional gemischten Stichproben zu unterscheiden. Als dritter Schritt wird die multivariate 
MRA um makroökonomische Eigenschaften der untersuchten Länder ergänzt. Dies wird 
unternommen, um die Ursachen der untersuchten Interaktionseffekte zu ergründen. 
Sämtliche Daten der empirischen Untersuchung wurden händisch aus der Stichprobe an 
Studien erhoben. 
 
3.2 Ergebnisse und Forschungsbeitrag 
Die beiden zentralen Beiträge des Aufsatzes bestehen zum einen darin aufzuzeigen, dass 
die Auswirkung der am häufigsten verwendeten unternehmensspezifischen Cash Hol-
ding-Determinanten in Abhängigkeit von der geographischen Region, in der sich ein Un-
ternehmen befindet, variiert. Zum anderen identifiziert der Aufsatz die einflussreichsten 
empirischen Modellierungsentscheidungen. Dies bedeutet, dass aufgezeigt wird, welche 
Wahlmöglichkeiten im Rahmen der empirischen Ausgestaltung einer Untersuchung sich 
am stärksten auf die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung auswirken. 
 
Im ersten Schritt der Untersuchung zeigen die univariaten MRA, dass der Zahlungsmit-
telbestand in der vorliegenden Stichprobe von Studien zunimmt, wenn das Markt-
/Buchwertverhältnis, F&E-Aufwendungen, Finanzierungsschwierigkeiten bzw. die In-
solvenzgefahr oder die Qualität der Corporate Governance zunehmen. Hingegen nehmen 
Cash Holdings ab, wenn die Bilanzsumme, Investitionsaktivitäten, das Net Working Capi-
tal, die Verschuldung, Cashflows oder Dividenden wachsen. Die Berücksichtigung der 
individuellen Eigenschaften der zugrundeliegenden Primärstudien im zweiten Schritt 
der Untersuchung zeigt, dass die zuvor identifizierten consensus associations zwischen 
geographischen Regionen variieren.  
 
Studien zu US-amerikanischen und europäischen Firmen weisen ähnliche Einflüsse der 
betrachteten Unternehmenseigenschaften auf den Zahlungsmittelbestand auf. Studien 
zu asiatischen Firmen sowie Studien, die Stichproben mit Unternehmen aus verschiede-
nen Regionen analysieren, dokumentieren hingegen deutlich abweichende Zusammen-
hänge zwischen den unternehmensspezifischen Determinanten und der Zahlungsmittel-
hortung. Die regionalen Unterschiede beim Einfluss unternehmensspezifischer Cash 
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Holding-Determinanten können im dritten Schritt nicht gänzlich durch die makroöko-
nomischen Eigenschaften einzelner Länder erklärt werden. Insbesondere die wirtschaft-
liche Entwicklung eines Landes, die Relevanz des nationalen Kapitalmarktes, der Demo-
kratisierungsgrad eines Landes und der Grad internationaler Handelsverflechtungen 
sind nicht allein für das Vorliegen der regionalen Unterschiede verantwortlich. Die Tra-
dition des nationalen Rechtssystems scheint hingegen ein bedeutenderes Erklärungspo-
tential zu haben. Hier werden Länder, die zum römischen Rechtskreis (civil law) gehö-
ren, von solchen unterschieden, die zum anglo-amerikanischen Rechtskreis (common 
law) gehören. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass der Investorenschutz  einer der zentralen 
treibenden Faktoren regionaler Interaktionseffekte ist, da dieser gem. La Porta et al. 
(2000) in common law countries deutlich ausgeprägter ist als in civil law countries. Je-
doch ist die Messung der Rechtstradition recht ungenau, da die Stichprobengröße deut-
lich reduziert werden muss und folglich nur eine geringe Anzahl verschiedener Länder 
betrachtet werden kann. 
 
Hinsichtlich des Zusammenhangs empirischer Modellierungsentscheidungen mit den 
primären Forschungsergebnisse kann gezeigt werden, dass Studien, die Instrumentalva-
riablen (Hansen/Singleton 1982) oder ein Difference-in-Differences-Modell 
(Card/Krueger 1994 und Feldstein 1995) verwenden, andere Ergebnisse erzielen als 
Studien, die lediglich OLS-Modelle einsetzen. Weiterhin führt auch die Verwendung von 
Fixed Effects, die Industrie- sowie Zeiteffekte kontrollieren, zu abweichenden Ergebnis-
sen. Von diesen Entscheidungen sind vor allem die Bilanzsummen-, Net Working Capi-
tal-, Verschuldungs-, Dividenden-, Insolvenzgefahr- und die Corporate Governance-
Elastizität des Zahlungsmittelbestandes betroffen. Die Wahl der Datenbank, auf deren 
Grundlage die Variablen einer Untersuchung bestimmt werden, sowie die Definition der 
Cash Holding Variablen haben keinen bzw. keinen klaren Einfluss auf die resultierenden 
Forschungsergebnisse.  
 
Es lässt sich also festhalten, dass eine Vielzahl der unternehmensspezifischen Determi-
nanten der Haltung von Zahlungsmitteln mit regionalen Eigenschaften interagieren. Die-
ser Befund hängt scheinbar weniger mit der Ausprägung der nationalen Kapitalmärkte 
und damit der Verfügbarkeit externer Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten, sondern mit dem 
nationalen Niveau des Investorenschutzes zusammen. Eine detailliertere Untersuchung 
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der Interaktionsweise individueller Ländereigenschaften mit einzelnen unternehmens-
spezifischen Treibern der Zahlungsmittelhortung soll in diesem Kontext nicht vorge-
nommen werden. Vielmehr motiviert der zweite Beitrag im Rahmen dieser Dissertation 
die zukünftige Forschung auf diesem Feld, indem er zeigt, dass vielfältige Interaktionsef-
fekte vorhanden sind, die ein besseres Verständnis des Zusammenhangs von Länderei-
genschaften und Zahlungsmittelbestand ermöglichen. Weiterhin zeigt der Aufsatz, dass 
die bisherige Cash Holding-Forschung möglicherweise von Endogenitätsproblemen be-
fallen ist, da einfache OLS-Modelle zu anderen Ergebnissen führen als Instrumentalvari-
ablen- oder Difference-in-Differences-Verfahren. Andere empirische Modellierungsent-
scheidungen treten diesem Befund gegenüber in den Hintergrund. Für künftige Untersu-
chungen kann es interessant sein, Methoden zu identifizieren, in denen eine kausale In-
terpretation des Einflusses der erklärenden Variablen auf den Zahlungsmittelbestand 
ermöglicht wird. 
 
4. How to Induce Persistent, Value-Increasing, Cash Holding Policies: The Ef-
fect of Long-Term Incentives 
4.1 Forschungsfrage und Untersuchungsdesign 
Der Beitrag How to Induce Persistent, Value-Increasing, Cash Holding Policies: The Effect 
of Long-Term Incentives greift eine weitere der Forschungsmöglichkeiten auf, die im ers-
ten Aufsatz diskutiert wurden. Er beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie ein Unternehmen 
bzw. das Management dazu motiviert werden kann, eine langfristige Strategie in Bezug 
auf die Zahlungsmittelhaltung zu verfolgen. Der Zahlungsmittelbestand wird laut Pin-
kowitz et al. (2006) und Faulkender/Wang (2006) vom Kapitalmarkt vorwiegend nega-
tiv wahrgenommen. Dementsprechend zeigen Dittmar/Mahrt-Smith (2007), dass 1$ 
zusätzliche Zahlungsmittel den Marktwert eines Unternehmens lediglich um 0,42$-
0,88$ steigert. Jedoch existieren verschiedene Umstände, die den Marktwert der Zah-
lungsmittel erhöhen und sogar über einen Wert von 1$ steigern können. 
 
Diese Umstände sind vor allem das Vorliegen von Finanzierungsschwierigkeiten bzw. 
Insolvenzgefahr sowie das Vorhandensein einer Corporate Governance von hoher Quali-
tät. Entsprechend zeigen Kalcheva/Lins (2007) und Frésard/Salva (2010), dass der 
Marktwert des Zahlungsmittelbestands steigt und sogar einen Wert von 1$ überschrei-
ten kann, wenn ein Unternehmen eine qualitativ hochwertige Corporate Governance 
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besitzt. Denis/Sibilkov (2010) dokumentieren eine Steigerung des Marktwertes gehal-
tener Zahlungsmittel, wenn Unternehmen finanziell eingeschränkt sind und Probleme 
bei der externen Finanzierung haben. Jedoch sind die beiden diskutierten Umstände, 
unter denen der Marktwert der Zahlungsmittel steigt, nicht geeignet, um diesen Markt-
wert aktiv zu steuern. Wie Larcker et al. (2007), Bhagat et al. (2008) und Brown et al. 
(2011) diskutieren, ist das Erreichen eines Systems hochwertiger Corporate Governance 
äußerst kompliziert, da einzelne Corporate Governance-Instrumente sich gegenseitig 
und teilweise gegenläufig beeinflussen. Weiterhin ist es unwahrscheinlich, dass Unter-
nehmen sich freiwillig finanziellen Schwierigkeiten oder sogar einer gesteigerten Insol-
venzgefahr aussetzen, um den Marktwert ihres Zahlungsmittelbestandes zu steigern.  
 
Die Forschung identifziert jedoch einen weiteren Treiber des Marktwertes der Cash 
Holdings. So zeigen Mikkelson/Partch (2003), dass der Zahlungsmittelbestand die Profi-
tabilität und den Marktwert von Unternehmen nicht beeinträchtigt und sogar steigern 
kann, wenn er konstant gehalten wird. Dieser Befund wird von Oler/Picconi (2014) und 
Chen/Shane (2014) konkretisiert. Beide dokumentieren, dass der Marktwert des Zah-
lungsmittelbestands bzw. seiner Veränderung sinkt, wenn dieser von Investoren nicht 
antizipiert werden kann. Eine solche mangelnde Antizipationsfähigkeit liegt vor, wenn 
der Zahlungsmittelbestand einer Periode nicht in der gleichen Weise von unterneh-
mensspezifischen Determinanten bewirkt wird wie in den Vorperioden, folglich ein von 
der Vorperiode abweichendes Management des Zahlungsmittelbestands vorgenommen 
wird. Im Umkehrschluss bedeutet dies, dass ein persistentes und damit vorhersehbares 
Management der Cash Holdings deren Marktwert steigert. Die bisherige Forschung hat 
allerdings keinen Weg aufgezeigt, über den eine solche Art des Cash Holding-
Managements bei Unternehmen motiviert werden kann.  
 
Ein Instrument, das verwendet wird, um eine generelle Langzeitausrichtung des Mana-
gements zu erzielen, ist die langfristorientierte Vergütung über sogenannte long-term 
incentives (LTIs). Diese LTIs verknüpfen die Vergütung eines Managers mit der langfris-
tigen Unternehmensleistung, um somit sein Interesse auf das langfristige Wohlergehen 
des Unternehmens zu lenken. Gopalan et al. (2014) und Li/Wang (2016) untersuchen 
die Determinanten von LTIs und zeigen, dass langfristorientierte Vergütung u. a. mit 
höheren Wachstumsmöglichkeiten, mehr langfristigen Vermögenswerten und einer ge-
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steigerten Unternehmensprofitabilität assoziiert ist. Sie treffen jedoch keine Aussage 
über den Zusammenhang von Cash Holdings bzw. dem Management von Cash Holdings 
und LTIs. Weiterhin können sie auf Grund ihres speziellen Untersuchungsaufbaus keine 
kausalen Zusammenhänge herausstellen, da nur Fälle betrachtet werden, in denen eine 
freiwillige Einführung von LTI-Vergütung stattfindet und folglich die Gefahr der Selbst-
selektion und daraus resultierender Endogenität besteht. 
 
Um derartige Probleme zu reduzieren und die Auswirkung langfristiger Vergütung auf 
den Zahlungsmittelbestand bzw. dessen strategische Steuerung zu untersuchen, be-
trachtet dieser Aufsatz den Einfluss des Gesetzes zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsver-
gütung (VorstAG) auf die Persistenz des Managements der Zahlungsmittelhaltung. Das 
VorstAG bewirkte im Jahr 2009 die verpflichtende Einführung von LTIs bei allen deut-
schen börsennotierten Unternehmen. Auf dieser regulatorischen Grundlage lässt sich 
ein Difference-in-Differences-Modell im Sinne eines quasi-natürlichen Experimentes 
durchführen. Dies bedeutet, dass alle deutschen Unternehmen zunächst zwei Gruppen 
zugeordnet werden. Zum einen sind dies Firmen, die LTIs bereits freiwillig vor dem Vor-
stAG verwenden (EarlyLTI), und solche Firmen, die LTIs gezwungenermaßen erstmalig 
mit dem VorstAG einführen (Non-EarlyLTI). Weiterhin lassen sich zwei Zeiträume unter-
scheiden: Die Periode vor dem VorstAG (2006-2008) sowie der Zeitraum seit der Ein-
führung des Gesetzes (2009-2015). Im Rahmen der Untersuchung wird die Persistenz 
der strategischen Steuerung des Zahlungsmittelbestands für EarlyLTI- und Non-
EarlyLTI-Unternehmen bestimmt. Nun wird die Differenz dieser Persistenzen im Zeit-
raum von 2006-2008 gebildet. Sie stellt den generellen Unterschied zwischen EarlyLTI- 
und Non-EarlyLTI-Unternehmen dar. Anschließend wird die Differenz der Persistenzen 
im Zeitraum von 2009-2015 gebildet. Sie spiegelt ebenfalls die Differenz zwischen 
EarlyLTI- und Non-EarlyLTI-Unternehmen wider sowie einen Zeittrend. Im letzten 
Schritt kann die Differenz der beiden vorab berechneten Differenzen gebildet werden. 
Sie drückt aus, inwiefern die Einführung des VorstAG den Unterschied zwischen 
EarlyLTI- und Non-EarlyLTI-Unternehmen verändert hat. Da beide Unternehmenstypen 
in Deutschland situiert sind, unterliegen sie abgesehen vom der Einwirkung der ver-
pflichtenden langfristigen Vergütung den gleichen externen Einflüssen im Zeitverlauf. 
Weiterhin weisen die Unternehmen aus beiden Gruppen vergleichbare Eigenschaften 
27 
 
auf, da über ein Matching-Verfahren jedem EarlyLTI-Unternehmen ein möglichst ähnli-
ches Non-EarlyLTI-Unternehmen gegenübergestellt wird. 
 
Die Persistenz der strategischen Steuerung des Zahlungsmittelbestandes wird über das 
absolute Residuum aus einer Regression, die den Zahlungsmittelbestand erklärt, ge-
schätzt. Das absolute Residuum stellt die absolute Abweichung zwischen dem prognos-
tizierten und dem tatsächlichen Zahlungsmittelbestand einer Periode dar. Der Zah-
lungsmittelbestand wird auf Grundlage einer Regression, welche die klassischen unter-
nehmensspezifischen Erklärungsvariablen gem. Opler et al. (1999) über 5 Jahre berück-
sichtigt, prognostiziert. Der Einfluss der unternehmensspezifischen Erklärungsvariablen 
kann dabei als strategischer Steuerungsansatz eines Unternehmens verstanden werden. 
Er beantwortet die Frage, wie ein Unternehmen auf bestimmte Unternehmenssituatio-
nen reagiert: In welchem Maß verändert sich der Zahlungsmittelbestand beispielweise, 
wenn die Unternehmensgröße, das Ausmaß der F&E Aufwendungen oder die Verschul-
dung steigt? Das absolute Residuum gibt folglich Aufschluss darüber, ob die unterneh-
mensspezifischen Erklärungsvariablen auf den Zahlungsmittelbestand auf vorhersehba-
re Weise einwirken und somit der strategische Steuerungsansatz unverändert ist. Hohe 
bzw. steigende Werte des absoluten Residuums zeigen eine Veränderung im Cash Hol-
ding-Management und damit eine gesunkene Persistenz der strategischen Steuerung der 
Zahlungsmittelhaltung an. 
 
LTIs sind ein zentrales Instrument, das laut Bebchuk/Fried (2004), Holmstrom (2005) 
und Bhagat/Romano (2009) dazu dient, die Interessen von Managern und Investoren zu 
vereinen und explizit eine Kurzfristorientierung der Unternehmensführung abzubauen. 
In Zusammenhang mit dem bereits dargestellten Befund, dass Investoren eine langfristi-
ge und vorhersehbare Strategie der Steuerung des Zahlungsmittelbestandes befürwor-
ten, wird auf dieser Grundlage folgende Hypohtese abgeleitet: 
 
H: Strategien der Steuerung der Zahlungsmittelhaltung werden persistenter, also 
weniger variabel, wenn die Vergütung des Managements von der langfristigen 
Unternehmensleistung abhängt. 
 
28 
 
Folglich wird erwartet, dass im Zeitraum von 2006-2008 die EarlyLTI-Unternehmen im 
Vergleich zu ihrer Non-EarlyLTI-Vergleichsgruppe eine persistentere Strategie in der 
Steuerung des Zahlungsmittelbestandes verfolgen. Dieser Unterschied sinkt im Zeitraum 
von 2009-2015, da Non-EarlyLTI-Unternehmen auf Grund der Einführung des VorstAG 
ebenfalls persistentere Strategien des Cash Holding-Managements verwenden. EarlyLTI- 
und Non-EarlyLTI-Unternehmen wurden auf Grundlage der händischen Erhebung von 
Vergütungsinformationen im Rahmen der Vergütungsstudie Managergehälter 2010-
2016 bestimmt. Sonstige Rechnungslegungs- und Kapitalmarktinformationen wurden 
der Datenbank Compustat Capital IQ Global entnommen. 
 
4.2 Ergebnisse und Forschungsbeitrag 
Die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung bestätigen die aufgestellte Hypothese und zeigen, dass 
durch die verpflichtende Einführung einer langfristigen Vergütung das Cash Holding-
Management der betroffenen Unternehmen eine stärkere Langfristorientierung und so-
mit eine höhere Persistenz aufweist. Diese Beobachtung wird vor allem durch Unter-
nehmen mit einem hohen Bestand an Zahlungsmitteln getrieben. Diese Untergruppe der 
Unternehmen neigt nach der Einführung des VorstAG besonders zu einer langfristigeren 
Steuerung der Zahlungsmittelhaltung. Weiterhin zeigen zahlreiche Abwandlungen des 
grundlegenden Difference-in-Differences-Modells die Robustheit der Ergebnisse. Redu-
zierte Modellvarianten, die Multikollinearität vermeiden sollen, bestätigen die Aus-
gangsergebnisse. Die Untersuchung mit einem sogenannten Placebo-Ereignis, das zu 
einem anderen Zeitpunkt als das VorstAG stattfindet, generiert erwartungsgemäß keine 
Resultate. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass die beobachteten Resultate tatsächlich durch das 
VorstAG herbeigeführt werden. Die verschiedenen Annahmen des Matching-Vorgangs 
werden ebenfalls schrittweise abgewandelt. Dies dokumentiert die hohe Robustheit der 
Ergebnisse gegenüber der Spezifikation des Matchings von EarlyLTI- und Non-EarlyLTI-
Unternehmen.  
 
Eine ergänzende Analyse des Marktwertes des Zahlungsmittelbestandes bestätigt die 
Ausgangsannahme, dass Cash Holdings vom Kapitalmarkt als wertmindernd angesehen 
werden. In diesem Kontext kann gezeigt werden, dass die Variabilität des Managements 
des Zahlungsmittelbestandes den Marktwert der Cash Holdings senkt. Im Umkehr-
schluss bedeutet dies, dass eine persistentere strategische Steuerung der Zahlungsmit-
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telhortung den Marktwert der Cash Holdings steigert. Eine zusätzliche Betrachtung ver-
schiedener Variabilitätsgrade des Cash Holding-Managements zeigt, dass grundsätzlich 
eine höhere Persistenz mit einer größeren Wertschätzung des Zahlungsmittelbestandes 
am Kapitalmarkt einhergeht. Dennoch existieren Situationen, in denen die Steuerung der 
Zahlungsmittelhaltung zu persistent, folglich zu wenig variabel sein kann und ebenfalls 
den Marktwert der Cash Holdings senkt. Dieser Effekt betrifft aber nur eine kleine Teil-
gruppe der untersuchten Unternehmen, weswegen die gesteigerte Persistenz insgesamt  
den Marktwert der Zahlungsmittelhortung erhöht. 
 
Die erläuterten Ergebnisse liefern verschiedene Erkenntnisse für die Forschung zur Hal-
tung von Zahlungsmitteln sowie auch für die Forschung zur Wirkung langfristiger Ver-
gütung. Erstens identifiziert der Beitrag langfristige Managementvergütung als ein ge-
eignetes Instrument, um Manager dazu zu bewegen, die Steuerung des Zahlungsmittel-
bestandes langfristig auszurichten. Folglich stellt vor diesem Hintergrund das langfristi-
ge und aus Investorensicht vorhersehbare Management des Zahlungsmittelbestands ein 
handhabbares Instrument zur aktiven Beeinflussung des Marktwertes des Zahlungsmit-
telbestandes dar. Zweitens repräsentiert dieses Ergebnis einen realen Effekt des Vors-
tAG und liefert somit Erkenntnisse über die Wirkung der Regulierung. Dies ist nicht nur 
für einen deutschen oder europäischen Regulierer von Interesse, sondern auch im nord-
amerikanischen Raum von Bedeutung. Die Securities Exchange Comission (SEC) und 
andere US-Behörden haben im Jahr 2016 eine Erweiterung des Dodd-Frank Act vorge-
schlagen. Diese enthält Regelungen zur variablen Vorstandsvergütung, die in ihrer Kon-
sequenz dem VorstAG nahekommen. Sie haben eine Fokussierung auf die langfristige 
Managementvergütung zur Folge. 
 
Drittens stellen die Ergebnisse einen Beitrag zur Forschung bezüglich der Wirkung lang-
fristiger Managementvergütung dar. Der beobachtete Effekt stellt somit sowohl eine rea-
le Wirkung des VorstAG als auch eine bisher nicht dokumentierte reale Wirkung lang-
fristiger Vergütungsanreize dar. Die besondere Bedeutung dieses Effekts der LTIs im 
Rahmen dieser Untersuchung besteht darin, dass die klassischen Endogenitätsprobleme 
dieses Forschungszweigs reduziert werden können. Normalerweise wird in diesem Kon-
text stets die freiwillige Einführung von LTIs untersucht. Derartige Situationen sind ge-
prägt von mangelnder Vergleichbarkeit, da unklar ist, ob die Unternehmen, die freiwillig 
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langfristige Vergütungsanreize einführen, sich nicht ex-ante von anderen Unternehmen 
unterscheiden. Die Gefahr einer solchen Selbstselektion wird durch die regulatorische 
Situation rund um das VorstAG in Deutschland reduziert, weshalb das gefundene Ergeb-
nis einen höheren kausalen Aussagegehalt besitzt. Schließlich stellt die Identifikation 
des VorstAG als Gelegenheit der Forschung zur LTI-Wirkung einen methodischen Bei-
trag dar. Die nachfolgende Forschung kann diese Gesetzeseinführung verwenden, um 
weitere Erkenntnisse über die Wirkung langfristiger Vergütungsanreize zu sammeln 
und gleichzeitig den Einfluss von Endogenitätsproblemen zu reduzieren. 
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Abstract 
This study contributes to a better understanding of the determinants of corporate cash 
holdings and their effects on firm value. First, the extensive theoretical basis of corporate cash 
policies is disentangled. I distinguish two categories of theories. The first category comprises 
theories that stem from capital structure research, namely, the trade-off theory and the 
pecking-order theory. The second category includes theories that focus on agency conflicts. 
Second, this review identifies the most common proxies used in empirical research, 
aggregates them into general categories of determinants, and compares their predicted 
influences, according to different theories. In sum, 10 general determinants, including firm 
size, growth opportunities, leverage, liquidity substitutes and corporate governance, are found 
to influence corporate cash holdings. Third, this article reviews the empirical evidence 
regarding what determines the level and market value of cash holdings, compares these 
observed associations to the predicted theoretical associations, and identifies avenues for 
future research. 
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1 Introduction 
Although a common proverb suggests that “Cash is King”, corporate cash holdings are highly 
polarizing and trigger vivid public discussion. The most prominent examples are perhaps Apple and 
Microsoft, whose cash hoarding behavior frequently makes headlines.
1
 An increased tendency to hold 
cash has also been recognized in the scientific research. Opler et al. (1999), Foley et al. (2007), and 
Bates et al. (2009) document a growing tendency among US firms to hoard cash, and Pinkowitz et al. 
(2012) document this trend among international firms. For example, Bates et al. (2009) find an 
increase in the average corporate cash ratio of 12.7% from 1980 to 2006. 
Empirical investigation of cash holdings was initially encouraged by the work of Harford (1999) 
and Opler et al. (1999), which motivated a series of follow-up studies (e.g., Dittmar et al. (2003), 
Faulkender/Wang (2006), D’Mello et al. (2008), Frésard (2010), Khieu/Pyles (2012), Harford et al. 
(2014), and Chen et al. (2015)). This branch of research focuses on two interdependent research 
questions: What determines a company’s cash holding policy? What influence does this cash holding 
policy have on a firm’s value, i.e., what is the market value of cash?2 
This review addresses these questions in three ways. First, it presents a theoretical framework in 
which research on cash holding can be understood. Second, it identifies the most common 
determinants of the level and market value of cash, using the theoretical framework set out, and 
compares the predicted effects of these determinants, according to different theories. Third, the review 
provides a discussion of the empirical results of cash holding research. This includes depicting the 
models used, reporting the observed influence of the common determinants, comparing these 
observations with theoretical predictions, and deriving implications for future research. 
Existing empirical studies are driven by a diverse set of theories that constitute the foundation of 
cash holding research. For example, Opler et al. (1999) investigate the ability of common capital 
structure theories to explain the level of cash. They find support for both the trade-off theory and the 
pecking-order theory, whereas Harford (1999) provides evidence that increasing cash reserves is 
associated with agency problems. More recent examples, such as Harford et al. (2008), Chen et al. 
(2012), and Harford et al. (2014), focus further on the agency perspective. Furthermore, Bates et al. 
(2009), Duchin (2010), and Hoberg et al. (2014) note the importance of constrained liquidity and the 
avoidance of underinvestment. I identify two general categories of theories employed in cash holding 
research. First, there are the capital structure theories, namely, the trade-off theory, as predicted by the 
models of Modigliani/Miller (1963), Bradley et al. (1984), and Titman/Wessels (1988), and the 
pecking-order theory of Myers/Majluf (1984). According to the trade-off theory, the level of cash 
results from comparing the costs and benefits of holding cash, while the pecking-order theory 
proposes that the cash stock is driven by ex-ante information asymmetries that make external 
financing costly. Second, there is a branch of theories that focus on agency conflicts resulting from 
information asymmetries between managers and investors, with the cash stock determined by these 
conflicts. This category comprises five theories. First, there is the flexibility hypothesis (Jensen 
(1986)), which states that managers prefer future financial flexibility and seek to avoid external 
discipline over current investment. Second, there is the spending hypothesis (Jensen/Meckling (1976)), 
according to which weakly controlled managers overinvest. Third, there is the motive of defense 
against hostile takeovers (Faleye (2004)), whereby cash is seen as an instrument to fight hostile 
takeovers that are attracted by bad corporate governance. Fourth, there is the shareholder power 
hypothesis (Harford et al. (2008)), which observes that shareholders appreciate large cash holdings 
when they are sufficiently protected. Fifth, there is the costly contracting theory (Liu/Mauer (2011)), 
which proposes that risky firms hold more cash because debt covenants enforce a higher cash stock.  
These underlying theories identify the determinants of the cash level and its market value. I 
discuss the 10 determinants most commonly featured in the research, namely, firm size, investment 
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  See, for instance, Tim Worstall, “If Microsoft has $92 Billion in Cash Then Why Has It Just Borrowed 
$10.75 Billion?”, Forbes, February 10, 2015; Rana Foroohar, “What Apple’s Gargantuan Cash Giveaway 
Really Means, Time, April 27, 2015; and Julie Bort, “Microsoft Has Nearly $93 Billion In Overseas Cash, 
And It’s Reduced Its Tax Bill By Almost $30 Billion”, Business Insider, August 23, 2014. 
2
  In cash holding research, the term “market value of cash” is used to describe the contribution of corporate 
cash to firm value. Theories of cash hoarding provide reasons why one incremental dollar held in cash does 
not equal an increase in firm value of 1 dollar. 
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and growth opportunities, leverage, profitability, liquidity substitutes,
3
 information asymmetries, 
corporate governance, financial distress, investment activities, and dividends. The capital structure 
theories derive nearly identical predictions regarding the effects of the determinants of the level and 
market value of cash. They differ with regard to the effects of profitability and liquidity substitutes. 
Agency-based theories are more distinct from one another. The shareholder power hypothesis predicts 
a pattern of associations between the determinants and the level of cash that is contrary to all other 
agency-based theories. The remaining theories in this category differ in terms of the assumed 
influence of profitability and liquidity substitution on the cash level. 
These diverse theoretical foundations lead to equally numerous and versatile empirical studies. 
The focus of such studies varies and embraces, among other things, the influence of family companies 
(Liu et al. (2015)), CEO compensation (Liu/Mauer (2011) and Liu et al. (2014)), product market 
competition (Qiu/Wan (2015)), accounting quality (Biddle et al. (2009)), and cross-listings obtained in 
the US (Frésard/Salva (2010) and Huang et al. (2013)). The majority of studies report that the level of 
cash increases when growth opportunities, profitability, or liquidity constraints increase. The cash 
level is found to decrease when firm size, leverage, liquidity substitutes, investment activities, or 
dividends increase. The shareholder power hypothesis applies only when corporate governance is of 
high quality, and the respective firm operates in a country with strong shareholder protection. When 
country-level shareholder protection is moderate, predictions of the flexibility and spending 
hypotheses gain importance, which implies that high quality corporate governance is associated with 
decreasing cash holdings. Weak corporate governance and high information asymmetries are 
associated with cash being spent faster on inefficient acquisitions as well as capital expenditures, and 
liquidity substitutes being turned into cash more often. The value of cash depends on two key drivers, 
namely, information asymmetries and liquidity constraints. The former lowers the market perception 
of cash, while the latter improves it. Furthermore, a persistent policy of high cash holdings is reported 
to positively influence a firm’s market position and performance compared with low-cash competitors. 
This highlights the varying importance of different cash holdings theories. Trade-off theory appears to 
explain corporate cash policies when no individual problem dominates corporate decisions. Pecking-
order theory is prevalent in times of constrained liquidity, and agency-based theories gain importance 
with increasing information asymmetries.  
Reviewing the empirical evidence suggests directions for future research. First, the interplay 
between cash holding theories is not well understood. The importance of these theories changes 
according to a firm’s environment and characteristics. Life-cycle models offer a potential way to 
understand the link between different theories and their changing relevance. Such models investigate 
how the level of cash and the determinants of the cash stock change over a firm’s life, i.e., at different 
stages of the life cycle. Each stage of a firm’s life cycle features different firm and environmental 
characteristics. This may offer a way to analyze changes in the importance of underlying theories as 
well as links between these theories over different stages of a firm’s life. Second, country- and 
industry-level characteristics, such as shareholder protection, affect the association between firm-level 
characteristics and cash holdings. Current research focusses either on country- or firm-level 
characteristics, ignoring their interactions. Investigating such interaction effects may aid understanding 
of how specific country-level characteristics affect the level of cash. This would mean, for example, 
not only investigating whether firms hold more cash in an environment of strong investor protection 
but also studying how the association between firm characteristics and the level of cash changes when 
investor protection is strong. Third, the persistence of cash has been shown to increase the market 
value of cash holdings. Thus, analysis of the determinants of cash holding persistence should be 
pursued in future research, as it offers an opportunity to identify instruments that induce value-
increasing cash policies. Another task is to separate the effect of ambiguity aversion from the 
association between R&D expenditures or, alternatively, information asymmetries and the level and 
the value of cash holdings. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses 
the theoretical basis of cash holding research. Section 3 reviews the empirical cash holding research. I 
conclude in section 4. 
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 The term “liquidity substitutes” sums up factors that make the hoarding of cash unnecessary. This is, for 
example, the case when a firm can finance investments directly from operating cash flow or has assets that 
are easy to liquidate. 
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2 Theories of cash holdings 
Several theories constitute the foundation of empirical research on corporate cash holdings and 
identify the determinants of the level and market value of cash. These theories can be structured into 
two general strands: capital structure theories and theories that focus on agency conflicts. A reference 
point for all these underlying theoretical viewpoints is the irrelevance of the capital structure according 
to Modigliani/Miller (1958), which states that in perfect capital markets, a firm’s value is independent 
of its sources of financing. Both categories of theories used in cash holding research relax the 
assumption of perfect capital markets. 
 
2.1 Capital structure theories 
Capital structure theories consider a firm’s entire financing decision rather than its cash holding 
policy exclusively. Such theories also embrace agency problems. However, the trade-off theory 
considers numerous other factors besides agency issues, and the pecking-order theory considers 
agency problems that differ from those discussed in the second category of theories. 
 
2.1.1 Trade-off theory 
The trade-off theory emerged out of the original Modigliani/Miller (1958) paper when taxes were 
taken into consideration by Modigliani/Miller (1963). Its main features are a trade-off between the tax-
deductibility of debt and bankruptcy costs
4
 and the notion of an optimal capital structure. When 
converting the trade-off theory from explaining the capital structure to explaining the corporate cash 
balance, the costs and benefits of holding cash are considered. Cash holdings are assumed to stem 
from operating cash flows and not from debt issuance. The benefits of holding cash consist of saving 
on transaction costs that occur with external financing, as proposed in Keynes’ (1936) transaction cost 
motive, and avoiding underinvestment. Thus, a firm’s access to capital markets, which can be 
determined by firm size, profitability, and a firm’s probability of facing financial distress, is a 
determinant of cash holdings. Additional determinants are the availability of liquidity substitutes and a 
firm’s investment in fixed and intangible assets. 
The costs of holding cash include various elements: A firm unable to invest cash misses returns 
and the tax benefits of debt financing. Furthermore, cash can potentially be used discretionarily by 
managers, which leads to agency costs. In sum, a firm’s leverage, taxes, the quality of its governance, 
and the degree of information asymmetry determine the level and value of its cash holdings. The 
outcome of this trade-off is an optimal level of cash that depends on the costs and benefits of cash 
hoarding. 
 
2.1.2 Pecking-order theory 
The pecking-order theory focuses on hidden characteristics in the spirit of Akerlof’s (1970) 
market for lemons and is thus based on agency conflict. I do not include this theory in section 2.2 
because the pecking-order theory is seen as a major stand-alone theory of the firm’s capital structure. 
Moreover, the theories in section 2.2 focus on hidden actions and hidden information instead of hidden 
characteristics. 
The theory analyzes a situation in which managers and potential investors have asymmetric 
information regarding a company’s value. The company must raise funds to finance a project. 
However, there is an incentive to avoid projects that have positive net present value (NPV) if the 
company is currently undervalued. This is the case when the NPV that can be earned from a project is 
smaller than the undervaluation, i.e., when the loss from issuing undervalued equity is not offset by the 
project’s profit. If the company’s value is overstated, the firm’s managers will always issue equity 
because they know they will earn more than the firm is worth. Thus, issuing equity securities to 
finance a project is a bad signal for investors, who will either avoid securities or demand a risk 
premium. The result of these considerations is a financing hierarchy. A positive NPV project will be 
financed by internal funds, i.e., hoarded cash, to avoid the problem of underinvestment as well as 
agency costs associated with debt and equity. If further external funds are needed, the firm prefers debt 
over equity because of the negative signaling effect of equity. Debt provides a positive signal because 
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 These bankruptcy costs not only include costs that occur as a result of bankruptcy but also costs of increased 
leverage. Such costs arise, for example, because of a change in credit ratings or increased agency conflicts be-
tween debt and equity holders, as suggested by Myers (1977 and 2003). 
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it shows that a firm is willing to undertake an obligation to make fixed interest payments. 
Consequently, the pecking-order theory identifies the same factors in determining the level and value 
of cash holdings as the trade-off theory. However, it puts more emphasis on the role of information 
asymmetries and growth/investment opportunities. 
 
2.2 Agency conflicts 
The second major category comprises theories that explain corporate cash holdings from an 
agency viewpoint. These agency-based theories consider the threat of having a non-owner manager 
use a firm’s cash for her own utility maximization instead of serving the owner. This risk is mainly 
driven by hidden actions and hidden information, which means that the principal cannot control or 
monitor how the agent spends the company’s money. 
 
2.2.1 Flexibility hypothesis 
The flexibility hypothesis assumes that managers prefer future financial flexibility over current 
investment (Jensen (1986)). Thus, cash is held to finance future projects and avoid external discipline 
from the capital market. The hypothesis implies that weakly controlled and risk-averse managers are 
expected to hold higher cash reserves. Moreover, cash holdings are expected to be positively evaluated 
by the capital market because they are an instrument to avoid a shortage of available funds. The is of 
hoarding  cash to guard against unexpected events is also framed in the precautionary motive by 
Keynes (1936), which does not focus on agency-conflicts. 
A motive closely related to the flexibility hypothesis is the motive of constrained liquidity. This 
motive is also mainly driven by the objective of avoiding a shortage of funds that leads to the omission 
of profitable projects. However, the motive of constrained liquidity focuses on one specific reason for 
a potential deficit in available funds instead of on the abstract risk of underinvestment. Such 
constraints may arise from the volatility of cash flows (see Opler et al. (1999), Han/Qiu (2007), and 
Chen et al. (2014)), credit ratings (Graham/Harvey (2001), Brisker et al. (2013), and Harford et al. 
(2014)), and relationships with banks (Steijvers/Niskanen (2013)). Predictions derived from specific 
liquidity constraints are similar to predictions derived from the flexibility hypothesis. A firm is 
expected to address the risk of illiquidity by building up cash. This means that a firm with highly 
volatile cash flows, bad or no credit ratings, limited relationships with banks, or other liquidity 
constraints is expected to hoard cash to mitigate the high costs of external financing and ultimately 
avoid underinvestment.
5
 The market value of cash holdings increases in these firms because the cash 
stock prevents the operating business from being affected by liquidity constraints. 
Finally, Acharya et al. (2007) introduce another motive that is similar to the flexibility 
hypothesis: the hedging perspective. This motive stresses the difference between holding cash and 
paying off debt for constrained firms. Hoarding cash is preferred to reducing debt when cash flows 
and investment opportunities exhibit a low correlation. Consequently, cash holdings play a valuable 
role in hedging against future deficiencies in funds when a firm’s cash flows are not expected to rise 
with future investments. This means that cash holdings serve as an instrument to maintain a certain 
level of investment over time. The intent to hedge with cash holdings increases when managers are 
risk-averse and information asymmetries are high. When cash flows and future investments are highly 
positively correlated, paying off debt is preferred to holding cash. In such cases, cash hoarding is not 
needed because future operating cash flows will be sufficient to fund investment opportunities. Thus, 
according to the hedging perspective, cash flows, growth opportunities, and the correlation between 
them influence the level and market value of cash. In summary, the flexibility hypothesis identifies the 
quality of corporate governance, information asymmetries, liquidity constraints, liquidity substitutes, 
and growth/investment opportunities as drivers of the level and market value of cash holdings. 
 
2.2.2 Spending hypothesis 
The spending hypothesis focuses on managers who, contrary to the flexibility hypothesis, prefer 
current investments over future financial flexibility. These managers tend to overinvest when they are 
weakly controlled and have cash available (Jensen/Meckling (1976)). This is problematic when there 
are no more profitable investments, and managers spend cash on value-destroying projects instead of 
paying it out to shareholders. There are several reasons for such behavior, as listed by Myers (2003): 
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  Ozkan/Ozkan (2004) provide an overview of common liquidity constraints and their effects. 
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seeking monetary benefits or certain firm assets, career concerns, and additional non-monetary reasons 
such as reputational effects and management hubris. Thus, the spending hypothesis distinguishes 
current investments in fixed and intangible assets from future growth/investment opportunities as 
determinants of the level and value of cash holdings. 
 
2.2.3 Shareholder power hypothesis 
The shareholder power hypothesis (Harford et al. (2008) and Kuan et al. (2011)) proposes a 
situation in which minority shareholders support cash stockpiling to avoid the underinvestment 
problem because they are sufficiently protected from expropriation, and interests are aligned. This 
change in the perception of cash holdings is also referred to as the alignment hypothesis (Liu/Mauer 
(2011)). These theories predict an increase in cash holdings due to an alignment of interests and 
decreasing agency problems.
6
 Thus, the quality of corporate governance is the central influencing 
factor in cash holdings. 
 
2.2.4 Costly contracting theory 
 The costly contracting theory of Liu/Mauer (2011) models a reaction to the riskiness of growth 
firms. The theory proposes that creditors anticipate risky investment behavior by young firms and 
demand incremental covenants that force the debtor to hold cash. The costly contracting theory derives 
predictions similar to those of the pecking-order theory. Firms are expected to prefer internal over 
external financing when the costs associated with the latter increase. Thus, the costly contracting 
hypothesis identifies the same factors to drive the level and value of cash as the pecking-order theory. 
However, the theories can be distinguished by the market valuation of cash. Investors attribute more 
value to cash held by firms that act in accordance with the pecking-order theory, as such firms can 
avoid the costs of external financing and pursue their investment projects without restraint. If the 
costly contracting theory applies, the value of cash is expected to decrease because creditors are likely 
to extract benefits from their debtors and limit risk-taking by firms. This means that cash reserves 
cannot be spent on investments, and thus, the freedom of investment is constrained.  
 
2.2.5 Defense against hostile takeovers 
The takeover defense motive can be regarded as a consequence of the flexibility and spending 
hypotheses. Faleye (2004) observes that high cash balances are associated with managerial discretion. 
This discretion might manifest itself in the form of excessive precautionary cash holdings or 
overinvestment. Such discretionary actions decrease shareholder value and attract hostile takeover 
attempts. Managers recognize this takeover threat and react by hoarding cash to ease the application of 
anti-takeover measures. Thus, cash holdings simultaneously increase the likelihood of becoming a 
target of a hostile takeover and the likelihood of successfully fighting off such an attempted takeover. 
This explains why high cash levels do not appear to be associated with an increased number of 
takeover attempts (Harford (1999)). The disciplining effect of the market, in the form of hostile 
takeovers, does not become effective. Thus, the takeover defense motive models managerial actions 
that aim to bypass external discipline. Similarly, to the shareholder power hypothesis, the defense 
against hostile takeovers motive focuses on the quality of corporate governance in determining the 
level and value of cash holdings. 
 
2.3 Theoretical determinants and the value of cash 
The theories introduced in section 2.1 and 2.2 identify several factors that determine the level and 
market value of cash holdings: firm size, growth/investment opportunities, leverage, profitability, 
liquidity substitution, information asymmetries, the quality of corporate governance, the probability of 
financial distress, investment activity, and dividends. These determinants are employed in the most 
frequently used empirical models in the cash holding research.
7
 Table 1 summarizes how different 
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 The alignment hypothesis states that such a convergence of interests can be achieved through equity-based 
compensation of managers (Liu/Mauer (2011)) and other instruments of corporate governance (Chen/Chuang 
(2009)). The shareholder power hypothesis considers shareholder protection more broadly, including protec-
tive legal regulation. 
7
 See section 3.1. 
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cash holding theories predict these determinants will influence the level of cash holdings (Panel A) 
and their market valuations (Panel B).  
Panel A documents the influence of individual determinants on the level of cash maintained by a 
firm. Within the first category of theories, the effect of liquidity substitution distinguishes the trade-off 
theory and the pecking-order theory. If cash substitutes that do not cause transaction costs to exceed 
the costs of hoarding cash are available, there is no reason to maintain a high cash level, according to 
the trade-off theory. In contrast, the pecking-order theory predicts these substitutes will be turned into 
cash to avoid underinvestment. Furthermore, the trade-off theory does not provide a clear prediction of 
the influence of profitability on the cash stock. A firm is believed to obtain easier access to the capital 
market when its profitability grows, and thus, the need to hoard cash declines. Increased profitability 
may also lead to additional agency problems caused by a lack of external control, induced by 
management success. These agency problems are associated with an increase in cash to avoid future 
external control by the capital market. 
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
Within the second category of theories, the shareholder power hypothesis can be separated from 
all other theories. The theory predicts that cash holdings will increase when external control increases 
because shareholders then feel protected from expropriation and allow for cash holdings. The 
remaining agency-based explanations presume that cash is not viewed positively by shareholders and 
is only hoarded when managers can act with discretion. Consequently, the level of cash is expected to 
decrease when external control increases. These remaining agency-based theories are difficult to 
differentiate. Profitability and liquidity substitution offer some insights. Increased profitability as well 
as an increase in liquidity substitutes decrease the risk of underinvestment and therefore decrease the 
need to hoard cash, based on the precautionary motive assumed by the flexibility hypothesis. The 
costly contracting theory is consistent with this prediction, as increased profitability and more liquidity 
substitutes ease access to debt and soften debt covenants. The spending hypothesis takes a different 
standpoint. It predicts that management will use incremental cash that is available due to increased 
profitability or an increase in liquidity substitutes for inefficient investments. 
Both general categories of theories make largely overlapping predictions regarding the 
association between individual determinants and the level of cash. The flexibility hypothesis and the 
costly contracting theory confirm the predictions of the trade-off theory by assuming a negative 
association between the cash level and both profitability and liquidity substitutes. The spending 
hypothesis and the hostile takeover defense motive overlap with the pecking-order theory in assuming 
a positive association between the level of cash and both profitability and liquidity substitutes. The 
shareholder power hypothesis is the only theory that exhibits a clear pattern of deviating associations. 
Panel B displays predictions regarding the impact of various cash holding determinants on the 
market value of cash.
8
 It does not offer new insights into the differentiation of capital structure 
theories. Furthermore, the predictions of the pecking-order and trade-off theories overlap with those of 
the flexibility hypothesis and the hostile takeover defense motive. They regard cash as valuable in two 
cases: First, when access to capital markets is constrained, as it is for small firms, highly leveraged 
firms, financially distressed firms, and firms facing high information asymmetries. Second, the value 
of cash increases when a firm’s demand for financing increases, i.e., when growth opportunities and 
investment activities are high. 
The spending hypothesis, the shareholder power hypothesis, and the costly contracting theory 
provide an opposing pattern of predictions. They perceive cash as valuable when management is 
strongly controlled, so that shareholders’ risk of expropriation is low. Accordingly, the value of cash is 
expected to increase when a firm’s leverage increases because this induces external control by debt 
providers. Moreover, higher quality corporate governance aligns managerial interests with those of 
shareholders. Dividend payments may also signal such an alignment. In all these cases, external 
control is assumed to increase, and thus, the value of cash increases. The effects of profitability, 
liquidity substitutes and financial distress distinguish the three theories. The spending hypothesis 
assumes that incremental cash, available through increased profitability or liquidity substitutes, is 
spent inefficiently, which decreases the value of cash. The costly contracting theory regards 
profitability and liquidity substitutes as factors that increase a firm’s credit rating and thus result in 
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more favorable debt covenants. More favorable debt covenants result in lower cash ratios and a rise in 
the value of cash because the firm is no longer forced to hoard as much cash as formerly. The exact 
opposite occurs when a firm faces financial distress: the firm’s credit rating deteriorates, and stricter 
debt covenants with higher cash ratios are enforced by debt providers. This increase in the mandatory 
cash level decreases the value of cash. According to the flexibility hypothesis, cash is held to mitigate 
underinvestment. The risk of underinvestment and thus the usefulness of cash holdings increase when 
there is financial distress and decrease when firm profitability or the availability of liquidity substitutes 
increase. Therefore, the value of the cash stock is positively associated with financial distress and 
negatively associated with profitability and liquidity substitutes. 
 In conclusion, the theories that constitute the theoretical foundation of cash holding research 
make largely overlapping predictions regarding the association between the level and market value of 
cash and cash determinants. The capital structure theories differ from the others only with regard to 
their predictions of the effects of profitability and liquidity substitutes. Agency-based theories are 
more distinctive, as they predict an increase in cash holdings when firms face liquidity constraints or 
decreased external control. Finally, agency-based theories, focusing on the effect of liquidity 
constraints, can be distinguished by the effect of profitability, liquidity substitutes, and financial 
distress on the market value of cash. 
 
3 Empirical research on cash holdings 
The prior discussion focuses on the theoretical foundations of cash holding research and the 
impact of 10 determinants of cash holding derived from this foundation. Empirical research utilizes 
various models to investigate the impact of these determinants and the questions inherent in the 
underlying theories. The respective models differ in their analytical scope, and the theoretical 
determinants of cash holding can be operationalized by numerous proxies that vary in their economic 
implications. 
 
3.1 Methodologies in cash holding research 
Two types of models are used to analyze the determinants and effects of firms’ cash policies. 
First, some models seek to explain why firms hoard cash by estimating the influence of various firm 
characteristics on the cash ratio. Second, value-of-cash models investigate the effects of cash holdings 
on firm value. The cash holding variable included in all these models generally consists of a firm’s 
cash and short-term investments.
9
  
 
3.1.1 Cash holding determinants 
Equation (1) is a generalized version of the models used to investigate the determinants of 
decisions to hoard cash. These models use the cash ratio (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡) as the dependent variable and 
explain it with various independent variables. 𝑋1𝑖𝑡 denotes the vector of firm-specific determinants, 
which are the central interest of study, and 𝑋2𝑖𝑡 is the vector of control variables. All variables in eq. 
(1) are standardized by a common scaling factor. Most studies scale by either total assets or net assets, 
which equal total assets less cash holdings. 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑋1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝑋2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 Cash holding research features three specifications of the generalized cash holding model in 
eq. (1). The first specification uses the level of cash as the dependent variable. The most prominent 
versions of this specification are the models of Opler et al. (1999) (OPSW) and Bates et al. (2009) 
(BKS). Both models include similar explanatory variables in the vectors 𝑋1𝑖𝑡 and 𝑋2𝑖𝑡 and have 
become the standard in cash holding research. 
OPSW employ the following variables: They estimate firm size by the natural logarithm of total 
assets. The market-to-book ratio and R&D expenditures scaled by net assets are simultaneously 
included in their models to represent growth and investment opportunities. Additionally, they employ 
firm leverage, calculated as total debt
10
 over net assets. Profitability is estimated by a cash flow-based 
measure, defined as cash flow scaled by net assets. Net working capital is estimated as current assets 
minus current liabilities minus cash divided by net assets and represents liquidity substitutes, i.e., 
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 In Compustat, this information is contained in variable-item #1, labelled “CHE”. 
10  This is measured as long-term debt plus short-term debt. 
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assets that can easily be sold. Capital expenditures scaled by total assets are incorporated as a measure 
of investment activity. They indicate investments in fixed assets. Dividends are captured by a dummy-
variable that takes a value of 1 in years in which dividends are paid and 0 otherwise. The 20-year 
standard deviation of cash flows serves as an estimate of financial distress respectively of liquidity 
constraints. A firm is more likely to exhibit financial distress and be constrained in its liquidity if it 
exhibits volatile cash flows. This variable is measured in two variants: As a firm-specific or industry-
specific metric. Finally, OPSW include indicators of the quality of corporate governance, namely, the 
percentage of insider ownership and a dummy-variable indicating the presence of anti-takeover 
measures. The interests of managers and owners are expected to be better aligned when managers 
participate in equity, which represents an increase in the quality of corporate governance. However, 
when internal ownership becomes too dominant, managers might have an incentive to exploit 
shareholders. Anti-takeover measures guard managers from external discipline, which may motivate 
them to act discretionarily. BKS differ from OPSW in using total assets instead of net assets as the 
scaling factor. Furthermore, they extend the OPSW model by incorporating acquisition expenditures 
scaled by total assets, which is another proxy for investment activities, into the level-of-cash 
regression. 
Additional variations of the OPSW and BKS models can be found throughout the literature. The 
quality of corporate governance is not routinely employed as an explanatory variable in subsequent 
studies. Nevertheless, many studies investigate the link between corporate governance and the cash 
stock, using variables that differ from those of OPSW to estimate governance quality. Proxies for 
information asymmetry are the inverse of corporate governance indicators, as high quality corporate 
governance implies low information asymmetry. The range of governance variables is large, 
embracing board structure as well as board independence (Harford et al. (2008) and Kuan et al. 
(2011)), variables that are estimated by the number of external and non-executive board members, 
board size and CEO duality. Larger board size is usually associated with an increase in agency costs, 
due to less flexible decision making. However, increased board size is also associated with a rise in 
monitoring of managerial actions. It is thus not possible to derive a clear prediction regarding the 
effect of board size. Dummy variables that measure CEO duality indicate the discretionary potential 
arising from managers that serve simultaneously as CEOs and board directors. Other indicators of the 
quality of corporate governance are ownership structure (Kuan et al. (2011)), governance indices 
(Dittmar/Mahrt-Smith (2007)—which mostly indicate anti-takeover measures (Harford et al. 
(2008))—and managerial compensation (Tong (2010) and Liu et al. (2014)).  
Similar diversity is found for variables indicating the probability of financial distress or liquidity 
constraints. The variability of cash flows, as used by OPSW, is the most frequently applied indicator 
of financial distress. Variation in cash flows is sometimes replaced by the volatility of earnings or 
stock returns. The well-known Altman Z-score provides an estimation of the propensity to go 
bankrupt. Another common indicator is credit rating, as used, for example, by Harford et al. (2008) 
and Subramaniam et al. (2011). Steijvers/Niskanen (2013) use the length of a firm’s relationship with 
its main bank, measured by the number of months of collaboration, as an indicator of liquidity 
constraints. Furthermore, they use the Herfindahl index to estimate bank power. A long banking 
relationship and highly concentrated banking markets are expected to decrease information 
asymmetries and thus the costs of external financing, lowering the incentive to hoard cash. A final 
indicator of liquidity constraints is access to external capital. The latter may be indicated by various 
proxies, such as issuance of convertible debt (Pinkowitz/Williamson (2002)), a dummy indicating that 
a firm recently went public or the time distance to that event (Chen et al. (2012)), the availability of 
credit ratings (Opler et al. (1999)), and the size of capital markets (Iskandar-Datta/Jia (2014)). The 
other cash holding determinants are estimated in more consistent ways, but some variation can still be 
found. Huang et al. (2015) calculate leverage as total debt scaled by the sum of total debt and the 
market value of equity. Mikkelson/Partch (2003) and Lee/Lee (2009) include earnings scaled by assets 
as a proxy for profitability. Net working capital is in rare cases replaced by the cash conversion cycle
11
 
as an indicator of liquidity substitutes. This variable measures how much time it takes for a company 
to generate cash from its investments in inventories. Some studies exchange the dividend-dummy for a 
                                                        
11
 Drobetz/Grüninger (2007) use the following formula to calculate the cash conversion cycle: 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
∗
360 +
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
∗ 360 −
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
∗ 360. 
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continuous variable that sets total dividends in relation to assets (Tong (2010)) or net income (Yu et al. 
(2015)). 
 The second specification of eq. (1) is introduced by Almeida et al. (2004) and replaces the level 
of cash with the change in cash, which is the difference between the current and prior level of cash 
holdings. D’Mello et al. (2008) and Bates et al. (2009) extend this approach by using a first-difference 
estimator, which also means replacing explanatory level-variables with explanatory change-variables. 
Using this first-difference estimator has the advantage of accounting for time-constant unobserved 
heterogeneity, as Bates et al. (2009) argue. However, this can also be achieved by using level-
variables in a fixed effects model. Employing changes instead of levels as dependent or explanatory 
variables also has implications for the research questions that can be addressed and is not an arbitrary 
choice. For example, Almeida et al. (2004), Riddick/Whited (2009), and Palazzo (2012) develop 
theoretical models to investigate the relationship between corporate saving and different 
characteristics of cash flows. They use the change in cash holdings as a proxy for corporate saving. A 
positive change in cash holdings indicates saving, whereas a negative change indicates spending. 
Employing the level of cash as the dependent variable in this setting would be misleading because a 
generally high level of cash is not necessarily related to an increase in the cash stock in a particular 
period. 
 The third specification uses excess cash as the dependent variable. The concept of excess cash 
was introduced by Opler et al. (1999). The underlying idea is to estimate the predicted level of cash for 
every firm-year, using a model in the style of OPSW. Excess cash is the residual resulting from this 
procedure, i.e., it is the difference between a firm’s actual level of cash and the predicted level of cash. 
Excess cash is relevant to research questions that investigate deviations from common cash holding 
policies. That means a researcher is not interested in the determinants of the level of cash but in the 
determinants of decisions to deviate from the established cash level. 
 
3.1.2 Value-of-cash models 
Value-of-cash models are used to analyze the effect of cash holdings on firm value or, 
alternatively, a firm’s stock returns. Two variants of value-of-cash models are applied in research: 
First, the current market value of a firm, i.e., the market value of equity plus the book value of 
debt (𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡), is regressed on cash holdings (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡) and various control variables. This approach is 
based on the valuation regression of Fama/French (1998) and was introduced into cash holding 
research by Pinkowitz/Williamson (2002) and Pinkowitz et al. (2006). Equation (2) shows the 
regression equation that has become standard in value-of-cash models: 
 
𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝑑𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 × 𝑑𝐸𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽4 × 𝑑𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 × 𝑑𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽6 × 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽7 × 𝑑𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 × 𝑑𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽9 × 𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 × 𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 × 𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽12 × 𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13 × 𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡 
    +𝛽14 × 𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽15 × 𝑑𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽16 × 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
The prefix 𝑑 indicates change-variables; thus, 𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1. A measure of earnings (𝐸𝑖𝑡) that 
excludes extraordinary items but includes interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits is 
employed. 𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 represents net assets, 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 is research & development expenditures, 𝐼𝑖𝑡 is interest 
expenditures, and 𝐷𝑖𝑡 is common dividends. All variables are scaled by a common factor, typically net 
assets or total assets. The regression coefficient of cash holdings, 𝛽16, indicates the association of cash 
holdings with firm value. It provides the basis for claims about the market value of cash. If, for 
example, the regression coefficient for cash holdings takes a value of 0.8, this indicates that an 
increase of $1 in cash is associated with a rise in firm value of only $0.80. In an alternative 
specification, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) include the lagged and lead changes of cash holdings in eq. (2). 
This bears the risk that the change in cash holdings may incorporate expectations about future growth. 
Thus, empirical research mostly employs the specification in eq. (2). 
Second, a measure of stock returns (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡) is regressed on cash holdings and various control 
variables in vector 𝑋2𝑖𝑡, as shown in equation (3). 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 can be designed as a buy-and-hold return, as 
Oler (2008) shows, or an abnormal return, as in Harford (1999) and Faulkender/Wang (2006). Such an 
abnormal return is calculated by comparing a normal or benchmark return (𝑅𝑖𝑡) with a firm’s actual 
return (𝑟𝑖𝑡).  
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𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ×
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2 × 𝑋2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
The interpretation of equation (3) is analogous to that of equation (2). However, the cash holding 
variable and the control variables contained in 𝑋2𝑖𝑡 must be scaled by the one-year lagged market 
value of equity (Faulkender/Wang (2006)). This scaling allows the regression coefficient of cash 
holdings to be interpreted as the dollar change in firm value caused by an incremental $1 in cash. 
 
3.2 Review of empirical results 
The empirical evidence presented in this section is derived from the first specification of equation 
(1) and focuses on the determinants of the level of cash. More specifically, I examine the determinants 
used in the seminal OPSW and BKS models as well as proxies for financial distress and the quality of 
corporate governance. The only exception to this is in the final paragraph, which addresses the market 
value of cash holdings, referring to equations (2) and (3). An overview of the influence of the 
determinants under analysis is provided in Table 2, which presents the median regression coefficients 
for every determinant considered from a broad sample of studies. While the OPSW and BKS variables 
are included in this table, proxies for liquidity constraints, except for cash flow uncertainty, and the 
quality of corporate governance are not tabulated, as these are too diverse and cannot be generalized in 
the same way as the other variables. The values of the median regression coefficients are not 
comparable across studies because they are affected in each case by the specific study design 
employed. Therefore, rather than the values of the coefficients, the discussion focuses on the signs of 
the coefficients, major trends, and especially deviations from these trends. 
 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
The seminal paper by Opler et al. (1999) introduces the OPSW-model and represents the first 
application of a full level-of-cash regression. The previous paper by Kim et al. (1998) does not 
incorporate R&D expenditures, capital expenditures, dividends or a proxy for the quality of corporate 
governance and thus lacks some central determinants. 
 The top of Table 2 shows that Opler et al. (1999) find a negative association between the level of 
cash and total assets, leverage, net working capital, and dividends. A positive relationship is reported 
between the level of cash and the market-to-book ratio, R&D expenditures, cash flows, capital 
expenditures, and cash flow uncertainty. Bates et al. (2009) find a negative association between 
acquisition expenditures and the cash level. Moreover, they confirm the associations found by Opler et 
al. (1999), except in the cases of capital expenditures and cash flows, which they report to be 
negatively associated with the level of cash. The results of Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009) 
correspond to the median of results across the sample of studies, shown at the bottom of Table 2. The 
sample medians confirm the positive relationship between cash flows and the cash level found by 
Opler et al. (1999) and the negative association between capital expenditures and the cash level 
reported by Bates et al. (2009). 
 Despite this large overlap between the sample medians and the results of Opler et al. (1999) and 
Bates et al. (2009), Table 2 shows that there is no consensus on how individual determinants are 
associated with the cash stock. In particular, the associations of total assets and to a smaller degree, 
investment activities, leverage, both profitability indicators, and dividends with the cash level exhibit 
large variation. Subsequently, I discuss results that deviate from the majority of reported results for 
every determinant. 
 
Firm size 
The majority of studies as well as OPSW and BKS report a negative association between firm 
size and the level of cash. Table 2 still shows several studies that identify a positive relationship. 
These positive deviations are mostly found in single-country studies focusing on Asia (Lee/Lee 
(2009), Chen et al. (2012), and Chen et al. (2014)), other non-US countries (Ozkan/Ozkan (2004) and 
Lee/Powell (2011)) and US new-economy (Chen (2008)) and technology firms (Chen/Chuang (2009)). 
In all these cases, country-level information asymmetries are assumed to be higher than in a broad 
international or US sample.  
Thus, the effect of firm size appears to depend on country-level of information asymmetries. When 
country-level of information asymmetries are low, and shareholders are protected from expropriation, 
an increase in size might coincide with increasing quality of corporate governance, which decreases 
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the level of cash, according to agency-based theories. When country-level information asymmetries 
are high, firm size is not sufficient to create a level of control that would decrease cash holdings.  
 
Investment activities 
The majority of studies find a negative association between cash holdings and capital 
expenditures and between cash holdings and acquisition expenditures, results that appear to conflict 
with the predictions of all major theories. The spending hypothesis predicts that investment activities 
will increase with increased cash hoarding, due to discretionary managerial actions. The trade-off 
theory and pecking-order theory predict that more cash is held in situations of increased investment 
activity to avoid the costs of external financing. 
Studies that use an empirical approach different from that of the standard level-of-cash regression 
obtain results that suggest a positive association between cash holdings and investment activities. 
Harford (1999) and Opler et al. (1999) document an increasing likelihood of undertaking value-
decreasing acquisitions among cash rich firms. Additionally, Harford et al. (2008) report that cash is 
spent more quickly on acquisitions and capital investments, but less is spent on R&D, when firms are 
poorly governed. Denis/Sibilkov (2010) confirm this observation and add that such usage of cash 
holdings is perceived as value increasing in constrained firms. 
This result indicates that cash holdings increase the likelihood of undertaking acquisitions and 
investments in fixed assets that are financed with cash. The negative coefficient for the investment 
activity-proxy found in level-of-cash regressions captures the fact that these investments are financed 
with cash. Thus, these findings are more in line with the spending hypothesis and the precautionary 
motive, as initially suggested. 
 
Leverage 
OPSW, BKS, and most empirical research confirm a negative association between leverage and 
cash holdings, as seen in Table 2. This is consistent with the flexibility hypothesis as well as the 
pecking-order and trade-off theories. Similar to the influence of firm size, the association of leverage 
with cash holdings depends on country-level information asymmetries. As Table 2 shows, a positive 
association between leverage and the corporate cash level is reported by Kalcheva/Lins (2007), 
García-Teruel/Martínez-Solano (2008), Chen et al. (2012), and Horioka/Terada-Hagiwara (2013) for 
non-US firms, which are presumed to be situated in environments with greater agency problems. In 
these countries, debt providers might be able to limit discretionary behavior. Thus, shareholders allow 
higher cash reserves in firms that are subject to increased monitoring by creditors. Another possible 
interpretation is that the positive influence of leverage on cash is enforced by debt covenants, as 
predicted by the costly contracting hypothesis. These diverging interpretations may be investigated by 
analyzing how information asymmetries affect the leverage-sensitivity of the market value of cash. In 
general, agency-based theories gain importance when information asymmetries are more severe. 
 
Profitability 
The majority of studies report a positive relationship between profitability and cash holdings. 
This observation is found in US samples (Harford (1999), Harford et al. (2008), and Denis/Sibilkov 
(2010)), international samples (Iskandar-Datta/Jia (2014) and Chen et al. (2015)), and Asian samples 
(Kuan et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2012)). This can be explained by the pecking-order theory, which 
assumes that available cash is hoarded to prevent underinvestment. Moreover, the flexibility 
hypothesis predicts that increased profitability will be associated with increased managerial discretion, 
leading to cash hoarding behavior. Few studies deviate from the majority result and report a negative 
relationship between profitability and cash holdings. This observation is not associated with specific 
regional sample characteristics, as it is in the cases of firm size and leverage. The negative coefficient 
can be explained by the trade-off theory, which means that the costs of hoarding cash exceed the 
associated benefits of increasing firm profitability. 
 
Dividends 
Table 2 reveals a primarily negative association between dividends and the level of cash which 
turns positive when country- or industry-level information asymmetries in the study sample are higher 
than in a standard sample of publicly traded US companies. This is reported by Chen/Chuang (2009) 
for American technology companies, by Kuan et al. (2011) for a sample of listed Asian companies, 
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and by Chen et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2014) for Chinese public companies. Thus, country-level 
information asymmetries are again found to influence the association between cash holdings and one 
of their determinants. This result might indicate that dividends do not discipline managerial behavior 
when a firm faces high country-level information asymmetries. However, dividends might also signal 
an exceptional alignment between managerial and shareholder interests, which leads shareholders to 
allow higher cash holdings, in the spirit of the shareholder power hypothesis. 
 
Investment and growth opportunities 
The vast majority of studies in Table 2 report a significant positive association between 
growth/investment opportunities and corporate cash levels, which corresponds to the spending 
hypothesis, the trade-off theory, and the pecking-order theory. 
 Bigelli/Sanchez-Vidal (2012) report a negative association between the market-to-book ratio and 
the corporate cash level and between R&D expenditures and the cash stock. Their sample consists 
solely of private Italian companies. The Italian setting suggests higher information asymmetries than 
in the standard US sample. However, private companies should be subject to fewer information 
asymmetries between its owners and managers because owners are more likely to actively manage the 
firm. Moreover, private firms rely more strongly on debt financing (Brav (2009) and Saunders/Steffen 
(2011)). Thus, the motive behind the observed negative association is ambiguous, but trade-off 
considerations that identify debt as better suited for financing growth opportunities in private 
companies than cash holdings might play a driving role. 
 R&D expenditures, used as an indicator of growth/investment opportunities, face a potential 
measurement problem. Breuer et al. (2016) note that firms decrease their level of cash when their 
shareholders are ambiguity-averse, i.e., when their investors wish to avoid uncertain investments.
12
 
The outcome of R&D investment is highly uncertain (Chan et al. (2001) and Dittmar et al. (2003)). 
Therefore, ambiguity-averse shareholders prefer lower R&D investment as well as a lower level of 
cash, if cash is primarily used to finance R&D. Thus, it is unclear whether the effect of R&D 
expenditures is exclusively based on the presence of growth/investment opportunities, driven by the 
association of growth opportunities and information asymmetries or also due to the ambiguity aversion 
of investors. 
 
Liquidity substitution 
Both indicators of the availability of liquidity substitutes, namely, net working capital and the 
cash conversion cycle, are found to be negatively associated with cash holdings. This result coincides 
with the trade-off theory. Horioka/Terada-Hagiwara (2013) object to the majority of results. They 
provide further evidence of the impact of country-level information asymmetries on the determinants 
of cash holdings, reporting a positive association between net working capital and the level of cash in 
emerging Asian markets. This is in line with the spending hypothesis and the pecking-order theory, 
both of which predict that cash holdings will rise because of managerial discretion or high costs of 
external financing caused by increased information asymmetries. Thus, the pecking-order theory and 
the spending hypothesis appear to gain explanatory power in an environment of high information 
asymmetry. 
 
Probability of financial distress and liquidity constraints 
Overall, the majority of studies indicate that the level of cash increases when the probability of 
financial distress rises. This positive association is consistently reported when cash flow uncertainty 
(Tong (2010), Iskandar-Datta/Jia (2014), and Chen et al. (2015)), credit ratings (Opler et al. (1999) 
and Subramaniam et al. (2011)), and the power of banks (Steijvers/Niskanen (2013) and Yu et al. 
(2015)) are used as indicators. This result is due to the increased cost of external financing and 
information asymmetries that accompany financial distress, as predicted by all major theories. 
Evidence regarding the influence of access to external capital on the level of cash holdings is 
mixed, with Iskandar-Datta/Jia (2014) reporting a significant positive association, whereas Chen et al. 
                                                        
12
  Ambiguity aversion describes an individual’s preference for known risks over uncertain risks. In contrast, 
risk aversion concerns situations in which risks are certain and can be assessed by their expected value. Fi-
nally, information asymmetries differ from both concepts, as they focus on the unequal distribution of certain 
information between different parties. 
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(2015) report a negative one. The former use the size of equity, credit, and bond markets, whereas the 
latter use a mix of equity market size, index affiliation, and foreign ownership to indicate the 
accessibility of capital markets. The negative association obtained by Chen et al. (2015) results from 
the foreign ownership variable, which might also capture the increased quality of corporate 
governance and not only access to capital markets. 
 Another area of ambiguity is the impact of financial distress, as measured by Altman’s Z-score. 
The variable is found to be insignificant, with the sign of the respective regression coefficient varying, 
according to Drobetz/Grüninger (2007), García-Teruel/Martínez-Solano (2008), Lins et al. (2010), and 
Neamtiu et al. (2014). This might be due to two conflicting effects: First, a firm under severe financial 
distress cannot raise external capital; thus, it is expected to use its cash reserves and has an incentive to 
increase the cash balance. Second, in such illiquid situations, it is usually not possible to increase cash 
reserves because cash is immediately spent. 
 
Information asymmetries and corporate governance 
The general notion of indicators of the quality of corporate governance or, alternatively, 
information asymmetries across the majority of studies is that increased information asymmetries and 
decreased quality of governance are associated with a rise in the corporate cash level. This result is 
unambiguous when governance indices are applied (Dittmar et al. (2003), Harford et al. (2008), Tong 
(2010), Subramaniam et al. (2011), and Chen et al. (2014)). 
 A more mixed relationship is found between ownership and the level of cash. Family ownership 
is positively associated with cash holdings, as Dittmar et al. (2003), Kuan et al. (2011), and 
Steijvers/Niskanen (2013) show. Family owned firms are more likely to be actively managed by their 
owners and less likely to appoint external managers. Therefore, cash hoarding is allowed because the 
family-owners can control the use of the cash stock and need not fear expropriation, as the shareholder 
power hypothesis suggests. Measures of managerial ownership indicate more ambiguous results. Opler 
et al. (1999), Ozkan/Ozkan (2004), and Kuan et al. (2011) find that cash holdings decrease with 
internal ownership. This observation is in line with the flexibility and spending hypotheses. The 
interests of management and shareholders are aligned as a result of having managers participate in 
equity. This alignment of interests results in a decline in discretionary behavior that leads to a 
reduction in the cash level. The contrary finding of a positive association is provided by Kalcheva/Lins 
(2007), Harford et al. (2008) and Yu et al. (2015). The differences in the association between 
managerial ownership and the cash level cannot be attributed to regional differences of the respective 
studies’ samples. Negative and positive relationships are documented in U.S. as well as international 
samples. The divergence of results suggests a non-linear relationship between internal ownership and 
cash hoarding. A moderate level of managerial ownership aligns the interests of shareholders and 
managers, which results in a decrease in the cash stock, as predicted by the flexibility and spending 
hypotheses. However, when management’s share in the firm becomes too large, managers tend to 
exploit minority shareholders. Such tunneling behavior is documented by Yu et al. (2015) and Liu et 
al. (2015). 
Board size is another area of ambiguity. Harford et al. (2008), Belghitar/Clark (2014) and 
Neamtiu et al. (2014) find a negative relationship between board size and cash holdings in UK and US 
firms. A positive association is documented when information asymmetries are more pronounced, as 
in the case of Asian (Lee/Lee (2009)) and US high-tech firms (Chen/Chuang (2009)). Consequently, 
board size is an effective instrument for mitigating cash hoarding when country-level information 
asymmetries are low or shareholders are better protected. Similar findings are not obtained when 
board composition is considered. Belghitar/Clark (2014) report a positive association between board 
independence, indicated by the ratio of non-executive members to all board members, and cash 
holdings in the UK. In contrast, Ozkan/Ozkan (2004), Harford et al. (2008), and Lee/Lee (2009) 
document a negative association. The association between CEO duality and the corporate cash level 
appears to be positive, which confirms the discretionary nature of such dual positions, in accordance 
with the flexibility and spending hypotheses, as Lee/Lee (2009), Kuan et al. (2011), and Yu et al. 
(2015) report. 
In summary, the influence of corporate governance depends on country- or industry-level 
information asymmetries. In general, predictions of the flexibility and spending hypotheses appear to 
hold, which means that decreases in information asymmetries reduce discretionary managerial 
behavior and initiate a decrease in cash holdings. However, in an environment of low information 
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asymmetries and strong shareholder protection, an incremental increase in corporate governance 
quality encourages shareholders to allow higher cash holdings, as predicted by the shareholder power 
hypothesis. 
 
Market value of cash holdings 
In the early stages of empirical research on cash holdings, cash was perceived as destroying firm 
value, as Harford (1999) states in his seminal paper. This implies that an incremental dollar held in 
cash should increase firm value by less than a dollar. Accordingly, Faulkender/Wang (2006) find that 
$1 in cash increases firm value by only $0.94, on average. A larger spread is documented by 
Kalcheva/Lins (2007), who find that an incremental $1 in cash raises firm value by $0.76 to, and 
Dittmar/Mahrt-Smith (2007), who report that $1 held in cash raises frim value by between $0.42 and 
$0.88 in firms subject to weak corporate governance. The negative value effect is also found when 
excess cash is employed instead of cash holdings, as Dittmar/Mahrt-Smith (2007), Frésard/Salva 
(2010), Martínez-Sola et al. (2013), or Huang et al. (2013) observe. 
Various factors may alter the negative perceptions of cash holdings in the capital market. The 
quality of corporate governance is shown to be positively associated with the market value of cash 
holdings. Frésard/Salva (2010) find that $1 in excess cash held by firms that are cross-listed in the US 
corresponds to an increase in firm value of between $1.23 and $2.17. Cross-listings are expected to 
decrease information asymmetries, due to increasing disclosure requirements, stricter legal 
environments, and increased monitoring. This increased external discipline ensures that cash is spent 
more efficiently, which increases the value of cash. Complementary to this observation, Pinkowitz et 
al. (2006), Dittmar/Mahrt-Smith (2007), Harford et al. (2008), Lee/Lee (2009), and Kusnadi (2011) 
document that the market value of cash increases with the quality of corporate governance. 
Furthermore, several authors recognize that the value of cash increases with the presence of 
liquidity constraints. Faulkender/Wang (2006) and Denis/Sibilkov (2010) show, for US-samples, that 
cash is more valuable in constrained firms, using dividends, firm size, and firm ratings as criteria of 
financial constrainedness. Chen et al. (2009) observe that the interplay between corporate governance 
quality and liquidity constraints determines the market value of cash. They find that the value of cash 
increases in firms that are well governed, an effect that is more pronounced in young and growing 
firms, which tend to have more stringent liquidity constraints than mature firms. 
Another value-increasing factor is the persistence of a firm’s cash holding policy, as 
Mikkelson/Partch (2003) note. They find that persistently high cash reserves do not affect firm 
performance negatively but improve a firm’s competitiveness. Martínez-Sola et al. (2013) and 
Oler/Picconi (2014) corroborate this finding, reporting that deviations from the long-term cash level 
are associated with decreasing firm value and profitability. 
Finally, Breuer et al. (2016) introduce ambiguity aversion as another factor that alters the 
valuation of cash holdings. They document that the value of cash decreases as ambiguity aversion 
increases, i.e., when investors aim to avoid information uncertainty. Ambiguity-averse investors 
perceive risky investments as less valuable. Thus, the cash stock is less valuable to these investors 
because it is used to finance uncertain investments. This result corresponds to the flexibility 
hypothesis, which proposes that cash holdings are maintained to ensure the execution of future 
investments. 
 
3.3 Avenues for future research 
 The above discussion of cash holding theories and related empirical results has four implications 
for future research. First, the discussion of cash holding theories shows that cash holding research has 
a diverse foundation consisting of several distinct theories. While the individual meanings of these 
theories has been well investigated, the interplay between them has not yet been a focus of research. It 
is an interesting prospect for future research to compare the relative importance of different cash 
holding theories and identify situations in which the relative importance changes. One way to analyze 
the interplay between theories would be through life-cycle models, which are currently utilized in two 
working papers (Dittmar/Duchin (2011) and Drobetz/Halling/Schroeder (2015)). These models are 
used to investigate how the level of cash and the association between the level of cash and its 
determinants changes over a firm’s life. A firm life consists of different stages that feature different 
firm and environmental characteristics. Such research may aid our understanding of how the 
importance of underlying theories and the links between theories change over different stages of a 
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firm’s life, i.e., in the presence of different firm characteristics and environmental situations. For 
example, young and growing firms are subject to greater information asymmetries and have greater 
difficulties obtaining external finance. Thus, life-cycle models could reveal that considerations based 
on the pecking-order theory and agency-based theories are more relevant for these firms. The trade-off 
theory may gain importance when firms grow more mature and must consider issues other than 
external financing when determining their cash stock.    
Second, a review of the empirical results of cash holding research suggests that country-level 
characteristics affect the association between firm-level characteristics and cash holdings. Current 
research investigates the influence of either country-level characteristics or firm-level characteristics 
on cash holdings but neglects their interaction. Study of this interaction may reveal information about 
how country-level effects influence the level of cash. Thus, research should not only focus on whether 
specific country characteristics are associated with changes in the level of cash but also seek to 
identify how they become effective. This implies that the level of cash not only changes because of a 
direct association with specific country characteristics but also because country characteristics affect 
how firm-level characteristics influence the level of cash. For example, Huang et al. (2013) and 
Iskandar-Datta/Jia (2014) find that firms subject to low country-level investor protection hold smaller 
cash reserves. Iskandar-Datta/Jia (2014) report that this observation is driven by a direct link between 
investor protection and cash holdings, which implies that firms in an environment characterized by 
low investor protection tend to spend their cash quickly by overinvesting. Huang et al. (2013) also 
show an indirect link between the level of cash and investor protection. They find that the positive 
association between corporate governance and the level of cash is more pronounced when investor 
protection is low. This implies that investor protection alters the association between firm-level 
governance and the cash level, revealing an indirect route by which country characteristics affect cash 
management.  
Third, the value of cash depends on information asymmetries, liquidity constraints, and the 
persistence of cash holding policies. While the first two aspects are broadly analyzed in existing 
research, the final one receives little attention. Empirical investigations either focus on market 
perceptions of deviations from the long-term normal cash level (Oler/Picconi (2014)) or analyze what 
these abnormal cash holdings are used for. Accordingly, Opler et al. (1999) find that deviations from 
the long-term level of cash are associated with increased acquisitions and higher payouts to 
shareholders. This association is more pronounced in countries with weak investor protection 
(Iskandar-Datta/Jia (2014)), firms that face financial distress, and firms in which managers are 
entrenched (Sheu/Lee (2012)). The question of what determines the persistence of the cash level is not 
considered. Answering this question might reveal effective instruments to avoid value-destroying cash 
regimes by inducing a long-term orientation to cash management as well as strategic planning in 
general. 
Fourth, Breuer et al. (2016) show that ambiguity aversion influences the level and the market 
value of cash. This observation reveals potential measurement problems in existing cash holding 
research. R&D expenditures as a determinant of cash holdings may not only represent available 
growth/investment opportunities but also capture ambiguity aversion. A similar concern can be raised 
regarding information asymmetries, which are often present in firms with larger volumes of uncertain 
investments, for example, high-growth and young firms. Consequently, a further objective of future 
research may be to disentangle ambiguity aversion, growth/investment opportunities, and information 
asymmetries. 
 
4 Conclusion 
Study of the corporate cash stock has been a growing trend in empirical research since 1999. 
Cash holding research is characterized by substantial diversity in its theoretical bases and associated 
empirical results. This literature review serves as an introduction to this field of research and a 
summary of its current state. Moreover, this review identifies new insights that arise from aggregating 
research results. Overall, this review provides three contributions: First, the theories upon which cash 
holding studies rest are disentangled and structured. Second, the most common determinants of the 
level and market value of cash holdings are identified, and their predicted effects are discussed. 
Finally, common empirical approaches are identified, observed results associated with these 
approaches are discussed, and unanswered questions and implications for future research are 
introduced. 
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Overall, I investigate 10 determinants of the level and market value of cash holdings, namely, 
firm size, investment and growth opportunities, leverage, profitability, liquidity substitution, 
information asymmetries, corporate governance, financial distress, investment activities, and 
dividends. In general, the level of cash increases when growth opportunities, profitability, or liquidity 
constraints increase. A negative relationship is documented between the level of cash and firm size, 
leverage, liquidity substitutes, investment activities, and dividends. The value of cash is reported to 
increase when firms are financially constrained, when the quality of corporate governance is high, 
when the level of information asymmetries is low, or when the level of cash is persistent. The market 
value of cash declines when shareholders are ambiguity-averse 
There exist several deviations from these general associations. The influences of many 
determinants depend on country- or industry-level characteristics. For example, the level of cash and 
its value increase with the quality of corporate governance and when a firm is located in a country 
with strong shareholder protection, as suggested by the shareholder power hypothesis. However, in an 
environment of low shareholder protection, high quality corporate governance influences the cash 
level negatively, as predicted by the flexibility and spending hypotheses. Existing research focuses on 
the impact of either country- or firm-level characteristics on cash holdings but ignores their interaction 
effect. Investigating this interaction is a perspective for future research. 
Reviewing the empirical evidence reveals further avenues for future research. Individual theories 
of cash hoarding are well understood. However, the interplay between these numerous theories is not 
yet on the research agenda. Persistence of cash holdings is reported to increase the value of cash. Thus, 
analyzing the determinants of cash holding persistence is a prospect for future research because it may 
reveal instruments that can be used to induce value-increasing cash policies. Another task is separating 
the effect of ambiguity aversion on the level and value of cash holdings from that of R&D 
expenditures or, alternatively, information asymmetries.  
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Cash flow 
uncertainty
Authors
Opler et al. (1999) -0.046 0.152 1.308 -3.037 0.310 -0.814 0.321 -0.126 0.955
Bates et al. (2009) -0.009 0.016 0.065 -0.368 -0.002 -0.203 -0.193 -0.259 -0.043 0.151
Kim et al. (1998) -0.001 0.009 -0.235 -0.014 -0.126 -0.00015 0.010
Harford (1999) 0.057 0.547 0.748
Pinkowitz/Williamson (2001) -0.116 0.085 2.169 -0.530 -0.508 -0.803 -1.172 0.116 0.164
Dittmar et al. (2003) -0.650 -0.080 1.680 -1.170 1.060 -0.840 -0.330 -0.180
Almeida et al. (2004) 0.002 0.004 0.259 0.045 -0.001 -0.400 -1.096
Ozkan/Ozkan (2004) 0.001 0.023 -0.063 -0.208 -0.073 -0.004 0.091
Acharya et al. (2007) -0.008 0.005 -0.326 0.053
Drobetz/Grüninger (2007) -0.390 0.002 0.091 -2.559 1.928 -0.032 -0.00010 0.445 4.186
Foley et al. (2007) -0.098 0.044 6.884 -1.952 0.704 -2.646 -0.251 3.358
Kalcheva/Lins (2007) 0.055 0.297 1.851 0.001 -1.766 -0.015 -1.222
Chen (2008) 0.011 0.017 0.176 -0.044 -0.064 -0.301 -0.465 -0.047 0.020
D'Mello et al. (2008) -0.030 0.007 1.127 -0.282 0.165 0.139 -0.236 -0.192 -0.372
Garcia-Teruel/
Martinez-Solano (2008)
0.005 0.005 0.001 0.079 -0.153
Harford et al. (2008) 0.011 0.003 0.915 -0.422 0.491 -0.657 -2.150 -2.998 -0.084 0.589
Chen/Chuang (2009) 0.030 0.010 -0.050 0.100 -0.190 -0.150 0.040 -0.010
Lee/Lee (2009) 0.010 -0.072 -1.839 0.008 0.072 -0.554 -0.362 -0.098 0.025
Riddick/Whited (2009) 0.129 -0.014
Denis/Sibilkov (2010) 0.197 -0.136 -0.115 -0.015
Duchin (2010) -0.016 0.065 -0.137 -0.108 0.063
Lins et al. (2010) 0.911 0.438 -0.082 1.746 0.382
Tong (2010) -0.019 0.025 0.114 -0.196 -0.173 -0.188 -0.065 -0.969 0.496
Al-Najjar/Belghitar (2011) -0.014 0.000 -0.134 -0.001 -0.120 -0.002 0.021
Khieu/Pyles (2012) -0.017 0.006 0.002 -0.098 0.181 -0.108 0.043 -0.016 0.000
Kuan et al. (2011) 0.030 0.010 0.060 -0.390 0.350 -0.470 -0.240 0.340
Kusnadi (2011) 0.050 -2.420 3.040 0.320 -0.480 0.670 -0.510 4.360
Lee/Powell (2011) 0.007 0.018 -0.385 0.502 -0.172 0.382 0.337
Subramaniam et al. (2011) 0.001 0.015 0.018 -0.297 -0.027 -0.288 -0.293 -0.020 0.040
Table 2 Empirical influence of various determinants on the level of cash holdings
Determinants
Firm size
Total assets
Market-to-
book ratio
R&D 
expenditures
Cash flow-
based
Capital 
expenditures
DividendsLeverage
Investment/growth 
opportunities
Profitability
Liquidity 
substitution
Investment 
activity
Other
Net working 
capital
Cash 
conversion cycle
Acquisition
expenditures
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Cash flow 
uncertainty
Authors
Alvarez et al. (2012) -0.032 -0.019 -0.019 0.040
Bigelli/Sanchez-Vidal (2012) -0.005 -0.050 -0.060 -0.201 0.020 0.286
Chen et al. (2012) 0.006 0.335 0.488 -0.025 -0.013 -0.074 0.034 0.570
Julio/Yook (2012) -0.001 0.029 -0.224 -0.049 -0.050 -0.023 1.017
Sun et al. (2012) -0.010 0.001 0.000 -0.030 0.011 -0.015 -0.193 0.005 -0.018 0.177
Palazzo (2012) 0.002 0.004 0.077 0.061 0.083 -0.274
Brisker et al. (2013) 0.000 0.000 0.314 -0.157 0.004 -0.404 -0.326 -0.499 -0.033 0.000
Horioka/Terada-
Hagiwara (2013) 
0.001 0.003 0.439 0.144 0.232 -0.051
Huang et al. (2013) -0.088 0.006 4.324 -0.723 -0.055 -0.779 0.651 0.172 0.116
Steijvers/Niskanen (2013) -0.065 0.001 -0.006 -0.014
Yu et al. (2013) -0.004 0.017 0.251 -0.078 0.132 -0.100 -0.049 0.001
Belghitar/Clark (2014) -0.011 0.015 0.011 -0.001 -0.244 0.011
Chen et al. (2014) 0.015 0.219 -1.309 1.246 -0.589 -0.734 0.336 6.120
Harford et al. (2014) 0.232 0.122 0.595 -0.701 0.466 -2.205 -2.243 -1.696 -0.185 0.109
Hill et al. (2014) -0.080 0.066 0.024 -0.209 0.683 -0.362 -1.195 0.025 2.117
Hoberg et al. (2014) -0.042 0.039 0.046 -0.001 -0.001 -0.024 0.014
Iskandar-Datta/Jia (2014) -0.011 0.010 0.022 -0.243 0.015 -0.195 -0.216 -0.003 0.149
Liu et al. (2014) -0.081 0.090 1.502 0.048 -0.006 -0.403 -0.395 -0.128 -0.009 0.041
Neamtiu et al. (2014) 0.000 0.002 0.004 -0.013 0.362 -0.026 -0.540 -0.002 0.013
Oler/Picconi (2014) -0.062 0.035 0.105 -1.152 -0.044 -1.329 -0.232 0.576 -0.013 0.160
Qiu/Wan (2014) -0.025 0.013 0.006 0.001
Chen et al. (2015) -0.004 0.011 0.185 -0.332 0.054 -0.227 0.175
Elyasiani/Zhang (2015) -0.177 0.058 -0.115 0.266 0.014 -0.360
Liu et al. (2015) 0.020 -0.150 0.040 -0.170
Total -0.0218 0.0355 0.9340 -0.5610 0.2880 0.1310 -0.4600 -0.0001 -0.8720 -0.3770 -0.0017 0.700
The values in table 2 are the median regression coefficients of variables which were used as regressors in a level-of-cash regression (1. specification of eq. (1)). The lines of the first  column indicate from 
which study the respective median regression coefficients were obtained. Each of the residual columns represents one cash holding determinant as indicated in the heading of the columns. The total value 
at the bottom of table 2 is the median across all studies. A missing number indicates that a study did not test for the respective determinant.
Table 2 Continued
Determinants
Firm size
Acquisition
expenditures
Capital 
expenditures
Investment 
activity
Dividends
Total Assets
Investment/growth 
opportunities
Market-to-
Book ratio
R&D 
expenditures
Leverage
Cash flow
based
Other
Profitability
Net working 
capital
Cash 
conversion cycle
Liquidity 
substitution
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This study documents the existence of interaction effects between regional and firm-level determinants of 
the corporate cash level. Moreover, this article explores how empirical design choices affect the results of 
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This article contributes to research on the determinants of cash holdings in two ways. 
First, it provides evidence on the existence of an interaction effect between firm-level 
characteristics and geographic regional characteristics as determinants of the corporate cash 
level. Prior research discusses various motives to hold cash intensively and identifies the 
influence of various regional (Julio/Yook, 2012; Huang et al., 2013; and Chen et al., 2015) as 
well as firm-level determinants on the level of cash. However, an interacted effect of these 
regional and firm-level characteristics in determining the cash holdings has been ignored.  
This observation of an interaction effect is important because it points out a new avenue 
for future research that leads to a better understanding of how firms determine their cash 
stock. Specifically, it shows that it is a meaningful and unexplored question to ask how 
regional characteristics can have an effect on the level of cash, i.e. asking which corporate 
decisions change because the regional characteristics in which a firm is situated are altered. 
This research question assumes that the level of cash does not only change because of the 
presence of a specific regional characteristic, i.e. a direct link between the regional 
characteristic and the cash level, but also because the regional characteristic affects how other 
firm-level characteristics are associated with the level of cash, i.e. an indirect or interacted 
effect. Ultimately, investigating the interaction effect of firm- and regional-level 
characteristics as explaining factors of the corporate cash stock means figuring out the 
specific routes how regional- or country-level characteristics influence the level of cash and 
providing a deeper understanding of how the framework of decisions on the corporate cash 
stock is affected by these characteristics. 
Second, this study investigates how the empirical design of cash holding studies 
influences their results. This provides guidance for future research regarding the most critical 
design decisions as well as the areas which are most prone to be influenced by these 
decisions. Determining the underlying empirical method of a study appears to be the most 
crucial decision in the empirical set-up. The association between individual firm-level 
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determinants and the level of cash differs when instrumental variables or a difference-in-
differences approach are employed instead of a standard OLS regression. Studies which do 
not employ these methods may suffer from endogeneity and are unable to provide causal 
inferences. This effect is especially pronounced when the influence of total assets, dividends, 
and corporate governance on the cash level is investigated. Including fixed effects to standard 
OLS models is routinely advised. The analysis also points out that the inclusion of industry 
and time fixed effects changes the influence of various firm-level determinants on cash 
holdings. Finally, the definition of the cash holding variable and a study’s source of data have 
either no influence or the effect cannot be distinguished from country-level characteristics.  
 The empirical analysis in this study unfolds in three steps. First, I estimate the 
consensus association, i.e. the average association across existing studies, between the level 
of cash held by a firm and each of the ten most prominent firm-level determinants of cash 
holdings. Second, I show that these consensus associations differ by geographic regions and 
are influenced by the empirical design of primary research. Finally, I investigate if 
macroeconomic characteristics such as a country’s development, the size of equity markets, 
or legal tradition can explain geographic differences in the consensus associations.  
I utilize the concept of meta-regression analysis (MRA) to undertake a quantitative 
review of the cash holding literature and to address all three steps of the analysis. MRA 
allows the empirical measurement of trends in research results by using the existing research 
as its sample. The method is well suited to investigate the existence of regional differences in 
the determinants of the cash level as well as the influence of empirical choices on the results 
of primary research. Firstly, undertaking a firm-level analysis of the interacted influence of 
various firm-level characteristics and regional characteristics on the level of cash requires 
various exogenous shocks or valid instruments on the firm level or on the regional level as 
well as an extensive data set of international firm data. Both are difficult to find for ten 
distinct firm-level determinants. Therefore, MRA offers an alternative to prominent quasi-
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experimental techniques because it aggregates diverse time periods, firm samples, estimation 
techniques, control variables, variable definitions, and weights the derived research results by 
their precision. This provides insights that are more robust than standard firm-level analysis 
in absence of exogenous shocks or valid instruments. Secondly, it is the main purpose of 
meta-regressions to analyze how the characteristics of primary research affect its results. 
Thus, it is an ideal methodology to investigate how empirical design choices that were 
employed influence the results of primary research as Égert/Halpern (2006) show. 
Results from the meta-regressions reveal the consensus association between each of the 
most frequently investigated determinants and the level of cash. Cash holdings decline when 
total assets, investment activities
1
, net working capital, leverage, cash flow, and dividends 
increase. The corporate cash reserves increase with an increasing market-to-book ratio, R&D 
expenditures, financial distress, and corporate governance quality. Moreover, the MRAs 
exhibit that firm-level characteristics affect cash similarly in US and Europe but different in 
Asia or the global sample.
2
 Finally, these regional differences are not entirely explained by 
specific country characteristics like the relevance of a country’s equity market, and a 
country’s development or time trends. A country’s legal tradition appears to drive many of 
the regional differences implying that investor protection affects the impact of firm-level cash 
holding determinants. However, this study can only investigate legal tradition in a very small 
sample. Consequently, there is an interaction between regional characteristics and the effect 
of firm-level determinants on the level of cash but individual driving country characteristic 
can only be hinted. 
MRAs indicate that the design of empirical research is especially important when the 
association between cash holdings and total assets, dividends, and corporate governance is 
investigated. Including industry and time fixed effects to standard OLS models is routinely 
                                                        
1
 Investment activities comprise capital expenditures and acquisition expenditures. 
2
 These regions refer to geographical, not political regions. Thus, Europe also includes Switzerland. The glob-
al sample refers to primary samples comprising several geographic regions, see section 3.3. 
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advised and affects the association of net working capital, leverage, and financial distress 
with cash holdings. The choice of the underlying database of primary empirical research also 
affects the associated results, but to a smaller degree. This effect partially overlaps with the 
influence of regional characteristics because hand collected data sets are more often used 
when regions are investigated that are not fully covered by standard databases such as 
Compustat. Finally, the definition of the dependent cash holding variable does not influence 
the results of primary research. 
The reported results on regional differences provide two possible explanations for the 
differences in Asia. First, information asymmetries might be smaller in US and Europe than 
in Asia, because the legal system protects investors better and provides more external 
discipline. This suggests a greater relevance of the FCF-hypothesis in Asia (Claessens/Fan 
2002). Second, Asian firms might lack alternatives in external financing; i.e. they have a 
more constrained access to capital markets (Claessens et al. 1999, Allayannis et al. 2003, 
Allen et al. 2005), suggesting a greater relevance of the underinvestment problem. The prior 
indications are based on the observed regional differences in the impact of individual firm-
level determinants. Thus, they require more intensive investigation to derive causal 
inferences, which is an interesting perspective for future research.  
 The meaning of the firm- and regional-level interaction found in this meta-study can 
be highlighted in a more straightforward way with an illustrative example. A frequently 
investigated regional, respectively country-level characteristic is investor protection. The 
direct effect of investor protection is documented in the existing literature. Dittmar et al. 
(2003) and Huang et al. (2013) show in international samples that until the year 1998 the 
level of cash decreases when investor protection increases. After 1998, Huang et al. (2013) 
report the cash level to increase when investor protection increases. This change in the 
association between cash holdings and investor protection is explained by the emerging 
market financial crisis in 1998 that made investors more aware of protecting the corporate 
64 
 
cash stock. The mentioned studies only regard the direct link between cash holdings and 
investor protection. They do not explicitly investigate how better investor protection 
increases the cash level in the post 1998 period but assume that this increase is exclusively 
achieved by investors allowing higher cash stocks when they are well protected.  
 Kalcheva/Lins (2007) implicitly investigate the interaction between corporate 
governance and investor protection as explanatory factors of the cash level in an international 
sample. They study how managerial entrenchment, indicated by firm-level measures of 
management control rights, affects the level of cash in different regimes of country-level 
shareholder protection. Their results show that entrenched managers hoard more cash when 
investor protection is low. In contrast, entrenched managers do not influence the cash level in 
countries with high investor protection. This means that investor protection does not only 
directly increase the level of cash but also alters the influence of entrenched managers on the 
cash level. There are potentially many more unexplored avenues how investor protection 
achieves its cash-increasing effect found in Huang et al. (2013). This meta-study is not able 
to identify these specific avenues because it cannot investigate individual country-level 
characteristics but has to focus on more general regional characteristics. Instead, the study 
points out that there is an interaction effect between regional characteristics and various firm-
level drivers in the explanatory function of cash holdings which highlights the potential for 
future research on individual firm- and country-level interaction effects.  
 Exemplarily, Asian countries typically feature lower investor protection than the US. 
Thus, the effect of the Asian regional dummy in the meta-regressions embraces the effect of 
investor protection on the determinant-elasticities of cash holdings. Referring to the results 
from my MRAs, this would mean that low investor protection increases the cash level by 
making large firms, firms with many fixed assets and growth firms hoard more cash. 
Contrarily, firms with high net working capital or leverage decrease cash holdings in an 
environment of low investor protection. However, the Asian regional dummy is not limited to 
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include only the effect of investor protection but also incorporates other characteristics of the 
Asian region. Therefore, it is not possible to attribute the regional effects unambiguously to 
one specific country-level characteristic such as investor protection. Instead, this example 
illustrates how future research can improve the understanding of how country characteristics 
influence specific corporate decisions and especially the determinants of cash management. 
This study shows the relevance of such research questions and identifies areas, i.e. firm-level 
determinants and geographic regions, which are promising to investigate. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: Section 1 reviews theories of cash 
hoarding, identifies the most common firm-level determinants, and discusses indications of 
regional differences in the effect of these determinants. Section 2 introduces the general 
methodology of MRA, my specific research design, and descriptive statistics. Results, 
consisting of graphical, univariate as well as multivariate analyses, and robustness checks, are 
presented in section 3. I conclude in section 4. 
 
1 Theory and literature review 
1.1 Theoretical foundation 
Cash holding research is characterized by a great diversity in its theoretical foundation as 
well as in the empirical approaches employed. The variety of theoretical perspectives leads to 
a large number of determinants that are assumed and reported to influence the level of 
corporate cash. The central questions of this study arise from these characteristics of cash 
holding research. First, existing research focusses either on firm-level determinants or on 
regional-level determinants of cash holdings but does not explore whether regional 
characteristics alter the association between firm-level determinants and the level of cash. 
The large number of distinct determinants makes it difficult to set up a model with primary 
data that is able to investigate an interaction between regional characteristics and various 
firm-level characteristics. Either a researcher chooses one specific firm-level determinant and 
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investigates whether regional characteristics affect its association with the level of cash or a 
meta-methodology is employed to explore interaction effects for various firm-level 
determinants. Second, considering the large number of existing research it is unclear how the 
individual empirical study design affects results regarding the drivers of the cash level. 
Both research questions result from the diverse theoretical foundation of cash holding 
research which consists of two strands. These are classic capital structure theories and 
agency-based theories. The prior derive statements regarding a firm’s entire financing 
decisions, the latter focus on how the relation between the management and its shareholders 
or other stakeholders affects the cash level. 
Two major capital structure theories are regarded in cash holding research. The trade-off 
theory originates from Modigliani/Miller (1963) who extend their original model by 
including taxes. Trade-off theory adds the risk of bankruptcy to the M/M-model and 
compares it to the benefits of tax-deductibility of corporate debt. The result of this trade-off is 
an optimal level of debt.
3
 When applied in cash holding research, the trade-off theory 
compares the costs and benefits of holding cash and assumes that firms have an, optimal, 
target level of cash. 
The pecking-order theory, introduced by Myers/Majluf (1984) who build on the work of 
Donaldson (1961), does not feature the assumption of an optimal level of debt or a target 
level of cash but suggests a strict hierarchy of financing that aims to avoid underinvestment. 
This hierarchy is induced by ex-ante information asymmetries that prevent potential investors 
from assessing a firm’s true value. Consequently, signaling makes external financing costly 
and secondary to internal financing. Within external financing, debt financing is preferred 
over issuing equity.  
Various agency-based theories are used to explain the level of cash. The most prominent 
is the FCF-hypothesis, according to Jensen/Meckling (1976). It regards cash holdings as the 
                                                        
3
 See Frank/Goyal (2008) for a general introduction and Bradley et al. (1984) as a classic example. 
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result of discretionary managerial behavior. Managers that are not controlled sufficiently act 
in self-interest. They build up cash from internal sources because this does not increase 
external discipline and can easily be used in their own interest. 
The shareholder power hypothesis, which is analyzed by Harford et al. (2008) and Kuan 
et al. (2011), shares central characteristics with the pecking-order theory but does not 
consider a firm’s entire capital structure. It stresses the avoidance of underinvestment as well 
as the influence of information asymmetries. The hypothesis regards a situation when 
shareholders are sufficiently protected from expropriation and discretionary managerial 
actions, for example by a strong legislation in favor of shareholders. Under such 
circumstances, shareholders allow increasing cash holdings because they do not fear 
exploitation by the management and acknowledge the benefits of avoiding costly external 
financing as well as underinvestment. 
 
1.2 Existing empirical results 
The empirical foundation of cash holding research is the seminal paper by Opler et al. 
(1999). They develop a model to explain the level of cash as a function of various firm 
characteristics which has become the standard in cash holding research. The model employs 
total assets as a proxy for firm size, the market-to-book ratio and R&D expenditures as 
proxies for growth opportunities, Capital expenditures as a measure of investments in fixed 
assets, total debt scaled by total assets as a proxy of firm leverage, cash flows scaled by total 
assets as a measure of profitability, net working capital as an estimate of liquidity substitutes, 
a dummy indicating dividend payments, and the standard deviation of cash flows as a proxy 
for financial risk, respectively financial distress. These variables or at least the determinants 
which they are supposed to represent have become the standard to include in cash holding 
models. Moreover, Opler et al. (1999) employ the percentage of insider ownership as an 
indicator for the quality of corporate governance. Proxies for governance quality have not 
68 
 
become a prerequisite for all cash holding studies but they are investigated frequently by 
many studies.  
The determinants in the standard level of cash-model represent firm-level characteristics. 
However, research has also investigated the association of the level of cash with country-
level characteristics. Exemplarily, Julio/Yook, 2012 show that firms increase their cash 
holdings in years of national political elections and simultaneously reduce corporate 
investments. Thus, this observation seems to be driven by a motive of precaution to guard a 
firm against political uncertainties. Chen et al., 2015 investigate the influence of a different 
country-level characteristic by focusing on the association between cash holdings and 
national culture. They find the cash level to decline and corporate investments to rise in 
countries with a more individualistic culture such as the United States. Vice versa, cash 
holdings rise and investments diminish with the degree of a country’s uncertainty avoidance 
which is indicated by an index corresponding to Hofstede (2001). 
As already mentioned, a shortcoming of existing research is that it either focuses on 
firm-level or country-level determinants but neglects the interaction between both types of 
cash holding determinants. Investigating this interaction effect addresses the question of how 
country-level characteristics influence the association between certain firm characteristics 
and the level of cash. Evidence on this question can only be derived implicitly by comparing 
firm-level results that are obtained from different countries. For example, Huang et al., 2013 
show that US cross-listings increase the level of cash and this effect is more pronounced in 
firms from emerging markets. This suggests that corporate governance has a more positive 
association with the corporate cash level when the country-level of investor protection is low; 
respectively country-level information asymmetries are high.  
Pinkowitz et al. (2016) choose a different approach to investigate international 
differences in cash holdings. They compare cash holdings in U.S. firms with the level of cash 
in foreign firms that have matching firm-level characteristics and do not find differences. 
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This either indicates the absence of an interaction effect between firm-level and regional 
characteristics or shows that regional characteristics have several interaction effects with 
different firm-level characteristics which overall offset each other.  
In this sub-section, I provide a descriptive overview of existing results that provide 
implicit indications of interaction effects between regional- and firm-level determinants. I 
differentiate 10 determinants that are usually operationalized by different proxies and 
highlight indications of an interaction between regional and firm-level determinants of the 
cash level. I focus on the basic determinants mentioned before, which stem from Opler et al. 
(1999) and are most frequently applied in empirical research. I compute box plots of the 
determinant-elasticities of cash holdings by geographic regions.
 4
 The box contains the 
median elasticity and is restricted by the 25%- and 75%-quantile. The whiskers indicate 
minimum and maximum determinant-elasticities. This allows comparing the quartiles, 
dispersion, and skewness of determinant-elasticities across regions. The regional categories 
US, EU, and Asia embrace results that were derived from samples that are entirely restricted 
to one geographic region. The global category refers to results that were obtained from 
samples embracing various geographic regions. The determinant-elasticities are calculated 
from my meta-sample of primary studies and indicate the percental change of the cash level 
in reaction to a change of 1% in a specific determinant. This means a determinant-elasticity 
of 0.02 indicates that the level of cash changes by 2% when an individual determinant 
changes by 1%. The definition of the 10 determinant-elasticities can be found in section 2.3. 
Figure 1 reports the box plots and reveals that various elasticities differ depending on 
geographic regions. This indicates an interaction between firm-level determinants of cash and 
regional characteristics.  
                                                        
4
 The composition of the meta-sample is explained in Section 2.4, 2.5, and Appendix B. The calculation of the 
determinant-elasticities is explained more detailed in Section 2.3.  
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The box plots provide two initial observations: First, there appear to be large differences 
in the determinant-elasticities between geographic regions. This indicates that regional 
characteristics have an influence on how firm-level characteristics are associated with the 
level of cash. Second, even within one geographic region the determinant-elasticities exhibit 
a large range of values. This suggests that either the empirical design of studies or the 
properties of specific sub-samples within a region affect how a firm-level determinant drives 
the level of cash. 
The box plots show that the median total asset-elasticity of cash is negative in US but 
positive in the EU and Asia. This is exemplarily confirmed by Ozkan/Ozkan (2004) for UK 
firms. The median elasticities in US and the EU are, unlike the elasticity in Asia, still close to 
each other. The investment activity-elasticity is negative across all regions. However, cash 
reacts more strongly in US, exhibiting a median elasticity close to -0.2, compared to all other 
regions. The US takes another distinct position when the R&D-elasticity of cash is regarded. 
European and Global studies report negative elasticities and object strongly to the positive 
results that are derived from US. A corresponding example from the literature are 
Bigelli/Sanchez-Vidal (2012) who point out that growth opportunities do not increase cash 
holdings in private Italian companies. Global and US results are reported to be negative but 
European and Asian results are positive. Exemplarily, a positive association between the level 
of cash and leverage is found in Chinese firms by Chen et al. (2012). As the box plots show, 
the elasticities have large outliers and especially observations from the Asian sample are split 
broadly between -1 and +1. The cash flow-elasticity of the cash ratio reports another switch 
of signs in elasticities. In this case, Global and Asian samples tabulate a positive median-
elasticity but US and European results are negative. 
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 The same differences are confirmed for the financial distress- and the corporate 
governance-elasticity. This is especially interesting in case of the corporate governance-
elasticity of cash holdings because a positive elasticity conflicts with predictions from the 
FCF-theory. Accordingly, declining information asymmetries that are caused by increases in 
the quality of corporate governance, decrease cash holdings in Global and Asian studies, but 
increase them in European and US studies. Specifically, Liu et al. (2015) find cash to increase 
with increasing board independence in China. A possible explanation is that country-level 
governance such as shareholder protection and legal enforcement is on average stronger in 
purely US and European samples compared to Asian and Global samples (La Porta et al., 
1997 and Leuz et al., 2008). Thus, strongly protected shareholders might acknowledge a 
firm’s need for cash to avoid costly external financing as suggested by the shareholder power 
hypothesis. Results that less dispersed across geographic regions are derived for the market-
to-book-, net working capital- and dividend-elasticity. 
In many cases determinant-elasticities appear to be more dispersed in Asia; the range of 
observed elasticity values in Asia embraces all observed value from other regions. This 
observation can be found for the total asset-, net working capital-, leverage-, financial 
distress-elasticity of cash holdings. The US shows by far the most dispersed elasticities when 
the market-to-book ratio and R&D expenditures are regarded. The global sample exhibits the 
most dispersed dividend-elasticities of cash. The dispersion of the remaining three 
determinant-elasticities is mostly similar. 
 
2 Methodology 
2.1 The approach of meta-regression analysis 
Meta-regression analysis allows the quantitative aggregation of results from distinct 
primary studies that investigate the same research question (Stanley/Doucouliagos, 2012). 
This aggregation of results accounts for differences in the research design of the respective 
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primary studies and structures conflicting results (Feld et al., 2013). The systematic 
procedure of MRA allows deriving new insights regarding the influence of primary study 
characteristics (Stanley/Jarrell, 1989). 
Empirical results on the determinants of cash holdings are diverse: Theoretical 
perspectives, variable definitions, econometric specifications, and the directions of estimated 
effects vary greatly which makes a comparison of results and the derivation of a holistic 
primary model a challenge. MRA is especially suited to resolve these issues by estimating the 
general effect of each of the most common cash holding determinants. It comprises existing 
cash holding studies into one meta-sample, consisting of various time periods, countries and 
firm characteristics. Moreover, the MRA approach pools existing results from different 
primary samples that were derived using different econometric methods and different 
variable definitions. Thus, meta-regressions identify the relation between the level of cash 
and specific determinants across modelling choices. This enables an estimation that is robust 
to the primary empirical modelling and allows predicting the impact of the study 
characteristics such as the geographic region. 
Economic research already picked up the instrument of MRA to investigate contrary 
results in individual areas of research.
5
 Examples include Égert/Halpern (2006) who study  
equilibrium exchange rates in new EU member states, Efendic et al. (2011) who analyze the 
effect of institutions on economic performance, Doucouliagos et al. (2014) who investigate 
the income elasticity of the value of a statistical life, i.e. the income elasticity of the marginal 
cost of avoiding deaths, and Zigraiova/Havranek (2015) who regard the impact of bank 
competition on financial stability. However, the MRA method is not widespread in the fields 
of business and finance, a scarce example is Feld et al. (2013) who analyze results regarding 
the effect of corporate taxes on capital structure. 
                                                        
5
 See Stanley/Doucouliagos (2012) for a general introduction into MRA and its areas of application. 
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MRA uses the association between one explanatory variable and the dependent variable 
found in primary studies as its dependent variable. Thus, MRA is the regression analysis of 
regression analyses. The economic association that serves as the dependent variable in a 
MRA is called “effect size” and can be estimated by various proxies like a regression 
coefficient, t-value or elasticity. The explanatory variables of a meta-regression describe the 
characteristics of the primary studies from which the effect sizes were derived. These 
characteristics include, amongst others, the econometric models used, the calculation of the 
dependent variable, the sample size, time period under analysis or the regional setting. 
Accordingly, a meta-regression model takes the following basic linear functional form, 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 × 𝑍𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 
𝐾
𝑘=1 𝜀𝑖𝑡,    (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the effect size of study 𝑖 in publication-year 𝑡. 𝑍𝑖𝑘𝑡 is a vector of 𝑘 explanatory 
variables describing characteristics of the primary studies. 
 
2.2 Publication Selection Bias 
An important challenge of MRA is publication selection. This describes the selective 
reporting of results to increase a study’s chance of being published. As Card/Krueger (1995) 
note, the main sources of publication selection are the intent of being compatible to the 
current conventions of the respective field of research and the preference of significant over 
insignificant results. Publication selection leads to results that are distorted towards current 
conventions and disregard insignificant results. This distortion is referred to as publication 
bias. There are numerous ways to account for this bias in MRAs. The funnel-asymmetry test 
(FAT) and the precision-effect test (PET), derived by Stanley/Doucouliagos (2007) and 
Stanley (2008), appear to be superior according to simulations undertaken by 
Stanley/Doucouliagos (2014) and Moreno et al. (2009). Their intuition, introduced by Egger 
et al. (1997), is that the standard errors associated with an effect size should vary 
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symmetrically around the most precise effect size and should be independent of the 
respective effect sizes. In the presence of publication selection, standard errors will vary 
asymmetrically, i.e., unprecise effect sizes will be distorted towards the conventional 
mainstream expectation and not symmetrically around the most precise estimates (Egger et 
al., 1997 and Stanley/Doucouliagos, 2014). The FAT-PET MRA accounts for this 
dependence and takes the following basic linear functional form: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.    (2) 
𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 is the standard error of the economic relation estimated in the respective 
primary study, which is used to calculate the effect size 𝑌𝑖𝑡. If 𝑌𝑖𝑡 in eq. (2) is a regression 
coefficient from a primary study, 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 equals the standard error of this regression 
coefficient reported in the respective primary study. In this univariate set-up 𝛽0 indicates the 
economic association in the primary study if publication bias was absent. Thus, 𝛽0 is also 
referred to as the precision-effect test (PET). When eq. (2) is applied on a sample of various 
studies, 𝛽0, i.e. the PET, represents the consensus association of this sample. The coefficient 
of 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚, 𝛽1 determines the magnitude as well as the sign of publication selection. It is 
called funnel-asymmetry test (FAT). Despite its simple construction, especially the PET has 
been proven to be “surprisingly effective in separating the wheat from the chaff” (Stanley, 
2008). 
 
2.3 Model design 
I follow the approach of Stanley/Doucouliagos (2012) in designing this MRA. A first 
indication of the effects of distinct cash holding determinants is provided by a graphical 
analysis. I derive funnel plots for each effect size. Subsequently, the impact of publication 
bias is controlled for, in univariate FAT-PET models that correspond to eq. (2). These models 
derive estimates for the individual association between the level of cash and each of the ten 
determinants leading to a total of ten distinct FAT-PET models. 
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Finally, I employ multivariate MRAs to examine the effect of other study characteristics 
on the consensus associations and to reduce potential sources of endogeneity. Most 
importantly, this approach tests if the geographic regions influences the effect size, which 
equals an interaction effect between regional and firm-level effects. The individual 
multivariate MRAs are determined according to the general-to-specific approach 
recommended by Stanley/Doucouliagos (2012) and their econometric specification is 
determined according to Feld/Heckemeyer (2011). A general version of these multivariate 
MRAs with a control for publication selection, based on eq. (1), is depicted in eq. (3): 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 × 𝑍𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 
𝐾
𝑘=2 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (3) 
 Corresponding to eq. (1), 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the effect size of study 𝑖 in publication-year 𝑡 and 𝑍𝑖𝑘𝑡 
represents a vector of 𝑘 explanatory variables describing characteristics of the primary 
studies. Heteroscedasticity is a frequent problem of MRAs. It is accounted for by using a 
weighted least squares (WLS) estimator. These WLS-MRAs scale all explanatory variables 
by a the standard errors that are associated with each observation of 𝑌𝑖𝑡. These standard errors 
need to be reported in the respective primary studies just like effect size.  
I include all estimates of the effect size that can be found in a primary study in my 
meta-sample. This approach generates a larger sample of observations of effect sizes per 
determinant and avoids a selection bias resulting from choosing only one specific observation 
from each primary study. However, this method bears the risk of unobserved heterogeneity, 
resulting from study-level effects, that needs to be accounted for. This means that 
observations which are obtained from the same study might be affected by specific 
characteristics of this primary study that are not controlled for in my MRAs. I rely on fixed 
effects WLS estimators and standard errors clustered on the study-level to mitigate this 
dependence, as advised by Stanley/Doucouliagos (2012). 
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Dependent variable 
 Each of my models uses the effect size of an individual cash holding determinant as 
dependent variable, which leads to 10 distinct models. I chose the elasticity 𝐸_ ∗𝑖𝑡 as the 
measure of effect size 𝑌𝑖𝑡. Elasticities are comparable across studies because they account for 
differences in the scaling of variables and they can be interpreted intuitively 
(Stanley/Doucouliagos, 2012). Exemplarily, when total assets are used to explain cash 
holdings in a regression model, the specification of the total assets-variable, either as the 
balance sheet value or its log, influences its regression coefficient. However, the total asset-
elasticity of cash holdings remains unaffected by this modelling choice. It denotes the 
percental change of the level of cash when total assets change by 1%, i.e. a total asset-
elasticity of 0.02 indicates that the level of cash changes by 2% when total assets change by 
1%. The individual elasticities are calculated by the subsequent formula: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸_ ∗𝑖𝑡= 𝐵_ ∗ ×  
𝑀_∗
𝑀_𝐶𝐻
    (4) 
 In eq. (4), 𝐵_ ∗ is the regression coefficient of the respective cash holding determinant, 
taken from a primary study. In each of the ten models, the asterisk is replaced by the name of 
the respective cash holding determinant, as shown in Appendix A. Consequently, 𝐵_𝑇𝐴 is the 
regression coefficient of total assets. 𝑀_𝐶𝐻 denotes the mean value of cash holdings and 
𝑀_ ∗ the mean value of the respective determinant in a primary study. Thus, 𝑀_𝑇𝐴 is the 
mean of total assets of a primary study. The determinants under consideration are total assets 
(𝐸_𝑇𝐴), investment activity (𝐸_𝐼𝑛𝑣), market-to-book ratio (𝐸_𝑀𝐵), R&D expenditures 
(𝐸_𝑅𝐷), net working capital (𝐸_𝑁𝑊𝐶), leverage (𝐸_𝐿𝑒𝑣), cash flow (𝐸_𝐶𝐹), dividends 
(𝐸_𝐷𝑖𝑣), financial distress (𝐸_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟) and corporate governance quality 
(𝐸_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑣). The resulting elasticities are stated in parentheses. Each is used as the 
dependent variable in a distinct MRA and measured in accordance with eq. (4). 
78 
 
 𝐸_𝐼𝑛𝑣 comprises two proxies, capital expenditures and acquisition expenditures. When a 
primary model uses capital expenditures or acquisition expenditures, I calculate the capital 
expenditure-elasticity respectively the acquisition expenditure-elasticity of cash according to 
eq. (4) but denote it in either case as 𝐸_𝐼𝑛𝑣.6 I proceed in the same way for 
𝐸_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟, which consists of proxies such as Altman’s Z-score, cash flow volatility 
or credit ratings as well as 𝐸_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑣, which consists of proxies such as managerial 
ownership, board independence or CEO duality. These distinct proxies are treated as 
observations of the same variable, 𝐸_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟 respectively 𝐸_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑣. Proxies 
for financial distress and the quality of corporate governance are adjusted to guarantee that a 
high value of each proxy indicates a high probability of financial distress, respectively a high 
quality of corporate governance. This is achieved by multiplying the primary study regression 
coefficient of the respective proxy with -1 whenever high values of a proxy in a primary 
study indicate a low probability of financial distress, respectively a low quality of corporate 
governance. This is exemplarily the case for entrenchment indices as in Harford (2008). A 
high value for this variable indicates that CEOs are entrenched and protect themselves from 
external discipline, which is a sign for corporate governance of low quality. 
 This approach is difficult to undertake for proxies of ownership because of its potential 
non-linear influence on the level of cash according to Drobetz/Grüninger (2007). I disregard 
this non-linearity of ownership proxies and assume high values to indicate high quality 
corporate governance. First, there is no consensus on the non-linearity of ownership and the 
general influence of different ownership variables. Second, it is my goal to investigate the 
general influence of corporate governance and not the specific implications of ownership. 
Finally, ownership variables are just one set out of various proxies that constitute 
                                                        
6
 Therefore 𝐸_𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡  can result from two equations: 𝐸_𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵_𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑥 ×  
𝑀_𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑥
𝑀_𝐶𝐻
 and 𝐸_𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵_𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢 ×
  
𝑀_𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢
𝑀_𝐶𝐻
. 
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𝐸_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑣, therefore a potential maladjustment of few ownership observations is 
absorbed by the unambiguous results of the remaining majority of governance variables. 
 
Explanatory variables 
 The vector 𝑍𝑖𝑘𝑡 of the multivariate MRA in eq. (3) represents the characteristics of 
primary studies, these are mostly coded as dummies. Inspired by Égert/Halpern (2006), I 
include dummies for each type of empirical estimation approach considered in the primary 
study. There are six options: Either OLS without fixed effects (the reference category), OLS 
with industry-fixed effects only (𝑂𝐿𝑆_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡), OLS with time-fixed effects only 
(𝑂𝐿𝑆_𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡), OLS with time- and industry-fixed effects (𝑂𝐿𝑆_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡), or either 
an instrumental variable approach or an difference-in-differences approach (𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡). These 
dummies take the value of 1 if the respective estimation approach was applied in a primary 
model and 0 otherwise.  
 Other explanatory variables are the log of the average sample year 
(𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡), log of the number of observations (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡), and 
dummies for the geographical region from which the primary study’s sample stems. These 
regional dummies indicate whether the sample of a primary study focusses exclusively on US 
(the reference category), exclusively on Asia (𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡) or exclusively on Europe 
(𝐸𝑈 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡). Whenever a primary study investigates firms from different regions jointly, 
e.g. Asian and European firms, and it is therefore impossible to identify a region-specific 
determinant-elasticity, the dummy 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 equals 1. 
Another dummy indicates if a primary study’s sample is restricted to firms that are 
especially subject to high firm-level information asymmetries (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡). Its 
purpose is to distinguish between country-level effects resulting from a country’s 
characteristics and effects resulting from the presence of unique firms that do not exist in 
other countries. It takes the value of 1 when a primary study focusses exclusively on high-
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tech, young, financially constrained, R&D-intensive, non-diversified, risky, badly-governed, 
small firms, firms with a high market-to-book ratio, firms with a non-investment credit rating, 
firms with a high standard deviation of cash flows, firms with entrenched managers, firms 
with CEOs that do not hold options of the respective firms, firms whose CEO compensation 
is highly sensitive to the stock price volatility (high vega),
7
 or firms with a high product 
market fluidity, i.e. firms that face competitors who quickly adjust their product portfolio to 
match the products of the firm under analysis, otherwise it takes the value 0. Thus, I do not 
measure information asymmetries myself but rely on the measurement of primary studies that 
restrict their samples to firms with specific features indicating the presence of information 
asymmetries. Consequently, my dummy for information asymmetries is independent from 
individual problems of modelling information asymmetries. This also implies that I only 
regard information asymmetries resulting from firm characteristics and not from country 
characteristics like investor protection.  
 I also employ a set of dummies indicating the control variables used in a primary model. 
The dummies take the value of 1 if a determinant was used as a control variable in the 
respective primary study, otherwise 0. I use the following dummies to account for the use of 
control variables: Firm size (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡), the market-to-book ratio (𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡), R&D 
expenditures (𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡), capital expenditures (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑡), net working capital (𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡), leverage 
(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡), cash flow (𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡), financial distress (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡), and governance quality 
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡). Such control variable dummies are only included if the respective determinant 
is not the dependent variable of the MRA. Due to multicollinearity, the multivariate MRAs 
do not contain all of the dummies. However, exchanging the aforementioned dummies does 
not alter the regression results. The multivariate MRA takes the general form of eq. (5), 
                                                        
7
 High vega indicates a high incentive for managers to take risks (Liu/Mauer, 2011). 
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where * is replaced by the respective variable, i.e. E_TA is the total asset-elasticity of the 
cash level:
 8
  
 
𝐸_ ∗𝑖𝑡= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝑂𝐿𝑆_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 × 𝑂𝐿𝑆_𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽4 × 𝑂𝐿𝑆_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 × 𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 × 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽9 × 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 × 𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 × 𝐸𝑈 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽12 × 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14 × 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽15 × 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16 × 𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17 × 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽18 × 𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽19 × 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽20 × 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽21 × 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22 × 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽23 × 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (5) 
Since there are 10 determinants under analysis, model (5) exists in 10 specifications, each 
with a different elasticity as dependent variable.  
 
2.4 Sample construction 
I identify relevant studies by a comprehensive literature research. First, all journals in the 
field of finance and accounting, ranked A+, A, or B, according to the journal ranking 
“Jourqual 2.1” of the German Academic Association for Business Research (VHB) as well as 
working papers from the NBER database are considered. These sources are searched for 
studies containing the term “cash holding” in their titles. Subsequently, the references of the 
studies found in the first scanning-routine are searched for additional studies related to cash 
holdings. 
The initial, hand-collected, sample of regression coefficients, associated standard errors 
and other study characteristics embraces 61 studies. Since this meta-study focuses exclusively 
on the influence of the most frequent determinants on the level of cash, only observations 
using a measure of the cash level as their dependent variable are kept in the final sample. 
Thus, studies that use excess cash or the change in cash as dependent variables as well as 
                                                        
8
 All dependent and explanatory variables and their abbreviations are introduced in Appendix A. 
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studies that investigate the influence of cash holdings on firm value are dropped. 
Furthermore, I omit studies that do not report mean values of the cash holding variable and 
the explanatory variables because these values are necessary to calculate elasticities. I also do 
not include interaction terms from the primary studies in my sample because these would 
inflate the number of explanatory variables in the meta-regression excessively and encounter 
problems of multicollinearity. Consequently, the final sample contains 45 studies, which 
equals 3439 effect sizes (elasticity-observations). I winsorize all elasticities at 1% and 99%. 
 
2.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for all dependent and explanatory variables. 
Panel A depicts summary statistics for the determinant-elasticities of cash holdings. 
According to the median-value cash holdings are rather inelastic to cash flows, dividends and 
financial distress. These determinants exhibit elasticities of 0.001, -0.003, and approximately 
0, which are the smallest median-values of all determinant-elasticities. In absolute terms, the 
market-to-book ratio and total assets are the determinants to which the cash level reacts most 
elastic (-0.074 and 0.087). However, in case of total assets this high median-value is tied to a 
standard deviation of 1.663, hinting a high variability in this elasticity. 
Distinguishing the market-to-book ratio and R&D expenditures, instead of treating them 
as one proxy, seems reasonable since the respective median-elasticities of 0.087 and 0.007 
differ substantially. Moreover, the investment activities-elasticity, reported with a median of -
0.053, indicates that tangible and intangible investments are financed differently. 
The median of the corporate governance-elasticity, -0.011, confirms the FCF-hypothesis, 
which assumes cash holdings to be the result of managerial discretion and thus to decrease 
with an increasing quality of governance. Furthermore, the elasticities of cash holdings to its 
potential substitutes, net working capital and leverage, are negative. Panel B reports summary 
statistics for all explanatory variables. 
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 Table 2 reports the number of observations of each determinant-elasticity split by 
geographic regions. The total sample comprises 3439 observations. Half of the observations 
stem from studies that focus exclusively on US. The other half is split evenly between Asian, 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A - Overview of Elasticities
Elasticity of 
Determinant
Mean Min.
25% 
Percentile
Median
75% 
Percentile
Max.
Std.
Dev.
Obs.
E_TA 0.042 -3.785 -0.625 -0.074 0.691 6.911 1.663 390
E_Inv -0.072 -0.661 -0.094 -0.053 0.008 0.307 0.159 301
E_MB 0.131 -0.805 -0.002 0.087 0.223 1.234 0.330 343
E_RD 0.026 -0.930 -0.046 0.007 0.131 0.460 0.180 236
E_NWC -0.010 -0.725 -0.166 -0.043 -0.009 0.282 1.869 319
E_Lev -0.188 -3.884 -0.372 -0.021 0.174 1.038 0.800 410
E_CF -0.009 -0.522 -0.031 0.001 0.027 0.267 0.110 364
E_Div 0.120 -0.546 -0.038 -0.003 0.260 2.852 0.538 243
E_TotalFinDistr -0.044 -1.776 -0.089 0.000 0.059 0.743 0.266 536
E_TotalGoodGov -0.014 -1.789 -0.052 -0.011 0.035 0.763 0.267 297
Total 3439
Panel B - Overview of Study Characteristics
Mean Min.
25% 
Percentile
Median
75% 
Percentile
Max.
Std.
Dev.
Obs.
ErrorTerm 0.311 0.000 0.006 0.030 0.114 19.030 1.130 3439
CHtoTA 0.573 0 0 1 1 1 0.495 3439
OnlyIndustry_FE 0.067 0 0 0 0 1 0.250 3439
OnlyTime_FE 0.130 0 0 0 0 1 0.336 3439
Industry&Time_FE 0.268 0 0 0 1 1 0.443 3439
IVorDiD 0.140 0 0 0 0 1 0.347 3439
AvgSampleYear 1997.5 1979 1994 1998.5 2002 2008.5 6.677 3439
Observations 19438.87 7 2180 5100 13864 209036 34647.6 3206
HighInfoAsym 0.121 0 0 0 0 1 0.326 3439
Firmsize 0.966 0 1 1 1 1 0.182 3439
M/B 0.942 0 1 1 1 1 0.233 3439
R&D 0.740 0 0 1 1 1 0.439 3439
NWC 0.845 0 1 1 1 1 0.362 3439
Lev 0.926 0 1 1 1 1 0.263 3439
CF 0.883 0 1 1 1 1 0.321 3439
CFuncer 0.834 0 1 1 1 1 0.372 3439
FinDistr 0.074 0 0 0 0 1 0.262 3439
TotalGov 0.605 0 0 1 1 1 0.489 3439
Infl 0.104 0 0 0 0 1 0.305 3439
The variables tabulated in table 1 are defined in Appendix A.
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European and global studies. Australia is not used as a distinct geographic region because of 
the small number of observations. Consequently, results from Australia are not considered in 
the multivariate MRAs analyzing the effects of geographic regions on determinant-
elasticities. However, results from Australia are kept for the univariate MRAs that derive 
consensus associations to include as many results as possible. 
 
 
 Figure 2 depicts the funnel plot of each determinant-elasticity. Funnel plots visualize the 
idea of testing for publication selection by investigating the distribution of elasticities with 
respect to their standard errors. The y-axis represents the precision of an elasticity, which 
equals the inverse of the standard error. This means that high values on the y-axis indicate 
high precision. The x-axis represents the value of determinant-elasticities. The distribution of 
elasticities should ideally mirror a funnel that is centered on the most precise estimates, i.e. 
imprecise elasticities deviate from more precise estimates but the direction of deviation is 
random. Thus, Unprecise estimates should vary symmetrically around the most precise 
estimate. Deviations from the symmetrical funnel indicate the presence of publication bias 
that leads to skewed results (Egger et al., 1997). This means that results are engineered 
towards a perceived conventional true elasticity that is expected to increase the chance of 
publication which makes the direction of the elasticity’s deviation depend on its precision. 
E_TA E_Inv E_MB E_RD E_NWC E_Lev E_CF E_Div E_TotalFinDistr E_TotalGoodGov
Asia 55 59 48 36 59 63 66 62 95 129 672
EU 81 9 52 25 30 92 28 40 54 25 436
Global 69 43 32 40 59 59 55 13 84 8 462
Australia 4 4 4 0 4 4 12 0 8 0 40
US 181 186 207 135 167 192 203 128 295 135 1829
Total 390 301 343 236 319 410 364 243 536 297 3439
The variables tabulated in table 2 are defined in Appendix A.
Table 2 Regional Sample Characteristics
Region
Observations
Total
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Highly precise elasticities that deviate from the funnel represent leverage points 
(Stanley/Doucouliagos, 2012). Such leverage points suggest situations when the general 
influence of a determinant on the cash level changes. Thus, they are not unprecise outliers but 
rather indicate that the determinant-elasticity of cash strongly deviates as a reaction to an 
influencing factor. The funnel plots complement many of the observations from the summary 
statistics and suggest the differences in individual determinant-elasticities by various leverage 
points.  
 The plots of the total asset-elasticity and of the net working capital-elasticity of cash 
holdings exhibit great outliers, as already indicated by their standard deviation. The outliers 
are in general quite large across all plots. While the median elasticities are, in absolute terms, 
all smaller than 0.1, the extreme values often exceed 1. Thus, the utilization of WLS 
estimator appears reasonable to account for these outliers. 
All plots roughly resemble the shape of funnels. However, in all cases the distribution of 
elasticities with respect to their precision is skewed. This can especially be seen in the plots 
of net-working capital-elasticity, leverage-elasticity, cash flow-elasticity and dividend-
elasticity of cash. Thus, publication selection is in general present but it remains impossible 
to determine its effect on the overall trend. Furthermore, many plots exhibit leverage points 
indicating meaningful deviation from the general trends. Examples include the total assets-
elasticity, investment activity-elasticity, R&D expenditure-elasticity, financial distress-
elasticity and corporate governance-elasticity of cash holdings. 
 
3 Results 
3.1 Consensus Determinant-Elasticities of Cash Holdings 
Table 3 reports the consensus associations between each determinant and the level of 
cash resulting from univariate MRAs. In this table and subsequent tables, 𝛽0 is the PET 
which indicates the consensus association, i.e. the elasticity, between an individual 
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determinant and the level of cash. The FAT, which indicates how publication bias affects the 
consensus elasticity, is represented by 𝛽1. Each column represents a different MRA-model 
analyzing the association between an individual determinant and the level of cash.  
 
 
Panel A tabulates WLS-MRA models with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, 
panel B reports fixed effects WLS-MRAs with standard errors clustered at the study-level, 
and panel C exhibits the results of random effects WLS-MRA models with standard errors 
modified as suggested by Knapp/Hartung (2003). The Hausman test reveals that correlated 
unobserved heterogeneity affects all univariate models. Moreover, the underlying approach of 
collecting all results from reported in each primary studies indicates the risk of unobserved 
heterogeneity resulting from study-level dependencies as pointed out in section 2.3. Thus, the 
fixed effects models (panel B) derive the most robust results. Overall, cash holdings increase 
when the market-to-book ratio, R&D expenditures, financial distress, and the quality of 
Table 3 Univariate FAT-PET MRA
Panel A - FAT-PET WLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variable: E_TA E_Inv E_MB E_RD E_NWC E_Lev E_CF E_Div E_Total
FinDistr
E_Total
GoodGov
Intercept:     (FAT) 895.7*** -0.514* 108.9*** 10.03*** -8.403*** -45.02*** 0.656*** 3.340* -9.545** 55.38**
(7.50) (-2.13) (6.75) (3.71) (-5.29) (-5.04) (3.59) (2.01) (-2.71) (2.63)
1/SE:      (PET) -1.916*** -0.0885*** 0.000677 0.000986*** -0.00592 -0.0127 -0.00106 -0.0644*** 0.0324*** 0.0398***
(-143.71) (-4.49) (1.11) (5.85) (-1.25) (-0.74) (-0.46) (-4.82) (5.71) (4.26)
Adj. R-sq 0.081 -0.000 0.112 0.049 0.062 0.041 0.021 0.009 0.002 -0.000
Panel B - Fixed Effects FAT-PET WLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Intercept:     (FAT) 206.8 -1.444 2.401 0.443 -0.620 -2.443 1.338 4.605 -1.948 114.6
(0.76) (-2.05) (0.27) (1.10) (-1.26) (-0.71) (1.18) (1.37) (-0.17) (0.93)
1/SE:      (PET) -1.902*** -0.0796*** 0.00215*** 0.00123*** -0.0110*** -0.0347*** -0.00204 -0.0655*** 0.0320*** 0.0395***
(-352.52) (-11.70) (17.75) (119.48) (-34.45) (-19.41) (-1.26) (-23.47) (59.15) (70.56)
Adj. R-sq 0.807 0.933 0.966 0.995 0.990 0.996 0.676 0.609 0.753 -0.057
Panel C - Random Effects FAT-PET WLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Intercept:     (FAT) 0.450** 0.427*** -0.213 0.0673 0.253 0.594*** -0.264* 0.424 -0.115 -0.173
(2.61) (3.42) (-1.32) (0.67) (1.41) (4.14) (-2.50) (1.92) (-1.17) (-0.85)
1/SE:      (PET) -0.0662 -0.129*** 0.151*** 0.0549*** -0.118*** -0.334*** 0.0247*** 0.0753* -0.0254* -0.0105
(-0.81) (-9.66) (7.75) (7.36) (-8.81) (-7.53) (4.51) (2.06) (-2.08) (-0.59)
Adj. R-sq 0.017 0.032 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.044 -0.002 0.014 0.002 0.006
# observations 390 302 343 236 319 410 364 243 536 297
# studies 38 27 36 21 34 39 33 25 38 21
This table presents results from the basic univariate FAT-PET regressions. Panel A uses WLS-regressions and heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors. Panel B uses fixed effects WLS-regressions, clustered at the study level and standard errors which are also clustered at the study 
level. Finally, Panel C uses random effects WLS-regressions and standard errors modified as suggested by Knapp/Hartung (2003). All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. The t-statistics are shown in parantheses.
𝛽 1
𝛽 0
𝛽 0
𝛽 1
𝛽 0
𝛽 1
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corporate governance increase. The corporate level of cash declines when total assets, 
investments expenditures, net working capital, leverage, and dividends diminish. 
The determinant-elasticities are mostly robust across all econometric specifications. 
According to panel A, the market-to-book ratio (model 3), net working capital (model 5) and 
leverage (model 6) do not have a significant influence on the corporate cash reserves. 
However, all these determinants turn out to influence the level of cash after controlling for 
the study-level dependence of results in panel B and C. Dividends (model 8), financial 
distress (model 9) and corporate governance (model 10) are reported to affect the level of 
cash in panel A and B but the sign of the association switches, respectively the association 
becomes insignificant, in the random effects model in panel C. All determinants, except cash 
flow, impact the cash level in the fixed effects models in panel B.  
 
3.2 Differences in the Determinant-Elasticities of Cash Holdings 
 The consensus determinant-elasticities presented in table 3 are estimated across the entire 
sample of studies and do not account for differences in the individual study design. In the 
next step of the analysis, I explore explanatory drivers of the determinant-elasticities and 
focus especially on the existence of an interaction between regional and firm-level 
determinants of cash holdings. Table 4 tabulates the corresponding results from fixed-effects 
multivariate MRAs. In these models, the constant cannot easily be interpreted as the elasticity 
after controlling for heterogeneity. It is difficult to derive statements on the general 
determinant-elasticity and its significance that are comparable to the univariate results in 
table 3. Thus, I focus on the influence of the individual primary study design, geographic 
regions, and high information asymmetries on the determinant-elasticities.  
 Overall, results indicate regional differences in the impact of individual cash 
determinants. However, the differences are less pronounced than existing research suggests. 
They are only found between US, Asia and the global sample. There is no indication of 
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differences in determinant-elasticities between US and Europe. Specifically, the results 
suggest that differences in Asia are the result of country-level agency issues or a lack of 
financing alternatives. This means that Asian legal regulations are less effective in protecting 
investors than their international counterparts and Asian firms do not rely on the capital 
market, especially equity investors. Overall, this points to a greater relevance of the FCF-
hypothesis and the underinvestment problem in Asia, whereas trade-off of considerations and 
a more balanced financing hierarchy are prevalent in US and Europe.  
 I observe regional differences that do not stem from firm-level information asymmetries 
for six determinants. US differs from Asia as well as the global sample regarding the total 
asset-, market-to-book-, net working capital- and leverage-elasticity of the cash level. Asia is 
the only region that features an investment-elasticity that differs from US while the global 
sample is the only region that exhibits a cash flow-elasticity that is distinct from US. 
 The total asset- and investment-elasticity increases in Asia compared to US. This 
suggests that Asian firms do, in comparison to US firms, not tend to diversify their sources of 
financing when they grow in size. Instead, they hoard even more cash and are not forced by 
external discipline to constrain their cash reserves. The more negative leverage-elasticity in 
Asia indicates that debt providers are more efficient than the legal regime in enforcing 
external discipline or offer the only financing alternative. The association of the Asian 
dummy with the net working capital-elasticity suggests that Asian firms tend to transform 
cash into other liquid assets more frequently than US firms. This might be motivated by the 
intent to hide large liquidity reserves and the potential for discretionary managerial actions. 
The regional differences observed between US and the global sample do mostly not match 
the differences between US and Asia. The influence of the global sample is difficult to 
interpret because the composition of the countries analyzed in individual primary samples 
contained in the global sample cannot be taken into account. Thus, I regard the differences 
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resulting from the global sample as a general indication of regional differences but refrain 
from deducing their cause on basis of the results shown in table 4. 
 High firm-level information asymmetries increase the dividend- and corporate 
governance-elasticity and decrease the R&D-elasticity of cash holdings. This suggests that 
firms with high information asymmetries tend to hold more cash than their counterparts with 
low information asymmetries when they pay out dividends or when their corporate 
governance quality increases. According to the FCF-hypothesis, the level of cash should 
decline when the information asymmetries decline and the interests between shareholders and 
managers are aligned. High quality of corporate governance implies such an alignment of 
interests and dividend payments also serve as a signal of alignment. Against this background 
the mentioned effect of high information asymmetries indicates that increasing the alignment 
of interests is more effective in reducing the corporate cash stock when information 
asymmetries are already low. Firms with high information are reported to hold less cash 
when they increase R&D expenditures. This suggests a higher dependence of such firms on 
cash as an instrument to finance R&D projects. The corporate cash stock and operating cash 
flows are depleted to undertake R&D investments.   
 Finally, table 4 provides implications for the design of primary research. In most cases, 
determinant-elasticities do not depend on the econometric method applied. The total asset-, 
dividend-, financial distress-, and corporate governance-elasticity of cash holdings are an 
exception. The total asset- and financial distress-elasticity of cash increase when fixed 
effects, instrumental variables, or a difference-in-differences approach are employed instead 
of simple OLS regressions. The dividend- and corporate governance-elasticity decline when 
industry and time fixed effects, instrumental variables, or a difference-in-differences 
approach are used. Thus, the association between these four determinants and the level of 
cash might especially suffer from endogeneity and researchers need to be careful when 
investigating them for causal inferences.  
91 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Explaining the Determinant-Elasticities of Cash Holdings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variable: E_TA E_Inv E_MB E_RD E_NWC E_Lev E_CF E_Div
E_Total
FinDistr
E_Total
GoodGov
Publication selection
ErrorTerm -43.21 -1.305 4.301 0.314 -0.792 -4.245 2.804 7.041 -6.303 108.2
(-1.14) (-1.94) (0.36) (0.79) (-0.95) (-1.14) (1.42) (1.40) (-1.28) (0.92)
Model characteristics
OLS_IndFE -0.0558 0.0309 -0.0163 -0.00187 0.00420 0.00572 -0.00471 -0.272* -0.0329***
(-1.38) (0.09) (-0.28) (-0.09) (0.07) (0.02) (-0.54) (-2.16) (-618.23)
OLS_TimeFE -0.247 0.0940 0.000388 0.00531 0.0333 0.218 -0.00316 -0.0305*** 0.106***
(-1.30) (1.76) (0.20) (1.87) (1.04) (1.54) (-0.41) (-42.16) (19.68)
OLS_IndTimeFE -0.236 0.102 0.00110 0.00492 0.0331 0.218 -0.00305 -0.0453*** 0.0835*** -0.167***
(-1.21) (1.79) (0.37) (1.73) (1.03) (1.54) (-0.40) (-27.48) (28.89) (-31.10)
IVorDiD 0.806*** 0.0383 -0.00178 -0.00570 0.0124 0.281 0.0107 -0.0225*** -0.000911 -0.266*
(3.85) (1.13) (-1.69) (-0.74) (0.66) (1.72) (0.47) (-7.10) (-0.51) (-2.29)
Sample characteristics
LogAvgSampleYear -205.0* 79.41* -32.77 1.884 11.91 17.85 18.57 -40.92
(-2.17) (2.73) (-0.41) (0.11) (0.11) (0.27) (0.64) (-0.15)
LogObservations 0.0318 -0.0111 0.00717 -0.00232 -0.0161 -0.125 0.00385 0.00871 0.00337*** 0.0487***
(1.28) (-1.84) (1.05) (-1.73) (-1.05) (-1.76) (0.96) (0.58) (60.72) (901.98)
Asian sample 1.030*** 0.300*** 0.291*** -0.495 -0.0833*** -0.970*** -0.342 -0.00812 5.826
(12.39) (5.19) (3.63) (-0.72) (-6.52) (-15.51) (-1.34) (-0.57) (1.34)
EU sample 0.484 0.0356 -0.332 -0.386 0.0518 0.223 -2.207 -0.736 20.33
(0.48) (0.15) (-0.42) (-0.71) (0.42) (0.22) (-1.37) (-1.61) (1.26)
Global sample 0.449*** 0.0161 -0.0533*** 0.00146 0.144*** 0.113*** -0.00858** -0.00405
(21.17) (1.72) (-15.35) (1.54) (18.96) (4.03) (-2.81) (-0.25)
HighInfoAsym 0.141 -0.00934 -0.0385 -0.0159*** 0.0194 -0.0429 0.0104 0.142*** -0.0258 0.0320***
(1.02) (-0.33) (-0.97) (-8.19) (0.73) (-0.40) (0.49) (6.59) (-0.58) (174.69)
Moderating variables of primary study
Firmsize -0.0174*** -0.00466
(-4.09) (-0.77)
Capx -0.000805*** -0.0000256 -0.000366 0.0129 0.0369***
(-8.24) (-1.73) (-0.09) (0.26) (5.99)
MB -0.00333 0.0248*** 0.584 0.0127 -1.540
(-0.02) (4.93) (0.67) (1.24) (-0.96)
NWC -0.0690 0.467 -0.464***
(-0.22) (1.52) (-7.50)
Lev 0.103*** -0.00378 -0.0364***
(18.05) (-0.93) (-5.91)
CF 0.645***
(9.30)
Div -0.0145
(-0.46)
FinDistr 4.329 -9.399 -3.910 -3.630
(0.36) (-1.17) (-1.47) (-1.39)
TotalGov 2.268*** -0.00639 0.0189 -0.00186* -0.00742 -0.118 -0.400 0.00384 0.00252*
(6.30) (-1.90) (0.87) (-2.46) (-1.13) (-1.11) (-1.35) (0.55) (2.31)
Constant 1554.9* -603.6* 249.2 0.0255 -14.19 -82.10 -135.9 -140.3 310.3 1.533
(2.17) (-2.73) (0.41) (0.19) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.27) (-0.63) (0.15) (0.89)
Database Dummies No No No No No No No No No No
Study Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Observations 366 258 319 216 295 386 300 223 507 297
# Sudies 36 25 34 20 32 37 31 24 36 21
Adj. R-sq 0.920 0.961 0.971 0.996 0.994 0.997 0.710 0.672 0.964 0.261
This table presents results from multivariate FAT-PET MRAs. Table 4 uses WLS-regressions with study fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the 
study-level. All variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. The t-statistics are shown in 
parantheses.
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 Table 5 provides further insights on the effects of the empirical research design by 
including additional variables that model the design of primary research. A dummy for the 
specification of the cash holding variable is included. It takes the value 0 if cash holdings are 
calculated as cash plus short-term investments scaled by net assets (the reference category)
9
 
and 1 if cash holdings are defined as cash scaled by total assets (𝐶𝐻𝑡𝑜𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡). I also include a 
dummy that takes the value 1 if a determinant was in the central focus of the respective 
primary study (𝑉𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡). The underlying intuition is that determinants which are in the 
central focus of a study are potentially subject to more publication bias than the control 
variables of the same study. A determinant is assumed to be in the central focus if it is 
mentioned in the abstract, the introduction or the conclusion of a study. Finally, I also add the 
variable 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 and 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝐵. They take the value 1 when the accounting 
information of a primary study do not stem from Compustat but from Datastream, 
respectively a different source of data. Both variables take the value 0 If the accounting 
information are obtained from Compustat. 
 The inclusion of these study characteristics results in losing the difference of the Asian 
region for the total asset-, market-to-book-, net working capital-, and leverage-elasticity of 
cash holdings. In contrast, the cash flow- and dividend-elasticity of cash holding rises, 
respectively declines, when Asia is compared to the US. This observation is most likely 
related to the addition of the database indicators. Studies that deviate from a standard US 
sample are more likely to employ databases distinct from Compustat. These studies either 
rely on Datastream because it offers a more extensive coverage of international firms or they 
use a national, potentially hand-collected database. Thus, changing a study’s database does 
not necessarily cause a change of results but the change of results is rather related to the 
geographic region of a study’s sample which determines the required database. 
 
                                                        
9
 Net assets equal total assets less cash. 
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Table 5 Determinant Elasticities of Cash Holdings and the Empirical Design of  Research
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
E_TA E_Inv E_M/B E_R&D E_NWC E_Lev E_CF E_Div
E_Total
FinDistr
E_Total
GoodGov
Publication selection
ErrorTerm -3.170 -0.406 -8.810 0.683 1.962 -6.070 0.610 3.517 -1.344 76.63
(-0.12) (-0.59) (-0.82) (1.11) (1.03) (-0.94) (0.93) (1.12) (-0.48) (0.88)
Model characteristics
OLS_IndFE 0.132 0.979* -0.241* -0.281** -0.229 2.559* -0.00423 -0.135 -0.0328*** -0.929*
(0.49) (2.57) (-2.45) (-3.43) (-0.51) (2.29) (-0.53) (-1.29) (-247.39) (-2.16)
OLS_TimeFE -0.158 -0.0589 0.000341 -0.0364 0.0960* -0.0864 -0.00495 -0.0336*** 0.00592 0.514***
(-0.91) (-0.60) (0.16) (-0.99) (2.38) (-0.13) (-0.69) (-9.16) (0.13) (4.87)
OLS_IndTimeFE -0.344* -0.0160 -0.000252 -0.0368 0.0993* 0.617* -0.00490 -0.0387*** 0.0638*** -0.166***
(-2.36) (-0.22) (-0.07) (-1.00) (2.31) (2.06) (-0.68) (-4.57) (3.64) (-10.41)
IVorDiD -0.0831 0.0170 -0.00134 0.00348 0.168 0.704 0.0290 -0.0223*** -0.0122 -0.222**
(-0.41) (0.29) (-0.60) (0.37) (1.90) (1.10) (1.10) (-9.34) (-0.92) (-2.87)
CHtoTA 0.0682 0.275** 0.0353 -0.0187 -0.0833 -0.388 0.000127 -0.144* 0.00473 0.326
(0.16) (3.16) (0.35) (-0.77) (-0.66) (-0.98) (0.01) (-2.67) (0.33) (0.83)
VarCentral -0.661*** 0.642** 0.279 -0.00331 -0.724 0.607 0.00298 -0.0712 0.0670 5.486
(-4.55) (2.94) (2.00) (-0.19) (-2.01) (1.77) (0.27) (-1.39) (0.78) (1.29)
Datastream 1.736** -0.0918 -0.367** -0.191** 0.252 1.940* -0.0195 0.349* -0.000732 -4.315
(3.43) (-0.73) (-3.16) (-3.12) (0.77) (2.21) (-0.80) (2.39) (-0.01) (-0.79)
OtherDataB -0.557** -0.830* -0.274 1.230 0.285 -0.195 0.0320** 0.370** -0.00480 -0.0101
(-3.45) (-2.40) (-1.81) (1.12) (1.59) (-0.26) (2.96) (3.30) (-0.05) (-0.02)
Sample characteristics
LogAvgSampleYear -175.9*** 121.0*** 29.84 -15.83** 12.33 146.5 -7.259 -20.13 -24.49*** -57.86
(-4.29) (4.39) (0.78) (-3.87) (0.86) (1.20) (-1.87) (-1.75) (-6.35) (-0.87)
LogObservations 0.0414* -0.00394 0.0159 0.0174 -0.0473* -0.303* 0.00383 -0.00882 0.00325*** 0.0487***
(2.17) (-0.52) (1.12) (1.00) (-2.26) (-2.10) (1.05) (-1.02) (19.10) (880.77)
Asian sample 2.091 1.140** -0.131 -1.320 -0.0411 1.568 0.0732** -0.241* -0.0775 -0.283
(1.87) (2.90) (-0.90) (-1.20) (-0.27) (1.65) (2.91) (-2.07) (-0.84) (-0.60)
EU sample -2.115*** -0.154 0.0675 0.159** 0.0619 -2.067* -0.0754 -0.235 0.269** 4.152
(-4.47) (-0.42) (0.41) (3.31) (0.11) (-2.65) (-1.56) (-1.70) (3.12) (0.81)
Global sample 0.149 0.615** -0.0385 0.0222 0.341 3.207** -0.00934* -0.216 0.0344 3.417
(0.89) (3.64) (-1.23) (0.93) (2.03) (3.23) (-2.10) (-1.91) (0.48) (0.70)
HighInfoAsym 0.128 -0.308 -0.382* 0.00255 0.326 0.812 0.0116 0.106* 0.0655 0.0319***
(0.72) (-2.02) (-2.09) (0.19) (1.59) (1.30) (0.80) (2.26) (1.16) (219.04)
Moderating variables of primary study
firmsize -0.659*** -0.540*** 1.070** 0.0807* 0.149*** 5.354
(-3.88) (-4.39) (2.96) (2.61) (4.36) (1.25)
MB -1.492*** 1.005** 0.0871 0.331 3.737*** 0.0575*** 0.315
(-4.77) (3.14) (0.49) (0.91) (3.74) (7.07) (1.19)
RD 1.498*** -0.445* 1.362
(5.13) (-2.71) (0.69)
Capx 0.124*** 0.343** 0.153*** -0.250 0.925 -0.0352* 0.0832 -1.384
(6.26) (3.15) (8.39) (-1.32) (1.84) (-2.65) (1.74) (-0.83)
NWC 0.204 -0.154 0.0822** 0.0643
(0.73) (-0.99) (3.12) (1.37)
Lev -0.343** -0.153*** 0.241 0.0360* 0.559
(-3.15) (-8.39) (1.27) (2.72) (0.46)
CF -0.416*** 0.154 -0.100
(-4.96) (0.68) (-0.73)
Div -0.404
(-0.57)
FinDistr -0.659*** -0.540*** 1.070** 0.0807* 0.149*** 5.354
(-3.88) (-4.39) (2.96) (2.61) (4.36) (1.25)
TotalGov 0.694*** -0.825*** 0.384 0.162*** -0.668*** -3.129*** -0.00274 -0.0473 0.00224* -1.053
(5.05) (-11.07) (1.71) (12.45) (-6.47) (-3.85) (-0.25) (-1.18) (2.46) (-0.62)
Constant 1335.5*** -919.3*** -227.4 120.1** -93.91 -1114.6 55.03 153.1 185.9*** 434.4
(4.29) (-4.39) (-0.78) (3.86) (-0.86) (-1.20) (1.87) (1.75) (6.35) (0.86)
Database Dummies
included?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Study Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No No No
# Observations 366 258 319 216 295 386 300 223 507 297
# Sudies 36 25 34 20 32 37 31 24 36 21
Adj. R-sq 0.797 0.922 0.927 0.941 0.862 0.871 0.646 0.597 0.957 0.268
This table presents results from multivariate Fat-Pet MRAs using WLS-regressions and standard errors clustered at the study-level. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. The t-statistics are shown in parantheses.
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 Most determinant-elasticities are robust to the definition of the cash holding variable. 
The only exception are the investment- and dividend-elasticity of cash holdings which  
increase, respectively decrease, when cash is scaled by total assets instead of net assets. 
Equivalently, most determinant-elasticities are robust to the focus of interest of a primary 
study. This means that determinant-elasticities do not change when the respective 
determinant is of central interest for the underlying study. The only exception are the total 
assets- and investment-elasticity which decline/increase when total assets/investments are in 
the central focus. 
 Overall, this shows that the association between individual explanatory variables and the 
level of cash is quite robust to empirical design choices. Choosing between simple OLS 
regression, the inclusion of different types of fixed effects, and using instrumental variable or 
a difference-in-differences approach appears to be the most influential design choice. It 
affects the total asset-, dividend-, financial distress-, and corporate governance-elasticity of 
cash holdings, at least. Table 5 also reports the investment-, market-to-book-, R&D-, net 
working capital-, and leverage-elasticity to be affected but these are rather infrequent 
observations. 
 
3.3 Country Characteristics and the Determinant-Elasticities of Cash Holdings 
So far, this study points out how the empirical design in level of cash regressions affects 
individual results  and provides evidence for the existence of an interaction effect between 
firm-level and regional drivers of cash holdings. Exploring the cause of these regional 
differences in the association between firm-level characteristics and the level of cash is 
outside of the scope of this study. Meta-regressions have the purpose of estimating general 
trends in research results and analyzing the effects of the design of primary studies. 
Subsequently, I try to explore the driver of the regional differences by modelling the 
characteristics of individual countries. This requires me to focus only on elasticities that are 
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derived from studies that analyze single countries. There are several studies that investigate 
the U.S. individually, but very few studies focus exclusively on one Asian or European 
country. I only regard the characteristics of countries that are investigated by at least two 
single-country studies. Consequently, I focus on single-country studies in China, Japan, 
Switzerland, the UK, and the US.  
I determine the following country characteristics: GNI scaled by the number of 
inhabitants (𝐺𝑁𝐼/𝑐𝑎𝑝) and the change in the capitalization of the capital market 
(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ), which is defined as the change in market capitalization of listed 
domestic firms scaled by the GDP. Both variables are obtained from The World Bank World 
Development Indicators database. Moreover, the Polity2 index of democracy (𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦) 
converted from a -10 to +10 scale to a 0-1 scale which is obtained from Gennaioli et al. 
(2014), and the sum of a countries exports and imports scaled by its DGP (𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) 
obtained from Gennaioli et al. (2014) are included. 𝐺𝑁𝐼/𝑐𝑎𝑝 is a common indicator for the 
economic development of a country as it is the central measure for the to differentiate 
developed countries from developing countries used by the World Bank. 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ suggests the size and relevance of the equity market. 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 
measures how democratic the political system of a country is. 0 represents a total autocracy 
and 1 equals a total democracy. Finally, 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 indicates if a country is well connected 
with other countries, which is beneficial because the transfer of technologies as well as labor 
is fostered and the economy grows.  
Moreover, dummy variables are included, indicating the decades over which the primary 
studies’ samples span. I employ five time dummies (60𝑠, 70𝑠, 80𝑠, 90𝑠 and 2000𝑠,). They 
equal 1 if at least one year of the respective decade is covered by the sample period of a 
primary study; otherwise 0. This provides insights about time trends of individual consensus 
associations. The 60s are used as the reference category. Thus the individual time dummies 
indicate how a switch from a sample period spanning over the 60s to one that spans, for 
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example, over the 80s impacts the consensus associations. The time dummy for the 90s is 
dropped because there is too little variation, as the 90s are covered by all studies.  
I apply the multivariate model presented in table 4 on the sub-sample of single-country 
studies and add the previously discussed country characteristics. The value of the respective 
country characteristics are assigned based on the average sample year of the sample from 
which an elasticity is derived. This means, if an elasticity is derived from a U.S. sample and 
the average sample year is 1990, consequently 𝐺𝑁𝐼/𝑐𝑎𝑝 takes the value associated with the 
year 1990 and 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ is equal to the growth in market capitalization from 1989 
to 1990. The results are presented in table 6, the control variables from table 4 are included 
but not tabulated. 
Results show that most regional differences are not explained by differences in the 
economic condition of a country or the relevance of the equity market. The total asset-, 
investment activity-, net working capital-, and leverage-elasticity of cash are unaffected by 
the additional control variables. Regional differences in the market-to-book-elasticity of cash 
holdings disappear after including the country characteristics and time dummies, although 
these variables do not have a significant impact. The inclusion of the decade dummies does 
not reveal a clear time trend. In most cases the dummies do not affect determinant-elasticities. 
The net working capital- and cash flow-elasticity of cash are the only associations that are 
affected by various decade dummies. However, sign associated with the dummies switches 
and does not document a persistent time trend.  
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In the next step, I extend the analysis by including the dummy variable 𝐶𝑖𝑣𝐿𝑎𝑤 which 
takes the value of 1 if a country‘s legal system originates from a civil law tradition. In case of 
a common law origin the variable takes the value 0. The classification of legal tradition is 
obtained from La Porta et al. (2000). This variable could not be included in the models of 
table 6 because it would have been absorbed by the study fixed effects. Therefore, table 7 
employs WLS regressions without study fixed effects. The tabulated results reveal that the 
differences in determinant-elasticities in Asia diminishes with the inclusion of 𝐶𝑖𝑣𝐿𝑎𝑤. The 
leverage-elasticity of cash holdings is found to be the only association that persists to differ 
between the US and Asia.  
Table 6 Determinant-Elasticities of Cash Holdings and Country Characteristics
FAT-PET WLS-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variable: E_TA E_Inv E_MB E_RD E_NWC E_Lev E_CF E_Div
E_Total
FinDistr
E_Total
GoodGov
Asian sample 1.936*** 0.273** -0.153 -1.769 -0.155*** -2.285* -0.281 -0.819 3.750
(8.84) (3.63) (-0.27) (-0.91) (-24.41) (-2.42) (-1.32) (-0.53) (0.97)
EU sample 4.604** -0.458* 2.918 -5.739 17.10 5.857
(2.99) (-2.64) (0.97) (-0.73) (0.96) (1.03)
70s 3.369* 0.00842 0.682 1.839 -0.184*** -1.191*** -0.161* 0.175 -26.09
(2.38) (0.04) (1.39) (0.92) (-10.25) (-6.77) (-2.12) (0.69) (-0.96)
80s -30.42 -0.00468 1.153 -0.671 0.106*** 0.177 0.314*** 1.131 19.00 8.948
(-1.04) (-0.07) (0.54) (-0.93) (17.88) (0.08) (4.30) (0.70) (0.94) (1.09)
90s 42.51 0.341 -10.68 2.388 -1.449*** -2.316*** 1.291 -2.481 -2.844 -3.847
(1.37) (1.16) (-0.83) (0.97) (-7.94) (-4.23) (1.80) (-0.71) (-0.91) (-1.19)
2000s 28.26 0.103 -1.805 0.912 -0.144*** 0.698 -0.289** -1.056 -16.99
(0.97) (1.41) (-0.66) (0.88) (-14.11) (0.23) (-3.22) (-0.67) (-0.94)
GNI/cap 0.000462*** 0.0000110* -0.0000125 -0.0000873 -0.00000124 -0.000271* -0.0000374 0.00000142 -0.000556 0.000110
(12.49) (2.49) (-1.01) (-1.00) (-1.22) (-2.26) (-1.43) (0.16) (-0.97) (1.03)
MarketCapGrowth 0.0538*** 0.00690 0.0562 0.00419 -0.000925 -0.0417 -0.000564 0.00167 -0.153 2.585
(7.71) (1.50) (1.07) (1.15) (-0.73) (-1.88) (-0.17) (1.55) (-1.05) (1.15)
Democracy 34.35** -0.0163 0.0657 1.511*** -26.57** 0.0278 -0.560 1.520 -0.271
(2.84) (-1.86) (0.87) (8.19) (-3.34) (2.06) (-0.21) (0.97) (-0.77)
Openess 13.38*** 0.234 10.13 -4.981 0.0234 4.651 1.738** -0.118
(6.85) (0.87) (0.70) (-0.97) (0.36) (0.26) (3.57) (-0.33)
HighInfoAsymmetry 0.195 -0.0144 -0.0260 -0.00473 0.0292 -0.0298 0.0161 0.155*** 0.0128 0.0320***
(1.34) (-0.44) (-0.61) (-0.81) (1.29) (-0.24) (1.59) (54.69) (0.64) (138.54)
Constant -55.79*** -0.277* -2325.3 1.327 0.142** -2529.0 -657.3* 2.621 26.60 -0.226
(-5.00) (-2.14) (-0.76) (1.06) (3.29) (-0.59) (-2.67) (0.68) (0.92) (-0.29)
Controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Database Dummies No No No No No No No No No No
Study Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Observations 261 180 263 151 193 283 201 174 371 226
# Studies 27 18 29 17 23 28 23 19 28 16
Adj. R-sq 0.920 0.956 0.971 0.998 0.999 0.998 0.854 0.640 0.967 0.258
This table presents results from multivariate FAT-PET MRAs using a sample consisting only of studies foucssing on single countries. 
Table 6 uses WLS-regressions with study fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the study-level. Models 1-10 include the same 
control variables as the corresponding models in table 4. For the sake of brevity, these control variables are not tabulated. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. The t-statistics are shown in parantheses.
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This indicates that the regional differences in the association of firm-level characteristics 
with the level of cash mainly results from diverging legal traditions. A common law tradition 
is assumed to be associated with a high country-level of investor protection; vice versa civil 
law countries feature a low level of investor protection, as La Porta et al. (2000) point out. 
This implies that country-level investor protection is largely responsible for regional 
differences in the influence of firm-level cash holding determinants. China as well as Japan 
and Switzerland follow a civil law tradition while the UK and the US follow a common law 
tradition. Thus, the effect of the legal origin is difficult to distinguish from the general 
regional differences between Asia and the US that was found before. Consequently, the 
insights from table 7 should not be interpreted as strong evidence but rather as a call for 
additional research that is able to clearly distinguish the effect a country’s legal tradition on 
the association between firm-level characteristics and the level of cash. I am unable to 
include more country characteristics, for example the corporate tax rate, or the level of 
investor protection because my sample features either too few observations or too little 
variation. Moreover, I need to partly sacrifice the strength of MRA, namely its broad sample 
and independence of individual modelling choices, to undertake this analysis of country 
characteristics.  
It is a goal for future research, to provide more insights on the regional differences in the 
impact of firm characteristics on cash holdings. The interaction of firm and country 
characteristics stills needs to be investigated more thoroughly from a causal viewpoint. This 
requires a more extensive investigation of various country characteristics in a broad 
international sample and especially the inclusion of a potential interaction effect between 
firm-level cash determinants and regional characteristics. 
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3.4 Robustness & limitations 
I conduct two sets of robustness checks for the multivariate analysis. Firstly, I alter the 
control for publication selection by exchanging the estimate’s standard error with the squared 
standard error. The PET estimator then becomes the so-called precision-effect estimate with 
standard error (PEESE) estimator. According to Stanley/Doucouliagos (2007 and 2014) and 
Moreno et al. (2009), this estimator provides an improved correction for publication 
selection, when there actually is a publication bias. However, the FAT-PET model is more 
precise when there is no publication selection. The corresponding results are documented in 
table 8. Secondly, I vary the effect size by using the t-values of the primary regression 
coefficients instead of its elasticities. T-values are, like elasticities, robust to differences in 
Table 7 Determinant-Elasticities of Cash Holdings and Legal Origin
FAT-PET WLS-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variable: E_TA E_Inv E_MB E_RD E_NWC E_Lev E_CF E_Div
E_Total
FinDistr
E_Total
GoodGov
Asian sample -48.51 0.259 6.362 0.278 -5.593* 1.243 0.421 -8.187 25.76
(-1.65) (0.25) (1.67) (0.80) (-2.20) (1.60) (0.54) (-1.28) (0.90)
EU sample -2.081** -0.241 -1.911 -11.33 0.634 5.640* -0.522* 1.160*** -0.923 -3.668
(-2.78) (-0.75) (-1.66) (-1.70) (0.66) (2.13) (-2.28) (5.44) (-0.23) (-0.89)
70s -0.214 0.332** -1.124 -0.438 1.034** 2.377 -0.239 0.408 0.0586
(-0.42) (2.96) (-1.71) (-0.71) (3.42) (1.51) (-1.56) (1.70) (0.15)
80s -0.201 -0.509*** -0.132 0.0127 -0.388** 0.294 0.0866** 0.231* -0.137 8.466
(-0.90) (-17.35) (-0.86) (0.27) (-2.97) (0.53) (3.35) (2.36) (-1.62) (1.03)
90s 0.688* -0.0631 -0.165 -0.706* 0.160 -3.339*** -0.109* -0.0185 -0.0102 -1.173
(2.30) (-1.03) (-0.69) (-2.64) (1.76) (-3.80) (-2.36) (-0.16) (-0.06) (-1.73)
2000s 0.0881 0.662*** 0.249 0.391 0.0731 -0.380 -0.00112 -0.222** 0.288 -0.407
(0.28) (11.31) (1.60) (1.88) (0.28) (-0.66) (-0.02) (-3.16) (1.92) (-0.12)
CivLaw 48.99 0.421* -0.163 -7.255* 6.789* -1.370 -0.541 7.114 -37.77
(1.66) (2.47) (-0.14) (-2.34) (2.55) (-1.56) (-0.76) (1.33) (-0.98)
GNI/cap 0.000000135 0.00000200 0.0000256*** 0.0000133 -0.0000240*** -0.000142*** 0.00000341 -0.0000120*** -0.00000234 -0.000268
(0.01) (0.54) (4.58) (1.99) (-5.31) (-5.92) (0.97) (-9.09) (-0.30) (-0.96)
MarketCapGrowth -0.102* 0.00216 0.444 0.0272 -0.0313 0.326* -0.0210 0.0233 -0.252 -1.528
(-2.33) (0.20) (0.96) (0.30) (-0.85) (2.09) (-1.28) (1.30) (-1.25) (-0.45)
Democracy 0.0733* -0.00389 -0.0276** -52.78 0.0250 0.194*** 0.00682* 0.00276 -0.00814 -0.722
(2.43) (-0.57) (-3.01) (-0.82) (1.99) (6.37) (2.39) (0.31) (-0.94) (-0.91)
Openess 6.037* -0.712 5.256 30.79 -3.692 -19.93* 0.802 0.0457 2.970
(2.37) (-1.41) (1.32) (1.87) (-1.34) (-2.14) (1.14) (0.03) (0.22)
HighInfoAsymmetry -0.0554 -0.0257 -0.0353 -0.00963 -0.208 0.437 0.0158 0.146*** 0.000137 0.0320***
(-0.21) (-0.97) (-0.76) (-1.47) (-1.37) (1.27) (1.93) (13.67) (0.01) (138.54)
Constant 2190.5* 77.65 1693.8* 2677.3* -1062.1* -4863.6* 267.3 -709.8*** 426.3 4.246
(2.57) (0.42) (2.63) (2.40) (-2.22) (-2.57) (1.10) (-4.11) (0.52) (0.74)
Controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Database Dummies No No No No No No No No No No
Study Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No No No
# Observations 261 180 263 151 193 283 201 174 371 226
# Studies 27 18 29 17 23 28 23 19 28 16
Adj. R-sq 0.913 0.956 0.951 0.990 0.971 0.974 0.821 0.635 0.967 0.258
This table presents results from multivariate FAT-PET MRAs using a sample consisting only of studies foucssing on single countries. Table 7 uses 
WLS-regressions and standard errors clustered at the study-level. Models 1-10 include the same control variables as the corresponding models in table 
4. For the sake of brevity, these control variables are not tabulated. All variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. The t-statistics are shown in parantheses.
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scaling across estimates but are not as easy to interpret from an economic viewpoint. The 
results of this test are tabulated in table 9. 
 
 
 
Table 8 Robustness Control - PEESE estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
E_TA E_Inv E_M/B E_R&D E_NWC E_Lev E_CF E_Div
E_Total
FinDistr
E_Total
GoodGov
Publication selection
ErrorTerm_squared 0.00790 -0.213 -0.000531 -0.0608 -0.601 -0.0281 0.149 0.724 0.00252 -0.449
(0.40) (-0.92) (-0.05) (-1.17) (-0.79) (-0.46) (0.85) (0.82) (0.09) (-0.91)
Model characteristics
OLS_IndFE -0.0498 -0.474 -0.0149 0.0160*** 0.00453 0.00208 -0.00372 -0.153 -0.0330***
(-1.32) (-2.06) (-0.25) (9.36) (0.08) (0.01) (-0.46) (-1.65) (-1410.13)
OLS_TimeFE -0.241 0.100 0.000439 0.00583 0.0303 0.212 -0.00777 -0.0300*** 0.109***
(-1.30) (1.50) (0.23) (2.06) (1.02) (1.51) (-0.91) (-61.62) (28.94)
OLS_IndTimeFE -0.231 0.108 0.00115 0.00543 0.0300 0.212 -0.00762 -0.0452*** 0.0859*** -0.166***
(-1.20) (1.51) (0.39) (1.92) (1.01) (1.51) (-0.89) (-32.57) (47.74) (-38.70)
IVorDiD 0.808*** 0.00330 -0.00183 -0.00595 0.0101 0.257 0.0237 -0.0178*** -0.000684 -0.159***
(4.02) (0.08) (-1.74) (-0.76) (0.57) (1.71) (1.66) (-11.80) (-0.41) (-26.59)
Sample characteristics
LogAvgSampleYear -190.9* 91.73* -32.34 0.269 11.11 0.457 19.23 -9.174
(-2.61) (2.47) (-0.39) (0.02) (0.10) (0.04) (0.84) (-0.07)
LogObservations 0.0355 -0.0102 0.00688 -0.00256 -0.0145 -0.119 0.00390 -0.000727 0.00342*** 0.0488***
(1.32) (-1.41) (0.98) (-1.92) (-1.02) (-1.71) (0.99) (-0.06) (99.89) (680.51)
Asian sample 0.950*** 0.198*** 0.291** 0.270 -0.0777*** -1.027*** 0.0223** 0.00421 0.190**
(33.08) (10.28) (3.54) (1.45) (-9.40) (-13.38) (2.99) (0.22) (2.92)
EU sample -0.402 -0.340* -0.115 0.170 -0.0819 -0.878 -0.0336 -0.0813 -0.157
(-1.26) (-2.38) (-0.42) (1.56) (-1.00) (-1.50) (-0.33) (-0.72) (-0.28)
Global sample 0.463*** 0.00780 -0.0532*** 0.00175 0.145*** 0.118*** -0.00674** -0.0243***
(33.49) (0.85) (-15.01) (1.93) (17.19) (3.96) (-3.17) (-39.19)
HighInfoAsym 0.100 -0.0650** -0.0344 -0.0162*** 0.0123 -0.0181 0.0330* 0.145*** -0.0312 0.0318***
(0.77) (-3.03) (-0.91) (-9.42) (0.44) (-0.20) (2.18) (11.99) (-0.67) (635.65)
Moderating variables of primary study
firmsize -0.0187*** -0.00455
(-3.74) (-1.03)
MB -0.00592 0.0247*** -0.400*** 0.0228*** -0.0696
(-0.04) (4.82) (-7.55) (5.10) (-1.26)
Capx -0.000815*** -0.0000283 -0.00316 -0.0441*** 0.0405***
(-8.50) (-1.92) (-0.63) (-3.59) (9.18)
NWC -0.172** 0.0136 -0.385***
(-3.27) (0.52) (-47.70)
Lev 0.104*** -0.00127 -0.0399***
(17.88) (-0.26) (-9.10)
CF 0.559***
(29.16)
Div -0.00788
(-0.47)
FinDistr 0.0754 -0.342 -0.911 -0.421
(0.50) (-0.82) (-1.01) (-0.79)
TotalGov 2.314*** -0.00514 0.0201 -0.00215** -0.00782 -0.117 -0.135* 0.000894 0.00254*
(6.86) (-1.37) (0.91) (-3.08) (-1.12) (-1.09) (-2.65) (0.15) (2.38)
Constant 1447.7* -697.1* 246.0 0.0303 -1.934 -82.20 -3.499 -146.1 69.27 -0.0441
(2.60) (-2.47) (0.39) (0.21) (-0.02) (-0.10) (-0.04) (-0.84) (0.07) (-0.79)
Database Dummies
included?
No No No No No No No No No No
Study Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Observations 366 258 319 216 295 386 300 223 507 297
# Sudies 36 25 34 20 32 37 31 24 36 21
Adj. R-sq 0.918 0.957 0.971 0.996 0.994 0.997 0.650 0.659 0.963 0.256
This table presents results from multivariate PEESE MRAs using WLS-regressions with study-level fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the study-level. 
The dependent variables are the determinant-elasticities of cash holdings. Table 8 replicates table 4 but uses the squared error term associated with the 
determinant-elasticities to control for publication selection. All variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels. The t-statistics are shown in parantheses.
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Table 9 Robustness Control - T-value of Cash Holding Determinants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable - 
T-value associated with:
E_TA E_Inv E_M/B E_R&D E_NWC E_Lev E_CF E_Div
E_Total
FinDistr
E_Total
GoodGov
Publication selection
ErrorTerm 735.1 -175.0 -489.9 -122.4 539.3* 174.4 485.4* 14.09 -202.6 861.9
(1.06) (-1.16) (-0.61) (-0.84) (2.12) (1.45) (2.34) (0.27) (-0.51) (0.95)
Model characteristics
OLS_IndFE 1.328 108.8 -9.711*** 9.935 48.48 11.95*** 0.308 3.773 -2.825***
(0.98) (1.61) (-20.66) (1.30) (1.97) (5.03) (0.53) (0.92) (-634.06)
OLS_TimeFE -11.30 15.71 0.923*** -12.74*** 3.556 12.75 9.637*** -1.681*** 6.078*
(-1.21) (1.92) (5.09) (-11.80) (0.50) (1.05) (13.89) (-20.49) (2.32)
OLS_IndTimeFE -9.573 18.51* 0.777*** -13.81*** 1.892 12.04 10.68*** -2.255*** 2.450*** -6.619
(-1.10) (2.12) (5.14) (-12.79) (0.26) (0.99) (15.42) (-22.15) (12.17) (-2.06)
IVorDiD -3.737 6.703 -0.970*** 1.237 -2.908 5.672 5.964** 1.531*** 0.128* -6.050
(-0.77) (1.02) (-12.68) (1.77) (-0.75) (0.82) (3.60) (10.89) (2.44) (-1.54)
Sample characteristics
LogAvgSampleYear 2525.2 -7316.4* 4260.8*** -16169.8* -13726.4*** -4310.8*** -1992.3* -5217.5
(1.94) (-2.37) (6.62) (-2.28) (-12.99) (-4.21) (-2.27) (-1.37)
LogObservations -0.972 -2.332* 6.528*** 9.375*** -4.812 -15.93* 3.434*** -1.622 0.471*** 2.720***
(-1.02) (-2.27) (25.90) (18.41) (-1.41) (-2.55) (12.41) (-1.19) (100.14) (782.44)
Asian sample -4.212* -6.323 18.66*** 221.8 -15.45 45.41*** -64.90* 2.870 167.5
(-2.44) (-0.46) (11.47) (0.88) (-1.64) (4.05) (-2.38) (0.99) (0.47)
EU sample 2.093 58.31 14.46 188.6 -63.30 20.67 -367.2* 1.337 662.5
(0.13) (1.26) (0.35) (0.95) (-1.22) (0.43) (-2.18) (0.18) (0.51)
Global sample 9.609*** 0.582 7.703*** -0.477 -0.175 -3.652 -6.501*** 6.242***
(18.50) (0.41) (61.53) (-1.36) (-0.13) (-1.29) (-30.03) (4.90)
HighInfoAsym 9.794** 2.015 -1.372 2.604 -6.241 -6.870 6.488** 4.272*** 1.477 2.780***
(3.34) (0.30) (-0.56) (1.09) (-1.48) (-1.38) (3.24) (3.97) (1.27) (801.49)
Moderating variables of primary study
firmsize 12.82*** -6.665***
(11.30) (-16.13)
MB -13.64*** -39.25 6.092*** -10.84
(-12.68) (-1.40) (7.11) (-0.88)
Capx -0.528*** 0.00613 -10.07*** -2.988 2.604*** -18.69
(-94.90) (1.09) (-7.06) (-1.54) (5.32) (-1.45)
NWC -35.82 44.61 -15.08**
(-1.87) (1.32) (-3.09)
Lev 42.63*** -12.70*** 4.065***
(35.86) (-9.43) (8.27)
CF 34.04***
(6.13)
Div -0.902
(-1.07)
FinDistr -486.8 382.2 -638.6* -13.20
(-0.61) (1.44) (-2.29) (-0.46)
TotalGov -11.93* -1.326* 3.647*** 4.331*** -3.211 -7.259 -10.89 -0.251 0.350*
(-2.56) (-2.38) (11.84) (15.66) (-1.99) (-1.75) (-0.57) (-0.36) (2.39)
Constant -19169.0 55528.8* -32405.0*** -79.37 122891.1* 104123.3*** 32679.6*** 15153.7* 39601.6 1.370
(-1.94) (2.37) (-6.62) (.) (2.28) (13.02) (4.19) (2.27) (1.37) (0.10)
Database Dummies
included?
No No No No No No No No No No
Study Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Observations 366 258 319 216 295 386 300 223 507 297
# Sudies 36 25 34 20 32 37 31 24 36 21
Adj. R-sq 0.962 0.872 0.807 0.998 0.984 0.991 0.975 0.854 0.911 0.644
This table presents results from multivariate Fat-Pet MRAs using WLS-regressions with study-level fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the 
study-level. Table 9 replicates table 4 but uses the t-values associated with the determinant-elasticities of cash holdings  as dependent variables. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. The t-statistics are shown in parantheses.
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The results from my previous analyses are confirmed by both robustness checks. The 
fixed effects PEESE model in table 8 stresses the difference between the Asian and Global 
samples on the one side and the US sample on the other side even stronger. They also 
confirm significant regional differences for the cash flow- and financial distress-elasticity. 
The multivariate fixed effects WLS using the t-values in table 9 roughly confirms the results 
of its counterpart which uses elasticities. However, it derives less pronounced results as many 
of the regional differences found in Asia are either lost or switch their signs. Results for 
Europe and the global sample remain more consistent with prior results. 
 
4 Conclusion 
This article investigates the existence of an interaction effect between regional and firm-
level characteristics in determining the corporate level of cash. Existing research documents 
the direct influence of regional and firm-level characteristics but remains silent on their 
interaction. By documenting the interaction effect this study points out that regional 
characteristics influence the level of cash by altering the association between various firm-
level characteristics and the level of cash. This indirect influence of regional characteristics 
needs to be investigated by future research to fully understand why and how regional 
characteristics such as investor protection influence cash holdings. 
Moreover, this study provides evidence on how the empirical design of cash holding 
studies influences their results, i.e. the association of cash holding determinants with the level 
of cash. These insights serve as guidance for future research and point out the most critical 
design decisions as well as the areas which are most likely to be influenced by these 
decisions. The influence of total assets, dividends, and corporate governance depends on 
whether a standard OLS regression is applied or instrumental variables, respectively a 
difference-in-differences approach. The association of net working capital, leverage, and 
financial distress with cash holdings is affected by the inclusion of industry and time fixed 
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effects. The choice of the underlying database has either no influence or its effect cannot be 
distinguished from country-level characteristics. The definition of the cash holding variables 
does also not affect the outcome of empirical research. 
In the first step, this study derives general statements regarding the determinants of the 
corporate cash level, which are not bound to specific situations, time periods, sample 
characteristics, the econometric modelling of primary studies or variable definitions. These 
so-called consensus estimates are obtained by aggregating the quantitative results from 
primary research in a meta-regression analysis. In the second step, I investigate regional 
differences in these consensus estimates which are equivalent to an interaction effect between 
regional and firm-level characteristics. This part of the analysis also investigates how the 
design of primary studies affects the respective results of primary research. In the last step, I 
test whether these regional differences are explained by specific country-level characteristics 
such as a country’s development, the size of equity markets, or legal tradition. 
I analyze the influence of 10 determinants on the level of cash, respectively the 
determinant-elasticity of cash. In summary, cash holdings decrease when total assets, 
investment activities, net working capital, leverage, cash flow, and dividends increase. 
Moreover, the corporate cash ratio rises when the market-to-book ratio, R&D expenditures, 
financial distress, and the quality of corporate governance declines. 
Graphical analyses and multivariate MRAs reveal regional differences in the influence of 
firm-level cash holding determinants. Determinant-elasticities are shown to be comparable in 
US and the EU but differ between US and Asia as well as the Global sample. The influence 
of firm-level determinants on the level of cash in Asia appears to be affected by the country-
level of governance quality or a lack of financing alternatives. This suggests a greater 
relevance of the FCF-hypothesis and the underinvestment problem in Asia in comparison to 
Europe and the U.S. These regional effects are robust to controlling for the presence of 
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specific firm types that feature high information asymmetries, the economic situation of a 
country, the liquidity of a country’s capital market, and the national legal tradition.  
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5 Appendix 
 
 
Variable Description
Data-variants of cash holding determinants - always combined with one of the suffixes below
B_* Regression coefficient of the respective determinant in  the primary study.
E_* Determinant-elasticity of cash holdings. The determinant is specified by the suffix that 
replaced the asterisk
M_* Mean value of the respective determinant in the primary study.
Cash holding determinants - always combined with one of the prefixes above
*CF Cash flow
*CFuncer Cash flow uncertainity
*CH Cash holdings
*Div Dividends
*Inv Investment expenditures
*Lev Leverage
*MB Market-to-book ratio
*NWC Net working capital
*RD Research & development expenditures
*TA Total assets
*TotalGoodGov Total good corporate governance
*TotalFinDistr Total financial distress
Explanatory variables
Asian sample Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a primary regression analysis considered 
exclusively Asian firms and 0 otherwise.
CHtoTA Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if cash holdings were calculated as cash scaled by 
total assets, in the respective primary regression model, and 0 otherwise.
ErrorTerm Standard error of a determinant's regression coefficient, taken from primary studies
EU sample Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a primary regression analysis considered 
exlusviely firms that are geographically located in Europe and 0 otherwise.
Global sample Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a primary regression analysis did not focus 
exclusively on one of the defined regions (NA, Asia, EU) and 0 otherwise.
HighInfoAsym Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a primary regression analysis focusses 
exlcusively on firms that are subject to high information asymmetries and 0 otherwise.
IVDiD Dummy variable indicating that the regression model of the primary study follows a 
difference-in-differences methodology.
LogAvgSampleYear Logarithm of the average sample year of a primary regression analysis.
LogObservations Logarithm of the observations (firm years) of a primary regression analysis.
OLS_IndFE Dummy variable indicating that the regression model of the primary study is a stanard 
OLS regression with industry-fixed effects.
OLS_TimeFE Dummy variable indicating that the regression model of the primary study is a stanard 
OLS regression with time-fixed effects.
OLS_IndTimeFE Dummy variable indicating that the regression model of the primary study  is a stanard 
OLS regression with industry- and time-fixed effects.
Appendix A Variable Description
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Appendix A Continued
Variable Description
VarCentral Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a determinant was a treatment variable and the 
value 0 if a determinants was a control variable,  in the respective primary study.
Capx Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a primary regression model contained a measure 
of capital expenditures as control variable and 0 otherwise.
CF Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a primary regression model contained a measure 
of cash flow as control variable and 0 otherwise.
Datastream Dummy variable that take the value 1 if a primary regression analysis obtains accounting 
data from Datastream and 0 otherwise.
Div Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a primary regression model contained a measure 
of dividends as control variable and 0 otherwise.
FinDistr Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a primary regression model contained a measure 
of financial distress as control variable and 0 otherwise.
Firmsize Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a primary regression model contained a measure 
of firm size, usually total assets, as control variable and 0 otherwise.
Lev Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a primary regression model contained a measure 
of leverage as control variable and 0 otherwise.
MB Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a primary regression model contained the market-
to-book ratio as control variable and 0 otherwise.
NWC Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a primary regression model contained a measure 
of net working capital as control variable and 0 otherwise.
RD Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a primary regression model contained a measure 
of R&D expenditures as control variable and 0 otherwise.
TotalGov Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a primary regression model contained a measure 
of corporate governance as control variable and 0 otherwise.
OtherDataB Dummy variable that take the value 1 if a primary regression analysis obtains accounting 
data from databases different from Compustat and Datastream and 0 otherwise.
Appendix A briefly describes all variables used in this study. The construction of the cash holding determinants 
is explained in more detail in section 3.2. 
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Study Countries Region Period
Kim/Mauer/Sherman (1998) US US 1975-1994
Opler/Pinkowitz/Stulz/Williamson (1999) US US 1971-1994
Pinkowitz/Williamson (2001) US, Ger, Japan
Global, EU, 
Asia, US
1971-1994
Ozkan/Ozkan (2004) UK EU 1998-1995
Acharya/Almeida/Campello (2007) US US 1971-2001
Dittmar/Mahrt-Smith/Servaes (2007) US US 1990-2003
Drobetz/Grüninger (2007) Swiss EU 1995-2004
Foley/Hartzell/Titman/Twite (2007) US US 1982-2004
Kalcheva/Lins (2007) Broad international sample Global 1996
Chen (2008) US US 2000-2004
D'Mello/Krishswami/Larkin (2008) US US 1985-2000
García-Teruel/Martínez-Solano (2008) Spain EU 1996-2001
Harford/Mansi/Maxwell (2008) US US 1993-2004
Bates/Kahle/Stulz (2009) US US 1980-2006
Chen/Chuang (2009) US US 1997-2003
Lee/Lee (2009) UK EU 2001-2005
Duchin (2010) US US 1990-2006
Tong (2010) US US 1993-2000
Al-Najjar/Belghitar (2011) UK EU 1991-2008
Kuan/Li/Chu (2011) UK EU 1997-2008
Kusnadi (2011) Malaysia, Singapore Asia 2000-2005
Lee/Powell (2011) Australia Australia 1990-2008
Subramaniam/Tang/Yue/Zhou (2011) US US 1988-2006
Álvarez/Sagner/Valdivia (2012) Chile Global 1986-2009
Chen/Chen/Schipper/Xu/Xue (2012) China Asia 2000-2008
Julio/Yook (2012) Broad international sample Global 1980-2005
Khieu/Pyles (2012) US US 1985-2009
Brisker/Colak/Peterson (2013) US US 1971-2006
Huang/Elkiwy/Jain (2013) Broad international sample Global 1992-2009
Steijvers/Niskanen (2013) US US 1998
Sun/Yung/Rahman (2013) US US 1980-2005
Yu/Sopranzetti/Lee (2015) Taiwan Asia 1991-2005
Belghitar/Clark (2014) UK EU 2000-2004
Chen/Li/Xiao/Zou (2014) China Asia 2005-2007
Harford/Klasa/Maxwell (2014) US Asia 1980-2008
Hill/Fuller/Kelly/Washam (2014) US Asia 1999-2006
Hoberg/Phillips/Prabhala (2014) US Asia 1997-2008
Iskandar-Datta/Jia (2014) Broad international sample Global 1985-2008
Liu/Mauer/Zhang (2014) US US 2006-2011
Neamtiu/Shroff/White/Williams (2014) US US 1987-2009
Oler/Picconi (2014) US US 1989-2008
Qiu/Wan (2014) US US 1982-2001
Chen/Dou/Rhee/Truong/
Veeraraghavan (2015)
Broad international sample Global, US 1989-2009
Elyasiani/Zhang (2015) US US 1996-2008
Liu/Luo/Tian (2015) China Asia 2004-2011
Appendix B Final Sample of Primary Studies
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1. Introduction 
 This study shows how variable executive compensation contingent on the corporate 
long-term performance is associated with the persistence of corporate cash holding 
policies. I document that cash holding policies become more persistent when long-term 
compensation incentives (LTIs) increase. This effect is especially pronounced in high-cash 
firms. I define a cash holding policy or strategy as the association between the 
characteristics of a firm and the level of cash. Cash holding policies describe how firms 
adjust their level of cash in response to specific firm situations and firm characteristics. 
These policies are persistent when a firm’s cash stock reacts to the firm’s characteristics in 
the same way over multiple periods, i.e. the association between the level of cash and the 
firm’s characteristics does not change. Exemplarily, a firm may pursue a strategy that 
strongly trades off cash holdings against debt, meaning a highly negative association 
between debt and the level of cash. In this situation, a persistent cash holding policy means 
that the cash level increases (decreases) when debt decreases (increases). A deviation from 
this policy occurs when cash holdings as well as leverage increase (decrease) 
simultaneously.  
 Prior research has shown that more persistent cash holding policies are associated with 
increases in the market value of cash holdings. Thus, this study identifies a novel real effect 
of LTIs by showing that they are a potential tool to influence the persistence of cash holding 
policies. This shows that the value of cash holdings can be managed by influencing the 
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persistence of cash holding policies, which means that LTIs motivate firms to employ cash 
holding strategies that benefit firm value. Moreover, this result represents a real effect of a 
German regulation on LTI compensation that helps assessing a similar proposed regulation 
in the US. This regulatory set-up also reduces some of the common endogeneity problems 
in LTI research and thus offers a new perspective for this stream of research to derive more 
causal inferences.  
 The market value of cash holdings is regularly found to be smaller than 1, which means 
that firm value increases by less than $1 if an additional dollar is held in cash. This shows 
that the corporate cash stock is perceived to be rather harmful than beneficial as Pinkowitz 
et al. (2006) and Faulkender/Wang (2006) point out. This perception of the cash stock 
corresponds to Jensen (1986) and implies that managers hoard cash to avoid external 
control, to exploit shareholders, and to act in self-interest. Thus, the value of cash reflects 
the investors’ perception of how beneficial a firm’s cash holding strategy is for firm value. 
Prior research has revealed three instruments to increase the market value of cash 
holdings: corporate governance, financial distress, and the persistence of cash holding 
policies. The prior two drivers are well investigated. Dittmar/Mahrt-Smith (2007) show 
that the market value of cash ranges between $0.42 and $0.88 in poorly governed firms. 
This value is doubled for well governed firms. Similar results are derived by Pinkowitz et 
al. (2006), Kalcheva/Lins (2007), Frésard/Salva (2010), and Huang et al. (2013). 
Denis/Sibilkov (2010) and Faulkender/Wang (2006) report the value of cash to increase 
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when firms become financially constrained, i.e. more likely to suffer from financial distress. 
The latter document a value of $1.04 for cash held by constrained firms, compared to a 
value of $0.77 in unconstrained firms. 
 However, actively controlling the value of cash as a manager is difficult with these 
determinants. Corporate governance consists of various instruments that affect each other. 
Thus, it is a challenge to establish and maintain a comprehensive system of high quality 
corporate governance (Larcker et al. 2007, Bhagat et al. 2008, and Brown et al. 2011). 
Moreover, firms are unlikely to voluntarily evoke financial distress to increase the value of 
cash. 
 In contrast, the third instrument, the persistence of cash holding policies, is not 
researched intensively. Prior studies have documented that the market value of cash 
increases when the level of cash becomes more constant and a firm’s cash policies are more 
persistent (Mikkelson/Partch 2003 and Oler/Picconi 2014). This observation is explained 
by the belief that investors appreciate persistent cash policies because they are easier to 
interpret and to predict since they convey less ambiguous information about the origin and 
usage of the cash stock (Oler/Picconi 2014). Shareholders do not appreciate unexpected 
deviations from prior cash strategies because they cannot tell if they are driven by agency 
motives. Despite the value-increasing effect of persistent cash holding policies, it has not 
been investigated how cash holding policies can be made more persistent. 
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 Long-term incentives in executive compensation are a popular instrument that is 
employed to motivate a stronger long-term perspective in managerial planning, but they 
receive little attention in recent research (Li/Wang 2016). They tie the managerial 
compensation to the corporate long-term performance to mitigate managerial short-
termism. The induced strategical long-term perspective embraces all corporate decisions 
including cash holding policies. However, empirical studies on the effects as well as 
determinants of LTIs are scarce and the specific link between long-term incentives and 
cash holding policies has not been investigated.  
 Research on the interplay of managerial compensation and the level as well as the 
market value of cash holdings finds that the level of cash decreases and the market value of 
cash increases when the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned (Liu/Mauer 
2011, Tong 2010, and Chava/Purnanandam 2010). These studies focus on the alignment of 
interest by compensating managers with equity-options, which motivates them to take 
more risks. It is not addressed how compensation is linked to the persistence of cash 
holding policies. Gopalan et al. (2014) and Li/Wang (2016) are rare examples of recent 
empirical studies that focus on long-term incentives different from pensions. They point 
out various determinants of long-term compensation incentives such as growth 
opportunities, more long-term assets, lower risk, better stock performance, lower accruals 
that inflate earnings, less variable stock performance, and independent boards. They are 
unable to identify causal effects of long-term incentives, because they exclusively regard 
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the self-selected voluntary adoption of LTIs, and do not address their effect on cash holding 
policies.  
 An ideal setting to investigate the effects of long-term incentives and especially their 
ability to make cash holding policies more persistent is an exogenous shock to the long-
term incentives in a random group of firms. This is necessary because the association of 
cash holding policies with compensation is endogenous. Similar to the argumentation 
provided by Gopalan et al. (2014), the relationship can be affected by omitted variables 
such as firm risk or information asymmetries. Higher firm risk implies more risky cash 
flows which can lead to a switch from long-term invectives to short-term incentives to limit 
the riskiness of the CEO’s compensation. At the same time, firms with riskier cash flows 
may tend to increase the cash stock as a precaution to ensure financing future projects 
although other firm characteristics did not change which represents a change in the cash 
holding policy. In firms with high information asymmetries, shareholders and the board 
may introduce long-term incentives to align interests. However, managers may tend to 
build up the cash stock to avoid external discipline when information asymmetries are 
high. 
 The SEC and other US agencies proposed a shock in the form of a regulatory initiative on 
incentive–based compensation in 2016. This rule is supposed to foster the strategical long-
term planning of firms, which also increases the long-term perspective in cash holding 
policies. This extension of the Dodd-Frank Act aims, amongst others, to prohibit incentive-
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based compensation that motivates “inappropriate risks”, which could lead to “material 
financial loss”. Avoiding such risks and associated financial losses means focusing on the 
profitable long-term development of a firm. Thus, the regulatory proposal uses long-term 
incentives as an instrument to avoid managerial short-termism which could also make cash 
holding policies more persistent.  
 A similar regulatory initiative, namely the Act on the Appropriateness of Management 
Board’s Compensation (VorstAG), was introduced in Germany in 2009. The VorstAG serves 
as a suitable setting to test the effect of long-term incentives and helps to assess one 
potential effect of the proposed US regulation. The German regulation provides a shock to 
managerial long-term incentives in compensation by forcing German firms to raise the 
proportion of long-term incentives in managerial compensation. Thus, it allows 
investigating how a switch towards long-term incentives in executive compensation is 
associated with the persistence of cash holding policies. I exploit this shock to long-term 
incentives by comparing two groups of German firms. I use German firms that are not 
affected by the VorstAG, because they already employed long-term incentives before the 
regulation became effective, as the control group and compare them to German firms that 
started employing long-term incentives after the VorstAG was introduced. 
 The absolute residual level of cash resulting from a model that explains the cash level 
based on the seminal study by Opler et al. (1999) serves as a proxy for the persistence of 
cash holding proxies. Corresponding to my definition of cash holding policies, this variable 
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does not indicate the level of cash but the explanatory power of the past associations 
between the level of cash and firm characteristics for the current level of cash. If the past 
influence of firm characteristics on the level of cash is still relevant to explain the current 
cash level, the absolute residual is small and indicates persistent cash holding policies. I 
find that the VorstAG is associated with an increase in the persistence of cash holding 
policies in treated firms compared to the control group, i.e. the absolute residual decreases 
in treated firms. An interaction of the difference-in-differences effect with the level of cash 
reveals that the effect of the VorstAG increases with the level of cash. Finally, I document 
that cash holding policies can become too persistent and exhibit value-decreasing effects. 
However, the overall association between the persistence of cash holding policies and the 
market value of cash is positive, as expected. 
 I contribute to existing research by establishing a link between executive compensation 
and the persistence of cash holding policies to investigate how long-term incentives in 
executive compensation induce persistence to the management’s cash holding policy. This 
makes persistent cash holding policies an instrument to influence the market value of cash, 
which ultimately means that firms employ cash holding policies in a way that increases 
firm value. Moreover, this study investigates an aspect of compensation that is novel to 
cash holding research: It analyzes the effect of an increase in the proportion of variable 
compensation that is contingent on the corporate long-term performance. This article also 
contributes to research on executive compensation in general by revealing a novel real 
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effect of long-term compensation incentives and reducing some of the endogeneity 
affecting prior studies. I find a setting that does not rely on the voluntary adoption of LTIs 
by a self-selected group of firms but instead investigate the mandatory adoption of LTIs by 
all German firms. Finally, this study is relevant for regulators because it investigates a real 
effect of the German regulation on incentive-based compensation. From an US perspective, 
this real effect helps in assessing the potential consequences of a similar rule on incentive–
based compensation proposed by the SEC and other agencies in the US. 
 The remainder of this study is structured as follows: I review associated literature and 
derive the testable hypothesis in section 2. Section 3 introduces the research design and 
data set. Section 4 presents the empirical results and robustness tests for the association 
between LTIs and the persistence of cash holding policies. Section 5 investigates the value 
effects of cash holding persistence for different levels of persistence. I conclude in section 6. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
2.1 Persistent Cash Holding Policies and the Market Value of Cash 
 The persistence of a firm’s cash holding policy has been shown to influence the value of 
cash, but only takes a minor role in existing research. Mikkelson/Partch (2003) explicitly 
investigate the effect of cash holding persistence on firm performance and firm value. They 
compare a sample of firms that sustain a high cash ratio for 5 years to firms that are 
matched by size and industry or their cash holding behavior. Results suggest that a cash 
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balance that is kept high constantly does not harm operating performance and firm value 
but rather increases both metrics in comparison to matched firms. Moreover, they find that 
firms with persistently high cash holdings exhibit higher capital and R&D expenditures 
than matched firms with a more variable cash holding policy. 
Oler/Picconi (2014) build on the cash-models of Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. 
(2009) to analyze excess and abnormal cash holdings. They estimate a firm’s normal level 
of cash by determining the association between the firm’s characteristics and the level of 
cash for past periods. Then the current firm characteristics are combined with these lagged 
associations to derive the predicted normal level of cash. Oler/Picconi (2014) go on to 
calculate the difference, i.e. the residual, between a firm’s actual cash level and its predicted 
normal level of cash, the so called excess or abnormal cash holdings. Excess cash holdings 
represent positive deviations from the predicted normal level of cash, whereas absolute 
excess cash includes positive as well as negative deviations. I regard abnormal cash as a 
short-term divergence from the long-term cash policy because it measures whether the 
association between firm characteristics and the level of cash derived from prior periods is 
able to explain the current cash level. Thus, high values of abnormal cash represent a 
change in the reaction of a firm’s cash stock to the set of firm characteristics, i.e. a deviation 
from the prior cash holding policy. Oler/Picconi (2014) report this deviation to be 
negatively associated to a firm’s future accounting performance and stock returns. This 
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relationship holds in case of excess as well as insufficient cash holdings. Overall, this points 
out the harmful character of deviations from long-term cash holding policies. 
Chen/Shane (2014) employ an empirical model similar to Oler/Picconi (2014) but focus 
on the abnormal changes of cash instead of the abnormal cash level. It indicates that the 
association between the change of the cash stock and the set of firm characteristics differs 
from prior periods, i.e. the firm policy that determines the change of cash is altered. 
Chen/Shane (2014) find abnormal changes of cash to be associated with decreasing future 
earnings and stock returns. This confirms the prior notion that deviations from long-term 
cash policies decrease the corporate performance and the market value of cash. 
Further research largely focusses on excess cash. These studies investigate the usage of 
excessively high cash levels but do not identify causes for deviations from long-term cash 
policies, i.e. absolute deviations from the predicted normal cash level. In this vein, 
Iskandar-Datta/Jia (2014) show that excess cash is used for investments, which is 
especially pronounced in countries with weak investor protection. Sheu/Lee (2012) report 
that excess cash is associated with capital expenditures and this relation is stronger when 
firms face financial distress or managers are entrenched. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, the capital market’s negative reaction to short-term 
variations in cash holding policies can be explained in two ways. First, the trade-off theory, 
when applied on cash holdings, suggests that there is an optimal level of cash. This optimal 
level is determined by the costs and benefits of holding cash such as missed returns from 
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investing the hoarded cash stock or greater future investment flexibility, as Opler et al. 
(1999) point out. Consequently, deviations from the optimal level of cash, which are 
approximated by the abnormal cash variable, signal an inefficient cash management, which 
is punished by the capital market and results in lower operating performance. 
Secondly, Oler/Picconi (2014) argue that shareholders react to abnormal cash levels 
because they are unable to fully understand the information conveyed by a deviation from 
the long-term cash holding policy. Abnormal amounts of cash may indicate that operating 
cash flows are higher than expected and consequently a firm faces fewer financial 
constraints. At the same time, cash levels that exceed the long-term level of cash are tied to 
agency costs, specifically inefficient acquisitions as shown by Harford (1999) and Oler 
(2008). If a negative abnormal cash level occurs, i.e. the cash level falls below the long-term 
level of cash, shareholders may appreciate the associated decreased risk of agency 
problems. However, this may also signal surprisingly low operating cash flows and 
increased financial constraints. Thus, short-term variations in cash holding policies are 
difficult to interpret by investors and may therefore negatively affect a firm’s stock price. 
 
2.2 Managerial Compensation, Long-term Incentives, and Cash Holdings 
Research on the relation between management compensation and cash holdings focuses 
on how compensation affects the riskiness of managerial behavior. It contrasts the effects 
of compensation that motivates risky behavior with the effects of compensation that does 
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not emphasize riskiness. Associated studies mostly analyze stock options granted to 
managers. Specifically, they use the parameters delta and vega, derived from the 
Black/Scholes (1973) model, as measures for incentive to take risks. Delta is the sensitivity 
of the option value to changes in the price of the underlying asset, while vega represents 
the sensitivity of the option value to the volatility of the underlying asset. As 
Belghitar/Clark (2014) note, there is no common interpretation for the role of delta and 
vega in cash holding research. Both proxies have been used to represent strong incentives 
for risky behavior as well as compensation incentives that do not promote excessive 
riskiness. 
 Tong (2010) interprets delta as well as vega as proxies for risk-induction and finds a 
negative association between vega and the level of cash. This indicates that the cash level 
declines when the managerial actions become more risky. Furthermore, Tong (2010) notes 
that the market value of cash is higher in high-vega firms, which means that shareholders 
appreciate increased riskiness. In contrast, Liu/Mauer (2011) interpret delta to increase 
riskiness but vega to decrease it. They find delta to be negatively associated with the cash 
level, while vega has a positive association. Thus, increased riskiness in managerial 
behavior is again linked to a decreasing cash level. Chava/Purnanandam (2010) alter the 
previous interpretation. They employ delta to represent lower incentives for risky actions 
and vega as a proxy for higher risk-taking incentives and report a positive association 
between delta and the cash level but a negative between vega and the cash level. Despite 
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the conflicting interpretation of delta and vega, all prior studies claim that their results 
confirm the notion that increased managerial risk-taking is associated with decreases in 
the cash level. It remains ambiguous how to manage the level of cash and how to increase 
the market value of cash because it is not clear which part of managerial compensation 
affects the riskiness of managerial actions. 
 Neamtiu et al. (2014) switch the focus of research by using the relation of the value of 
CEO options scaled by total CEO compensation and find a negative association between this 
proxy and the level of corporate cash. This approach is motivated by Jensen/Meckling 
(1976)’s Free Cash Flow-Hypothesis, which suggests that available cash is a source and an 
instrument of managerial discretion. A central goal of compensation is to align managerial 
and shareholders’ interests and decrease the management’s incentives to act in discretion. 
CEO options are supposed to put the CEO in the role of an equity investor. Consequently, an 
increasing option-based compensation is expected to make the CEO refrain from excessive 
cash hoarding and undertaking value-destroying investments. 
 Literature that connects executive compensation with cash holding research has not yet 
focused on instruments of long-term incentives in compensation. In general, recent 
literature on the effects and determinants of long-term compensation incentives is scarce. 
The seminal paper by Larcker (1983) initiated the empirical interest in LTI compensation 
and motivated some subsequent studies.1 Larcker (1983) undertakes an experiment by 
                                                        
1 Li/Wang (2016) provide an overview of earlier studies on the determinants of LTIs and associated capital 
market reactions. 
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comparing firms that chose to adopt long-term compensation plans to non-adopting firms. 
They find adopting firms to exhibit a larger growth in capital expenditures and a positive 
capital market reaction. Tehranian et al. (1987) report a more positive stock market 
reaction in divesting companies that employ LTIs in comparison to divesting Non-LTI 
firms. Gopalan et al. (2014) and Li/Wang (2016) are to my knowledge the only more recent 
articles that empirically investigate LTIs. Gopalan et al. (2014) establish a novel metric for 
LTIs by calculating the duration of executive compensation as the weighted average 
duration of executive pay consisting of salary, bonus, restricted stock, and stock options. 
They find longer pay duration to be positively associated with growth opportunities, long-
term assets, greater R&D intensity, lower risk, and better stock performance. A negative 
relation is found between pay duration and earnings-increasing accruals. However, 
Gopalan et al. (2014) are unable to provide causal inferences because they are for example 
unable to identify whether the pay duration increases growth opportunities or vice versa. 
Li/Wang (2016) model the choice to generally adopt a long-term compensation contract as 
well as the choice to adopt specific types of long-term contracts. They document long-term 
incentives to increase when accounting performance is less variable than stock 
performance, when shareholders have a long-term horizon, and when boards are 
independent. Gopalan et al. (2014) and Li/Wang (2016) are able to identify drivers of long-
term compensation contracts but do not investigate real effects of such LTIs. Moreover, the 
seminal studies and also more recent studies suffer from potential endogeneity because 
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they exclusively investigate cases of voluntary LTI adoption. Such experimental set-ups 
exhibit a high risk of an omitted variable bias because the self-selected choice to introduce 
LTIs may be explained by diverging characteristics of adopting firms. 
 In summary, there are three general observations: First, research argues that cash 
holdings increase when there are fewer managerial incentives to take risks and more 
discretionary leeway. Vice versa, cash holdings decrease when incentives for risky actions 
and interest alignment with the shareholders increase. Second, the market value of cash 
decreases when incentives for risk-taking decline and managerial discretion increases. Vice 
versa, the market value of cash increases when managerial risk-taking incentives and 
interest alignment with shareholders rise. Third, there are no studies on the effect of LTIs 
on cash holdings and in general no empirical evidence on the real effects of LTIs. 
 
2.3 The VorstAG and International Compensation Regulation 
 The Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board’s Compensation (Gesetz zur 
Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung, VorstAG) became effective in Germany in 2009 
and affected the German Stock Companies Act (Aktiengesetz), the German Commercial Code 
(Handelsgesetzbuch), as well as the German Corporate Governance Code (Deutscher 
Corporate Governance Kodex). It is based on the “Recommendation on Director’s pay: C 
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(2009)” (2009/385/EC) by the European commission published in April 20092 and is 
mandatory for all publicly listed German firms. The regulation introduces several changes, 
the most important are: First, the total compensation of executive directors needs to be 
adequate in relation to the directors’ performance and customary in comparison to other 
firms of the same industry or country. Second, executive compensation needs to motivate a 
sustainable (long-term) development of the company. This specifically means that variable 
compensation should partly be based on long-term metrics of performance. Third, the 
supervisory board has extended possibilities to decrease executive compensation ex-post if 
firm performance deteriorates. Fourth, the annual stockholders meeting may cast a non-
binding vote on the policy of executive compensation. Hitz/Müller-Bloch (2014) find a 
negative stock market reaction to the announcement of the VorstAG. This observation is 
mainly driven by stock price discounts in firms that exhibit excessive managerial 
compensation. Evidence on the real effects of the VorstAG is scarce. Hillebrand (2015) 
documents a reduction in accrual-based earnings management and a switch to real 
earnings management in treated firms after the VorstAG was introduced. 
 The VorstAG affects the design and structure of executive compensation in all publicly 
listed German firms and has therefore a more extensive scope compared to other 
compensation regulations. In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act, which became effective in 2010, 
focuses on say-on-pay requirements and incremental disclosure in public firms. The design 
                                                        
2 See Commision Recommendation 2009/385/EC which complements the previous recommendations 
2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/directors-
remun/directorspay_290409_en.pdf. 
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of executive compensation is not directly affected by these regulations. In 2016 it was 
proposed to expand the Dodd-Frank rules to prohibit “excessive compensation” and 
“inappropriate risks”, which could lead to “material financial loss” and might result in a 
regulation similar to the VorstAG.3 In the UK, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
introduced the remuneration code for financial firms, which provides standards that are 
similar to the VorstAG. The code became effective in 2010 and aims to prevent short-
termism. It explicitly states the alignment of compensation with the corporate long-term 
interests as one of its key principles.4 The EU introduced a compensation cap for bankers as 
part of the Capital Requirements Directive IV, which became effective in 2014 and limits 
the ratio of variable and fixed compensation for European banks and banks that operate in 
the EU.5 The Dodd-Frank Act, the UK regulation, and the EU regulation only address 
financial institutions and have therefore a more narrow scope than the VorstAG. In 
Switzerland, a referendum resulted in a regulation aimed to prevent excessive 
compensation in all listed companies. This legal initiative introduced, amongst others, say-
on-pay directives and incremental disclosure requirements.6 In a similar vein, say-on-pay 
regulations were introduced in various countries between 2003 and 2012 as Correa/Lel 
(2016) sum up the studies by Larcker et al. (2012) and Murphy (2013). Neither the Swiss 
                                                        
3 See notice of proposed rulemaking and request for comment, https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
2016/34-77776.pdf. 
4  See Financial Conduct Authority (2016), Chapter 19A IFPRU Remuneration Code, https://www.handbook. 
fca.org.uk/handbook/SYSC/19A.pdf. 
5 See directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and the European Council, 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/501977/OJ_JOL_2013_176_R_0338_01_EN_TXT.pdf. 
6 See Swiss Federal Council, Verordnung gegen übermäßige Vergütung bei börsenkotierten Aktiengesell-
schaften (VegüV), https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/20132519/index.html. 
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nor the other international say-on-pay laws affect the design of compensation contracts 
and especially not the temporal structure of variable compensation. 
 Thus, the VorstAG is, to my knowledge, the only compensation regulation that addresses 
public firms across different industries and enforces a mandatory change in the structure 
of executive compensation, i.e. an increase in variable compensation contingent on the 
corporate long-term performance. Despite its large scope, the VorstAG regulation does not 
provide precise requirements regarding the type of long-term incentives a firm needs to 
introduce. Thus, it does neither prescribe the usage of certain compensation instruments, 
such as stocks, options, or long-term cash plans, nor define what is meant by a sustainable 
(long-term) corporate development. Still, the actual composition of variable executive 
compensation changed after the introduction of the VorstAG for German public firms 
because incentives could no longer be exclusively related to the short-term performance, 
which can be seen in Hillebrand (2015). Consequently, the German legal initiative appears 
as a suitable event to investigate the real effects of a change in the temporal basis of 
variable executive compensation. 
 
2.4 Hypothesis 
 From an agency-based viewpoint, deviations from long-term cash holding policies can 
be driven by two key reasons: First, the management might hold more cash than their past 
cash policies suggest because it wants to guard itself against external control and 
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discipline. This grants the management incremental freedom to pursue its personal goals in 
discretion as Jensen (1986) suggests. Secondly, the cash level might be lower than prior 
cash policies predict because the management chooses to invest a larger fraction of the 
cash stock to benefit itself and to avoid payouts to shareholders as Jensen/Meckling (1976) 
point out. Both motives to deviate from a long-term cash holding policy can be mitigated by 
introducing long-term incentives to executive compensation.  
 However, deviations from prior cash holding policies do not necessarily violate the 
interests of shareholders. Exemplarily, regulatory initiatives, which affect a firm’s 
operating activities, may change the association between a firm’s characteristics and its 
level of cash. Such a change in the influence of firm characteristics makes a change of the 
cash holding policy necessary and should serve shareholders’ interests. It is in general 
difficult to distinguish between agency-driven changes in cash holding policies and changes 
that are a reasonable reaction to fundamental changes in the firm or its environment. Thus, 
shareholders generally prefer more persistent and long-term oriented cash holding policies 
to ease the interpretation of such policies as Oler/Picconi (2014) point out. 
 Long-term incentives punish managers for sacrificing a long-term policy to pursue their 
short-term personal goals. Deviations from the long-term policy will result in an inefficient 
development of the firm and in missing the long-term goals of the compensation contract. 
Consequently, managers will avoid deviating from their long-term cash holding policies, 
which increases the persistence of cash holding policies. Ultimately, managerial interests 
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are more aligned with shareholders’ interests. Long-term incentives are promoted as a tool 
to align interests and avoid managerial short-termism in existing literature (Bebchuk/Fried 
2004, Holmstrom 2005, and Bhagat/Romano 2009). Edmans et al. (2012) develop a 
dynamic model to derive optimal compensation contracts that maintain CEO efforts and 
avoid short-termism. This is achieved by a state-dependent rebalancing of the CEO’s wealth 
consisting of firm stocks and a cash component as well as time-dependent, long-term, 
vesting. This stresses the importance of LTIs to align managerial and shareholders’ 
interests. The expectation that LTIs will lead to more persistent cash holding policies 
assumes that such policies are in the interest of shareholders. This can be presumed based 
on prior evidence that more persistent cash holding policies and decreasing deviations 
from long-term cash levels increase the value of cash (Mikkelson/Partch 2003, Chen/Shane 
2014, and Oler/Picconi 2014). Consequently, I derive the following hypothesis on the effect 
of the VorstAG, respectively on the association of the persistence of cash holding policies 
with long-term incentives in management compensation: 
 
H: Cash holding policies are more persistent, i.e. less variable, when managerial 
compensation becomes more contingent on long-term performance. 
 This hypothesis expects more persistent cash management strategies in Germany in 
comparison to other countries, as a result of the VorstAG regulation in 2009. 
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3. Research Design 
3.1 Identification Strategy 
 Investigating the association between compensation incentives and cash holding policy 
persistence bears two central difficulties that need to be taken into account in the research 
design. First, compensation incentives and the persistence of cash holding policies might 
both be affected by a third, endogenous, influencing factor. For example, a firm might face 
financial distress. In this case, it finances projects with cash since external financing 
becomes expensive. This leads to a deviation from the firm’s long-term cash level, 
indicating a higher variability of the firm’s cash holding policy. Furthermore, a distressed 
firm is less profitable and the management has difficulties to achieve its performance 
targets, which decreases the variable compensation. In this situation decreasing cash 
holdings, increasing variability of cash holding policies, and declining variable 
compensation coincide but do not cause each other. 
 Secondly, even if such an influence from an omitted explanatory factor can be ruled out, 
a causal interpretation remains unclear because the direction of their relation cannot be 
determined. Does an increase in incentive-based executive compensation increase the 
persistence of cash holding policies or does a more persistent policy of holding cash 
increase corporate profitability, which increases incentive-based compensation? 
 I exploit a German regulatory initiative that was introduced in 2009 to deal with these 
issues of identification. The Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board’s 
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Compensation (Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung, VorstAG) requires 
German public firms to align their compensation structure with a sustainable (long-term) 
firm development. Public firms need to adopt long-term incentives in their executive 
compensation to enforce a long-term strategic perspective on their management. These 
long-term compensation plans make variable compensation partly dependent on long-term 
firm performance. This means that managerial compensation is deferred for two to five 
years and made contingent on a firm’s future performance. In economic terms, the 
regulation provides a shock to the compensation structure, specifically to the proportion of 
the total variable compensation that depends on long-term performance. This change in the 
compensation structure is neither caused by specific firm characteristics nor chosen by the 
management or the shareholders. 
I compare the persistence of cash holding policies in German firms that used long-term 
incentives in executive compensation before the VorstAG was introduced (EarlyLTI) with 
German firms that adopted long-term incentives after the VorstAG was introduced (Non-
EarlyLTI). The intuition of this set-up is that the VorstAG regulation had no effect on 
EarlyLTI firms because their compensation structure already matched the requirements of 
the VorstAG. Therefore, these firms serve as an untreated control group. The Non-EarlyLTI 
firms had to adjust their compensation structure according to the VorstAG and 
consequently represent the group of treated firms. The number of EarlyLTI firms is small, 
therefore these untreated firms are matched with comparable Non-EarlyLTI firms using 
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propensity score matching with a nearest neighbor heuristic. In this approach, I estimate 
the propensity of being an EarlyLTI firm for all German firms with a probit regression 
model. This probit model employs the variables from the classic cash holding regression by 
Opler et al. (1999) as explanatory variables.7 A dummy that takes the value 1 if a firm 
adopted long-term incentives before the VorstAG became effective (EarlyLTI), 0 otherwise, 
serves as the dependent variable. The probit regression is run for every yearly cross-
section. Yearly expected values of the dependent dummy-variable for each firm, the so-
called propensity scores, are the result of this approach. Each EarlyLTI firm is matched 
with the Non-EarlyLTI firms that has the closest propensity score. The matching procedure 
is further specified in accordance to the matching procedure in Pinkowitz et al. (2016). This 
means, I allow a caliper, i.e. a maximum range of difference in the propensity score between 
an EalryLTI firm and the respective matched firm, of 0.01. This means when an EarlyLTI 
firm has a propensity score of 0.9, the matched Non-EarlyLTI firm needs to have a 
propensity score between 0.89 and 0.91. A Non-EarlyLTI firm can only be matched once, i.e. 
no replacement. Furthermore, I implement the common support condition that requires 
the matched Non-EarlyLTI firms to have a propensity score that does not exceed/fall below 
the highest/lowest propensity score in the sample of EarlyLTI firms. Finally, firms from the 
financial service or utilities sector are dropped from the matching procedure. German firms 
are forced to report the management’s compensation structure since 2006. Thus, EarlyLTI 
                                                        
7 The explanatory variables are cash holdings, firm size, leverage, capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, 
dividends, profitability, net working capital, market-to-book ratio, the standard deviation of cash flows, 
and industry dummies. The variables are defined in section 3.2. 
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firms are determined from 2006-2008. Information on the existence of long-term 
incentives during this period is obtained from a hand-collected dataset of the University of 
Cologne, which is also the data basis for the managerial compensation study by Kuhner et 
al. (2010-2016) (Studie Managergehälter 2010-2016). This study defines LTIs to occur 
when a firm discloses them and it is apparent that the incentives refer to a time horizon of 
at least 3 years. This means that an incentive based compensation that is labelled LTI by 
the reporting firm, but refers to a period of only 1-2 years does not enter this study as a 
LTI. The EarlyLTI firms identified from 2006-2008 are matched with comparable German 
Non-EarlyLTI firms in every year from 2001-2015. The result of this propensity score 
matching procedure is a firm sample that equally consists of treated firms (Non-EarlyLTI) 
and control firms (EarlyLTI). Subsequently, I employ a difference-in-differences regression 
on this matched sample of firms to investigate the overall effect of the VorstAG regulation 
on the persistence of cash holdings policies in treated German firms in comparison to the 
control group of German EarlyLTI firms. 
The identification suffers from some limitations. The control group is not random but 
self-selected, the pre-treatment period only embraces three years, and the regulatory event 
may not have surprised firms. These limitations bear the risk of unobserved heterogeneity. 
However, this empirical set-up still represents an improvement to prior studies because it 
does not rely on the voluntary adoption of LTIs as a treatment and tries to address the 
problem unobserved heterogeneity with propensity score matching and the regulatory set-
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up. Possible violations of the parallel trends assumption in the pre-treatment period are 
tested via placebo testing. The VorstAG regulation resulted from the European 
recommendation 2009/385/EC published on 30th April 2009 which was driven by an 
invitation of the ECOFIN Council issued 2nd December 2008 motivated by the outbreak of 
the financial crisis. Thus, firms had little time to adjust their compensation strategies and 
anticipate the implementation of the VorstAG in 2009, which reduces the risk of an 
announcement effect during the development of the VorstAG. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
The difference-in-differences regression model used in the investigation employs 
absolute abnormal cash holdings as dependent variable and is depicted in eq. (1):  
 
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻it = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝐶𝐻 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 × 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽4 × 𝐶𝐻 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡𝐴𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 × 𝐶𝐻 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 × 𝐶𝐻^2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 × 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽8 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 × 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 × 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 × 𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽12 × 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽13 × 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14 × 𝐶𝐹𝑠𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15 ×
𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽16 × 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17 × 𝐹𝐹12𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡  
+𝛽18 × 𝐹𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽19 × 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (1) 
 The explanatory variables consist of two categories: First, difference-in-differences 
indicators. 𝑉𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡𝐴𝐺𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in firm-years that are 
later or equal to 2009, 0 otherwise. Thus, it represents the general change in 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻it 
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that occurs over time. In eq. (1),  𝑉𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡𝐴𝐺𝑖𝑡  is only depicted as part of interaction terms 
and not as a stand-alone variable because it represents a time trend and is thus already 
included in the time dummies (𝐹𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡) contained in the model. The dummy variable 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 takes the value 1 for Non-EarlyLTI firms and 0 for EarlyLTI firms. 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 
measures the general difference in 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻it between EarlyLTI and Non-EarlyLTI firms. 
The dummy variable 𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡 indicates the difference-in-differences effect. It is the interaction 
of 𝑉𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡𝐴𝐺𝑖𝑡 and 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡. Thus, it takes the value 1 for Non-EarlyLTI firms after the 
introduction of the VorstAG, i.e. after 2008, and indicates how the difference between Non-
EarlyLTI and EarlyLTI firms changed over time due to the introduction of the VorstAG. 
Since EarlyLTI firms are not affected by the VorstAG, the change in the difference between 
both groups of firms is due to the effect of the VorstAG on Non-EarlyLTI firms. 
 The second category of explanatory variables are moderators obtained from Compustat 
Captial IQ Global and North America, item names are stated in parentheses, and are 
calculated as follows: 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 equals cash and short-term investments (CHE). 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡  is the 
logarithm of total assets. Total assets are converted into dollar values by using exchange 
rates obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 is R&D expenditures (XRD). 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑡 
equals capital expenditures (CAPX). 𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡 is net working capital which equals working 
capital (WCAP) less cash and short-term investments. 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 is earnings before interests 
and taxes. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 equals total liabilities (LT). 𝐶𝐹𝑠𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the five-year rolling standard 
deviation of operating cash flows (OANCF). 𝑀𝑖𝑡/𝐵𝑖𝑡 is the market value of equity divided by 
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total assets less total liabilities. The market value of equity is calculated by multiplying the 
closing share price (PRCCD) at the end of the fiscal year with the number of common 
shares outstanding (CSHOC). 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 equals total dividends (DVT). All prior variables, except 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡  and CFsd, are scaled by total assets. 𝐹𝐹12𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡  is a vector of industry dummy 
variables representing the 12 Fama/French industries. 𝐹𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 is a vector of dummy 
variables representing the respective fiscal year. 𝐶𝐻 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the interaction of  𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 with 
𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡. It indicates the effect of the VorstAG on the association between the level of cash and 
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻it. This interaction also requires interacting 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 with 𝑉𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡𝐴𝐺𝑖𝑡(𝐶𝐻 ∗
𝑉𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡𝐴𝐺𝑖𝑡) as well as 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 (𝐶𝐻 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡). Ultimately, I also add squared cash 
holdings 𝐶𝐻^2𝑖𝑡 to the model to account for an indicated non-linear influence of 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 on 
the dependent variable. 
 As already mentioned, the dependent variable is absolute abnormal cash (A𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡), 
which is the yearly absolute difference between the actual cash level and the predicted 
normal level of cash derived from the model of Opler et al. (1999). More specifically, I 
combine the approaches of Faleye (2004) and Oler/Picconi (2014) to estimate the 
predicted level of cash for each year. The model is shown in eq. (2): 
 
𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 × 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 × 𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡  
+𝛽5 × 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 × 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 × 𝐶𝐹𝑠𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 ×
𝑀
𝐵 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9 × 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽10 × 𝐹𝐹12𝐼𝑛𝑑 − 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 × 𝐹𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2) 
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To avoid a peek-ahead bias, the model is predicted on a rolling basis over a 5-year window 
prior to the respective firm-year under analysis. The resulting rolling 5-year coefficients 
are used to estimate the normal level of cash by plugging the current values of the 
respective firm-year into eq. (2). Finally, 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  is the absolute residual that results 
from this procedure, i.e. the absolute difference between actual and predicted normal level 
of cash. The underlying idea of this measure is that the predicted normal level is derived 
from a firm’s prior policy of cash holding, i.e. the association between a firm’s 
characteristics and its cash level for the past 5 years. Thus, the predicted normal level of 
cash is an expectation resulting from the long-term cash holding policies. The actual cash 
level varies around the predicted normal level. Absolute abnormal cash indicates 
deviations from the predicted normal cash level, respectively from long-term cash holding 
policies. This means that a firm’s past policy of cash holding is insufficient to explain the 
actual level of cash, which signals variability in cash holding policies. Vice versa, low values 
of A𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 indicate higher persistence of cash holding policies because the past 
strategies of cash management are able to explain the actual level of cash. It has to be noted 
that the regression coefficients in eq. (2), which represent cash holding policies, represent 
a sample average and not an individual firm. Therefore, abnormal cash holdings indicate an 
individual firm’s deviation from the long-term policies of the entire sample which is the 
closest approximation of a individual firm’s deviation from its own long-term policies that 
this study can achieve. 
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 A𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 is determined from 2001-2015 because the earliest date to determine 
EarlyLTI firms is 2006. Because of the rolling 5-year window, I end up with observations of 
A𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 for the years 2006-2015.  
 Finally, the large body of control variables contained in eq. (1) and (2) bears the risk of 
including bad controls into the analysis. Especially, if the VorstAG induces a long-term 
focus to the management’s strategies, this will affect all firm-level characteristics such as 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 and 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡. Eq. (1) and (2) are tested in reduced form in section 4.3 to explore if the 
effect of the VorstAG persists in absence of potential bad controls. 
 
3.3 Data & Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 tabulates descriptive statistics for four sub-samples. These consist of 
German firms that did not employ long-term incentives early and German EarlyLTI firms. 
Both groups of firms are regarded in two periods: pre- and post-treatment. The sample 
contains 1546 firm-year observations in total. Most variables show an identical 
development from the pre- to the post-treatment period for the treated and the control 
group. The only exception are the level of cash, net working capital and 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 . The 
level of cash increases for untreated EarlyLTI firm by about 3% in the mean and about 31% 
in the median.  
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The cash level is more constant in treated Non-EarlyLTI firms which show decline in the 
mean by about 1% and an increase in the median by about 2%. EarlyLTI firms show an 
unambiguous decline in net working capital whereas Non-EarlyLTI firms exhibit a 
pronounced increase in net working capital by around 12% in the mean and median. The 
mean and median level of 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 declines in treated Non-EarlyLTI firms by about 4%, 
respectively 7%. In contrast, untreated EarlyLTI firms exhibit constant 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 in the 
mean and a decrease by 8% in the median. This indicates that the VorstAG induced a more 
pronounced decline of 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  and consequently an increase in the persistence of cash 
holding policies in German firms that did not employ long-term incentives before the 
regulation. 
Table 2 analyzes the correlation of all variables contained in eq. (1). Panel A provides an 
overview for all dependent and explanatory variables. It reports a positive correlation 
between 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  and 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡. Panel B investigates this correlation between 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  
and 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 in more detail. It undertakes a sub-sample analysis for Non-EarlyLTI as well as 
EarlyLTI firms, post and prior to the VorstAG. Moreover, this analysis compares 
correlations for firms whose cash level is higher/lower than the median level of cash. Panel 
C is equivalent to panel B but uses a different definition for high- and low-cash firms. Here, 
high-cash firms are within the upper quartile of 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡, while low-cash firms are within the 
lower quartile of 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 
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Overall, panel B and C reveal a non-linear association between 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  and 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 when 
all sub-samples are regarded in aggregate. Moreover, the Non-EarlyLTI sample features a 
less strong increase in the correlation between 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  and 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 during the transition 
from the Pre- to the Post-VorstAG period for high-cash firms. Panel B shows that the 
correlation between 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  and 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 increases by about 74% in EarlyLTI high-cash 
firms, whereas their Non-EarlyLTI counterparts exhibit only a growth of 20% in the 
correlation. Low-cash firms do not exhibit such a difference in the development of 
correlations: In EarlyLTI firms there is a decline of 37%, Non-EarlyLTI firms display a 
decline of about 33%. 
The altered sub-samples of panel C corresponds to the previous observation but 
generally exhibits more extreme changes in the correlations. Untreated EarlyLTI high-cash 
firms exhibit a stronger increase than Non-EarlyLTI high-cash firms (258% vs 191%). This 
observation is inverted when low-cash firms are regarded.  
Non-EarlyLTI as well as EarlyLTI low-cash firms exhibit a decline in the correlation of 
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  and 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 but this decline is more pronounced in EalryLTI firms (-79% vs -
89%). When the sub-samples of panel B and C are regarded in aggregate, an inverted S-
curved association is found between 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  and 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 for both samples in the Pre-
VorstAG period. This pattern changes to an inverted U-curve for both samples in the post-
treatment period.  
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After the introduction of the VorstAG, low-cash firms from panel C exhibit the lowest 
correlation, whereas low-cash firms according to panel B exhibit the highest correlation 
closely followed by high-cash firms from panel B. The correlation between 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  and 
𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡decreases again for high-cash firms according to panel C. 
 Figure 1 compares the evolution of the yearly mean-level of 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  in Non-
EarlyLTI and EarlyLTI firms. The graphic analysis reveals a decline in 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  after the 
VorstAG was introduced. This effect is most pronounced and persistent in treated Non-
EarlyLTI firms, indicating the effectiveness of the VorstAG. However, figure 1 also indicates 
that the effect of the VorstAG wears off by reporting a high growth in 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  for 
EarlyLTI firms in 2013 and 2015. Finally, the graph indicates a somewhat parallel trend in 
the treatment and control group during the pre-treatment period but does not provide 
strong evidence. This concern is analyzed and mitigated in section 4.4 by performing 
placebo tests. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Matching Treated and EarlyLTI German Firms 
In the first part of the analysis, the full difference-in-differences model, depicted in eq. 
(1), is applied on treated German firms and German EarlyLTI firms from 2006-2015. Table 
Figure 1 Absolute Abnormal Cash Holdings, the Level of Cash, and the VorstAG 
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of absolute abnormal cash holdings from 2006 to 2015 for two groups of German 
firms. Firms which introduced long-term compensation incentives before the Act on the Appropriateness of 
Management Board Compensation (VorstAG) became effective in 2009 (EarlyLTI firms) are represented by the blue 
line. Firms which implanted long-term incentives as a result of the VorstAG in 2009 (Non-EarlyLTI firms) are 
represented by the red line. EarlyLTI and Non-EarlyLTI firms are matched with a propensity score matching 
procedure that uses a nearest neighbor heuristic, the common support hypothesis, no replacement, and a caliper of 
0.01.  The matching approach is described in more detail in section 3.1, the absolute abnormal excess cash variable is 
defined in section 3.2. 
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3 exhibits the results of this investigation. Column 1 employs only the difference-in-
differences effect, column 2 interacts this effect with the level of cash, column 3 
incorporates squared cash holdings instead of the interaction term, and column 4 applies 
the interaction term as well as squared cash holdings. 
The results show the VorstAG to decrease absolute abnormal cash holdings, which 
means that the persistence of cash holding policies increases. This effect is primarily driven 
by a decrease in the association between 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 and 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻. 𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡 exhibits a negative 
coefficient when it is not interacted with the level of cash, as shown in column 1. This 
shows that the VorstAG decreases the variability of cash holdings policies overall. The 
effect of the VorstAG is further explained in the subsequent columns. When the interaction 
term 𝐶𝐻 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑑 𝑖𝑡 is added in columns 2 and 4, 𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡 becomes insignificant which indicates 
that the negative effect of 𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡 in column 1 was driven by the interaction between CH and 
𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡 which is represented as a separate effect in columns 2 and 4. 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 has a positive effect 
on 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  and the interaction term 𝐶𝐻 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑑 𝑖𝑡 exhibits a negative coefficient. This 
disentangles the association between 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 and 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  by indicating that the VorstAG 
decreases the positive association between the level of cash and absolute abnormal cash 
holdings. Thus, the negative effect of 𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡 found in column 1 is driven by the VorstAG’s 
effect on the association between 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 and 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  captured in 𝐶𝐻 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑑 𝑖𝑡. 
Consequently, the VorstAG is most effective in motivating more persistent cash holding 
policies in high-cash firms. 
150 
 
 
Predicted Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
DiD - -0.0135*** 0.00444 -0.00561 -0.00445
(-2.71) (0.63) (-1.15) (-0.62)
CH*did - -0.155*** -0.0710*
(-3.58) (-1.86)
treated 0.00490* 0.00239 0.00159 0.00871*
(1.67) (0.51) (0.53) (1.72)
CH + 0.0430* 0.0394 -0.312*** -0.333***
(1.83) (1.35) (-7.79) (-8.41)
CH*VorstAG 0.0311 0.0630***
(1.34) (3.39)
CH*treated 0.0303 -0.0136
(1.02) (-0.49)
CH^2 0.644*** 0.668***
(9.58) (10.23)
logNetA -0.00180** -0.00160** -0.00219*** -0.00223***
(-2.22) (-1.99) (-2.96) (-2.91)
Lev -0.0973*** -0.1000*** -0.0912*** -0.0945***
(-5.09) (-5.32) (-5.00) (-5.16)
Capex -0.0816* -0.0815* -0.0631 -0.0624
(-1.76) (-1.72) (-1.36) (-1.33)
Div 0.140 0.119 0.0378 0.00122
(1.60) (1.37) (0.47) (0.01)
EBIT -0.0735*** -0.0693*** -0.0563*** -0.0552**
(-3.10) (-2.85) (-2.78) (-2.58)
NWC -0.125*** -0.124*** -0.112*** -0.113***
(-9.04) (-9.14) (-8.02) (-7.98)
R&D 0.0487 0.0687 0.0579 0.0739**
(1.12) (1.61) (1.63) (2.10)
M/B 0.00302*** 0.00325*** 0.00274*** 0.00269**
(2.77) (2.95) (2.67) (2.55)
CFsd 0.0787 0.0888 0.140*** 0.144***
(1.33) (1.48) (2.75) (2.82)
Constant 0.151*** 0.148*** 0.169*** 0.169***
(10.20) (9.89) (11.67) (11.41)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
#observations 1546 1546 1546 1546
R-sq 0.202 0.212 0.284 0.291
Adj. R-sq 0.196 0.203 0.277 0.283
Table 3 Intra-German Difference-in-differences regression
This table presents results from the difference-in-differences model introduced in section 3.2, 
eq. (1). The model compares untreated German firms that adopted long-term incentives 
before the VorstAG to German firms that introduced long-term incentives subsequent to the 
VorstAG. The dependent variable, absolute abnormal cash holdings, as well as all moderating 
variables are explained in section 3.2. Column 2 incorporates the interaction of cash holdings 
and the difference-in-differences effect. Column 3-4 add squared cash holdings to the model 
to account for the potential non-linear influence of the level of cash on absolute abnormal 
cash holdings. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by time and 
industry. The corresponding t-statistics are derived via pair cluster bootstrapping as 
suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004), Cameron et al. (2008), and Harden (2011) for studies 
with few clusters. All models include time and industry fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, t-values are shown in parantheses.
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Column 3 and 4 add the squared level of cash to the model to account for the non-linear 
association between 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 and 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  found in table 2. The inclusion of 𝐶𝐻^2𝑖𝑡 makes 
𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡 become insignificant, indicating that the VorstAG partly becomes effective by 
influencing the non-linear association between 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 and 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡, as already 
mentioned in the discussion of table 2. 
 
4.2 Reduced Models 
 A concern regarding the validity of the results presented in section 4.1 is related to the 
control variables contained in the difference-in-differences model. If the VorstAG induces a 
more long-term focus to managerial strategies, this will not only affect the corporate cash 
management but all corporate strategies. Thus, the VorstAG would be correlated with most 
of the explanatory variables employed in table 3, such as 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡, and 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡. The 
variance inflation factors related to the respective models do not identify multicollinearity 
as a major concern. Still, I estimate reduced models to see whether the results hold in 
absence of potentially bad control variables. Table 4 exhibits the results of the Intra-
Germany quasi-natural experiment using reduced models. I either include no control 
variables or vary between 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀/𝐵𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝐹𝑠𝑑𝑖𝑡, and 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑡.  
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This reveals that the VorstAG reduces the variability of cash holding policies in the reduced 
models and confirms the results in tables 3. The reduced form models only investigate the 
overall effect of the VorstAG and are unable to explore the path on which the regulation 
affects the persistence of cash holding policies because 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 is dropped. 
 
4.3 Placebo Testing 
 A further concern that is already raised when figure 1 is discussed is a potential 
violation of the assumption of parallel trends. A difference-in-differences analysis assumes 
that the treatment and control group develop in a parallel trend during the pre-treatment 
period. On this basis both groups are predicted to continue this parallel trend in absence of 
the treatment, i.e. the treatment is the reason for diverging trends during the post-
treatment period. The parallelism can be tested formally by undertaking a placebo test. 
This means focusing exclusively on the pre-treatment period and introducing a placebo 
treatment during this period. 
 I restrict my sample to the time-period from 2006-2008 and assume a placebo 
treatment to become effective in 2008. In the first step, I use the reduced models from table 
4 for placebo testing. Table 5 exhibits the associated results which reveal no significant 
effect of the placebo treatment. This provides a confirmation of the parallel trends 
assumption. The effect of the VorstAG found in tables 3 and 4 does not coincide with an ex-
ante difference between the treated German firms and EarlyLTI firms. 
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Table 6 Full Placebo Difference-in-Differences Regression
Predicted Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
DiD - -0.000732 0.000475 0.00263 0.00397
(-0.09) (0.04) (0.32) (0.31)
CH*did - -0.0596** -0.0493***
(-2.27) (-3.48)
treated -0.000970 -0.00100 -0.00605 0.00555
(-0.18) (-0.18) (-0.99) (0.77)
CH + 0.0329 -0.000335 -0.383*** -0.404***
(0.96) (-0.01) (-4.28) (-4.72)
CH*VorstAG 0.0602** 0.0556*
(2.20) (1.79)
CH*treated 0.0293* -0.0466**
(1.89) (-2.71)
CH^2 0.652*** 0.689***
(7.27) (7.20)
logNetA -0.00105 -0.000750 -0.00357** -0.00274*
(-0.67) (-0.50) (-2.70) (-1.99)
Lev -0.160*** -0.168*** -0.153*** -0.166***
(-5.41) (-5.91) (-4.54) (-5.06)
Capex -0.121* -0.116* -0.0846 -0.0761
(-1.93) (-1.82) (-1.46) (-1.36)
Div 0.191* 0.168 0.138** 0.113
(1.85) (1.21) (2.38) (1.14)
EBIT -0.108*** -0.109*** -0.0745*** -0.0719***
(-3.99) (-4.00) (-3.60) (-3.57)
NWC -0.130*** -0.128*** -0.134*** -0.136***
(-4.74) (-4.40) (-4.79) (-4.60)
R&D -0.0177 -0.0296 0.0183 0.00241
(-0.20) (-0.32) (0.26) (0.04)
M/B 0.00217* 0.00261** 0.00195* 0.00239**
(1.89) (2.19) (1.96) (2.15)
CFsd 0.0415 0.0436 0.0973* 0.125**
(0.69) (0.77) (1.80) (2.48)
Constant 0.192*** 0.194*** 0.227*** 0.225***
(10.61) (10.75) (7.78) (8.24)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
#observations 453 453 453 453
R-sq 0.310 0.315 0.433 0.444
Adj. R-sq 0.291 0.291 0.416 0.424
This table presents results from the replication of table 3 but uses a different definition of the 
pre- and post-treatment period. The smaple period is 2006 to 2008 and excludes the real post-
treatment periods (2009-2015). The placebo treatment is assumed to occur in 2008. The 
placebo pre-treatment periods is 2006-2007 and the post-treatmentperiod embraces 2008.  
The dependent variable, absolute abnormal cash holdings, as well as all moderating variables 
are explained in section 3.2. Column 2 incorporates the interaction of cash holdings and the 
difference-in-differences effect. Column 3-4 add squared cash holdings to the model to account 
for the potential non-linear influence of the level of cash on absolute abnormal cash holdings. 
Standard errors are heteroskedasticiy-robust and clustered by time and industry. The 
corresponding t-statistics are derived via pair cluster bootstrapping as suggested by Bertrand et 
al. (2004), Cameron et al. (2008), and Harden (2011) for studies with few clusters. All models 
include time and industry fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.1 levels, t-values are shown in parantheses.
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I repeat the placebo test with the full models based on table 3. Results are exhibited in 
table 6. Again, 𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡 does not have an effect on 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  in any of the model 
specifications. The interaction 𝐶𝐻 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 decreases 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 . However, the full effect of 
the VorstAG is captured by aggregating the effect of 𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡 and 𝐶𝐻 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 which does not 
yield a significant influence on 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 as column 1 shows. Thus, this provides further 
indications for the absence of a violation of the parallel trends assumption. 
 
4.4 Robustness of Matching 
 A central factor that influences the results of this investigation is the matching 
procedure’s specification. I report results for the most cautious set-up of the propensity 
score matching, using a caliper of 0.01, no replacement and applying the common support 
condition. In an analysis of robustness, I test numerous variants of the specification set-up 
for the models used in table 3: First, employing the common support condition and not 
allowing replacement. Second, prohibiting replacement as well as not introducing the 
common support condition. Third, allowing replacement and using the common support 
condition. Fourth, allowing replacement and not using the common support requirement. 
All specifications are tested for different calipers: 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, and 0.99. The caliper 
specification of 0.99 essentially means not requiring the matches to lie within a specific 
caliper. Table 7 tabulates the results of the described analysis of robustness. The 
observation that the VorstAG overall decreases 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 , which means increasing the 
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persistence of cash holding policies, as well as the negative influence of the VorstAG on the 
association between the level of cash and absolute abnormal cash holdings is found 
consistently throughout the vast majority of different variants of the matching procedure. 
The results hold for the most conservative calipers (0.01 and 0.02). Some associations 
become less significant when the caliper is further relaxed (0.05 and 0.99) which means 
including worse matches. 
 
 
caliper 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.99
-0.0135*** -0.0109** 0.0124*** -0.0115**
(-2.71) (-2.01) (3.60) (-2.15)
-0.155*** -0.172*** 0.0152 -0.157***
(-3.58) (-3.33) (0.93) (-3.11)
-0.0138*** -0.00983* -0.0111** -0.0113**
(-2.82) (-1.89) (-2.21) (-2.18)
-0.158*** -0.188*** -0.152*** -0.150***
(-3.72) (-3.71) (-3.21) (-3.09)
-0.0148*** -0.0123** -0.00949 -0.0111*
(-2.64) (-2.04) (-1.53) (-1.82)
-0.192*** -0.229*** -0.241*** -0.236***
(-4.29) (-4.65) (-4.95) (-4.94)
-0.0135*** -0.00837 -0.0111** -0.0115**
(-2.71) (-1.35) (-2.16) (-2.15)
-0.155*** -0.248*** -0.148*** -0.157***
(-3.58) (-5.02) (-3.10) (-3.11)
DiD
CH*did
Table 7 Robustness of Matching Specification
Common support requirement, no replacement
DiD
No common support requirement, no replacement
Common support requirement, with replacement
No common support requirement, with replacement 
This table presents results of testing how the the matching procedure's specification influences the results 
of the differene-in-differneces regression in table 5. The table exhibits the coefficients and t-value of DiD 
and CH*did, obtained from the model specificied in table 3. DiD is obtained from a replication of the 
column 1 in table 3. CH*did is obtained from a replication of column 2 in table 3. The columns of table 7 
indicate different calipers that were used during the matching procedure of the replication. The lines 
indicate differences in the application of the common support requirement and in allowing the multiple 
usage of international firms as matches. Standard errors are heteroskedasticiy-robust and clustered by 
time and country. The corresponding t-statistics are derived via pair cluster bootstrapping as suggested by 
Bertrand et al. (2004), Cameron et al. (2008), and Harden (2011) for studies with few clusters. The 
underlying regression model includes time and industry fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, t-values are shown in parentheses.
CH*did
DiD
CH*did
DiD
CH*did
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5. Are more persistent cash holding policies always beneficial? 
The previous analysis assumes that more persistent cash holding policies are generally 
beneficial. It is unclear if there is an optimal level of persistence, i.e. if having a too 
persistent cash holding policy can harm the value of cash and firm value. I investigate this 
question by applying the classic value-of-cash model by Pinkowitz/Williamson (2006) 
depicted in eq. (3): 
 
𝑀
𝐵 it
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 × 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽4 × ∆
𝑀
𝐵 𝑖𝑡+1
+ 𝛽5 × 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 × ∆𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 × ∆𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽8 × ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽9 × ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽10 × 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 × ∆𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽12 × ∆𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽13 × 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽14 × ∆𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15 × ∆𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽16 × 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17 × ∆𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽18 × ∆𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡+1 
+𝛽19 × 𝐹𝐹12𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽20 × 𝐹𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (3) 
This model is estimated for all listed German firms from 2006-2015. The VorstAG-
setting is not employed because the introduction of the regulation only changes the 
persistence of cash holding policies but not how investors perceive persistent cash 
holdings. All variables are obtained from Compustat Captial IQ Global and calculated as 
defined in section 3.2. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 equal interest (XINT) expenditures scaled by total assets. 
The prefix ∆ indicates a change variables. Thus, ∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 and ∆𝑋𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡+1 −
 𝑋𝑖𝑡. 
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Predicted Sign (1) (2) (3)
- 0.605* 0.343 1.611***
(1.78) (1.01) (3.33)
- 1.491*** 3.216***
(3.33) (3.72)
-7.225***
(-2.75)
-0.539*** -0.537*** -0.537***
(-7.82) (-7.85) (-7.88)
-1.777** -1.643** -1.529**
(-2.61) (-2.43) (-2.27)
3.155*** 3.183*** 3.115***
(3.87) (3.91) (3.81)
2.958*** 3.050*** 3.133***
(3.98) (4.17) (4.31)
0.590** 0.597** 0.588**
(2.15) (2.22) (2.18)
1.169*** 1.167*** 1.128***
(3.43) (3.42) (3.29)
7.500*** 7.638*** 7.455***
(6.36) (6.45) (6.09)
-3.705* -3.598* -3.777*
(-1.74) (-1.73) (-1.79)
0.168 0.310 0.407
(0.08) (0.15) (0.20)
24.21*** 23.79*** 23.45***
(13.06) (12.65) (12.45)
-4.325* -4.466* -4.270*
(-1.84) (-1.87) (-1.79)
10.52*** 10.02*** 10.74***
(4.04) (3.73) (4.15)
25.29*** 25.46*** 27.95***
(6.77) (6.80) (7.27)
2.463 2.293 2.025
(0.46) (0.43) (0.38)
22.58*** 22.49*** 23.97***
(3.04) (3.01) (3.20)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
#observations 3318 3318 3318
R-sq 0.303 0.305 0.308
Adj. R-sq 0.296 0.298 0.300
Table 8 The Value of Cash and Absolute Abnormal Cash
This table presents results from the value-of-cash model based on 
Opler/Pinkowitz (2007) introduced in section 5, eq. (3). The dependent 
variable, which is the market-to-book ratio, and all explanatory variables are 
defined in section 5 and section 3.2. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-
robust and clustered by time and industry. The corresponding t-statistics are 
derived via pair cluster bootstrapping as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004), 
Cameron et al. (2008), and Harden (2011) for studies with few clusters. All 
models include time and industry fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, t-values are shown in 
parantheses.
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Table 8 tabulates results for the application of the value-of-cash model presented in eq. 3 
on the full sample of listed German firms. Column 1 represents the standard model 
according to Pinkowitz/Williamson (2006). Column 2 adds 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 to the model and 
column 3 includes the interaction term 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡. Column 1 corresponds to the 
general notion in the literature and reports the value of cash to be smaller than 1. This 
indicates that cash holdings destroy firm value. The significant effect of 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 is lost in 
column 2 which shows that the overall effect of the cash level depends on the persistence of 
cash holdings policies. Including the interaction term in column 3 disentangles this 
association further. 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  affects firm value positively, while 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻 ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 
features a negative coefficient. This points out that 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  does not have a negative 
association with firm value in general. Instead, 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  is negatively associated with 
the market value of cash, i. e. more variable cash holding policies reduce the value of the 
cash stock. 
Table 9 separates the sample in 10 sub-samples that correspond to the yearly level of 
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 . Columns 1-3 contain firms with 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  smaller or equal to the 10th 
percentile. Columns 4-6 regard a sub-sample consisting of firms with 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  smaller 
or equal to the 20th percentile but larger than the 10th percentile. Columns 7-9 focus on 
firms with 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  smaller or equal to the 30th percentile but larger than the 20th 
percentile, etc. Columns 4-6 and column 28 show a negative coefficient for 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡. In contrast, 
columns 7-9 exhibit a positive coefficient for 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡. 
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This points out that the positive coefficient of 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 for the aggregated sample that is found 
in table 8 column 1 is largely driven by the positive coefficient found in table 9 columns 7-9. 
Moreover, the negative coefficient of 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 in table 9 columns 3-6, for the group of firms that 
feature 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  smaller or equal to the 20th percentile but larger than the 10th 
percentile, shows that cash holding policies can be too persistent. Moderate levels of 
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐴𝑏𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  do not seem to affect the market value of 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 as they do not exhibit any 
significant overall effects of 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 This study shows that compensation incentives, which are contingent on long-term 
performance, are associated with long-term strategies in corporate cash management. 
Prior research has identified such persistent cash policies to increase the value of cash but 
did not provide means to induce persistence. Thus, this study contributes to existing 
research by identifying long-term incentives as a potential tool to motivate more persistent 
cash holding policies and prevent value destroying cash regimes. Long-term incentives are 
negatively associated with the positive association between the cash level and the 
variability of cash holding policies. This means long-term incentives are associated with the 
implementation of more long-term oriented cash holding policies in high-cash firms. 
 These results help assessing a real effect of a German regulation on incentive-based 
compensation as well as the potential effect of a similar proposed rule in the US. The 
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proposed rule by the SEC and other US agencies aims to avoid “inappropriate risks”, 
leading to “material financial loss”. Inappropriate risks-taking is especially tied to short-
term incentives in executive compensation. Thus, the regulatory proposal is linked to 
motivating long-term strategic planning and increasing long-term incentives. A regulatory 
initiative in Germany, the Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board’s 
Compensation (VorstAG), which became effective in 2009, shares several features with the 
proposed US rule. In general, the German regulation required executive compensation to be 
adequate and customary as well as to motivate a sustainable (long-term) corporate 
development. The VorstAG, forced all publicly listed German firms to adjust their 
managerial compensation contracts. Thus, the VorstAG enforced an increase of long-term 
incentives in the compensation structure of German firms and serves as a suitable setting 
to investigate the association of long-term incentives with the persistence of cash holding 
policies as well as to explore one implication of the proposed US rule.  
 Finally, this study contributes to research on executive compensation in general by 
identifying a real effect of long-term incentives and by addressing some of the endogeneity 
issues affecting prior research. I exploit the VorstAG as a mandatory shock to long-term 
incentives. This lowers the problem of self-selection that affects prior studies focusing on 
the voluntary adoption of long-term incentives and allows more causal inferences. I match 
treated German firms with German firms that used long-term incentives before the 
VorstAG became effective (EarlyLTI). EarlyLTI firms are unaffected by the VorstAG because 
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they did not have to adjust their compensation structures. I compare the persistence of 
cash holding policies of the matched pairs in a difference-in-differences analysis. First, this 
reveals a general increase in the persistence of cash holding policies in treated Non-
EarlyLTI firms after the VorstAG regulation becomes effective. Second, this result is 
especially driven by a decreasing association between the level of cash and the variability 
of cash holding policies. 
Overall, my results provide implications for the design of compensation contracts that 
are relevant to shareholders, regulators, and managers. Increasing the persistence of cash 
management policies increases the market value of cash, as previous research points out. 
Such a persistent long-term policy in cash management is associated with long-term 
compensation incentives, as they are introduced by the VorstAG in Germany. Thus, the 
study emphasizes a real effect of the VorstAG and a real effect of adopting LTIs in general, 
which is not only important for the German regulator and German companies but all firms. 
Moreover, this observation helps to assess a proposed rule on incentive-based 
compensation in the US, which shares several characteristics with the VorstAG. 
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